North Korea: The Death of a Dictator
By S P SETH

The television images of mass grief in North Korea over the death of its dictator, Kim Jong-il, says a lot about the country. While a fair bit of it is a command performance required by the regime, it is not difficult to imagine that many North Koreans might be genuinely sad over the passing of their Great Leader, as he was called. While North Korea is a basket case economically, with many of its people dying of starvation, its population has only known Kim dynasty as the country’s rulers ever since the Peninsula was divided in the aftermath of the WW11. The death of Kim Jong-il, who succeeded his father Kim Il-sung in 1994, does create a vacuum of sorts in a country so structured around the personality cult of its leader. Kim Jong-il’s anointed heir, Kim Jong-un, his third son, is an unknown quantity, having been groomed by his ailing father for only a little over a year before he died. He is very young at about 28 years of age and with little political experience, Kim Jong-un era might be a little rocky, though his lineage is an advantage for him in a country where virtually all authority has percolated down from the ruling Kim dynasty from the beginning.
For a small country with a population of about 24 million, Kim Jong-il’s death has created a lot of flutter in the major capitals of the world. Indeed, both the US and China are equally worried about the political transition in Pyongyang, and their foreign ministers have been in touch to ensure that the political transition there happens peacefully to ensure regional stability. While the US and China might agree broadly about this, they remain distrustful of how a crisis in North Korea might pan out. For China the Korean peninsula is its strategic space, and it regards the United States as an outside power. On the other hand, for the United States, South Korea is its military and strategic ally. Indeed, the two halves of Korea are technically still at war with each other-- the war having ended in an armistice without a peace treaty.
A bit of history to the Korean problem might be in order here. When North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950, the peninsula was not only plunged into a brutal war but also became a theatre of Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Additionally, there was a new China under the leadership of the Communist Party. It felt threatened when the US forces in South Korea started pushing closer toward its border with North Korea. This brought China into the war on behalf of its North Korean neighbor and ally. China’s forces finally pushed the US troops back and the war ended in 1953 with a truce along the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea. The two countries are now separated by a demilitarized zone, more or less eyeballing each other with the not infrequent fear of a military confrontation. Indeed, the sinking of a South Korean naval ship last year, believed to be by a North Korean torpedo, and the shelling of one of its islands, created the fear of a military flare up. The Korean peninsula remains a flash point with the likelihood of the US and China drawn into it by virtue of their alliance relationship--- China with North Korea, and the United States with South Korea.
Things might get even more than usually dangerous in the new situation created by the death of its dictator, Kim Jong-il, and the succession of his inexperienced son, Kim Jong-un. With North Korea’s economy in dire straits, and its political transition worrisome, there are fears that the country might collapse from within. If this were to happen, it would pose serious challenges for regional stability. For instance, China might be faced with the prospect of a large influx of refugees from across a crumbling North Korea. The same will be true of South Korea. For South Korea, the bigger challenge/danger will be to prepare for a possible unification of the Korean peninsula in the event of a North Korean collapse.
Even with South Korea’s relatively strong economy, the economic cost of integrating North Korea will be prohibitive. Germany’s example is instructive, but the West German economy was much larger and it wasn’t facing a precarious strategic situation: not knowing how China will react to such sweeping developments on the Korean Peninsula. With South Korea allied to the US, any unification process under South Korean terms and patronage will make the unified country a military ally of the United States. The prospect of having US troops on its border is unlikely to be acceptable to China. China, therefore, will seek to perpetuate the new political order in Pyongyang under the nominal or effective leadership of the younger Kim. The problem, though, is that even China doesn’t really know the internal workings of the hermit kingdom, as North Korea is called. Therefore, there are more questions thrown up by Kim Jong-il’s death than there are plausible answers.
What is known, though, is that North Korea is an economic basket case, hugely dependent on aid and trade with China. Despite this, Beijing’s political leverage over North Korea seems rather limited. Short of ditching its ally, thus giving the United States a foothold on its border, Beijing cannot afford to wash its hands off the hermit kingdom. This is why it is seeking to enlist the US cooperation in bringing about a peaceful political transition in North Korea to perpetuate the Kim dynasty.
The US interest in North Korea is centered on ridding it of its nuclear capability. China doesn’t favor a nuclear North Korea, but it is against joining the US and its allies for sanctioning North Korea, and worse. It doesn’t want to be a party to upsetting the status quo on the Korean peninsula lest it works against its strategic interest, as earlier discussed. If the political transition in North Korea goes peacefully avoiding an internal collapse, it is likely that the suspended talks for North Korea’s denuclearization might be revived, with Beijing as its venue.
China has played the host in these on-off talks in the last few years, but without much success. This is so because Pyongyang wants to use its nuclear leverage to get the maximum mileage from these talks through a phased process of linking abandonment of its nuclear program with concrete diplomatic, aid and trade concessions from its negotiating partners. On the other hand, the US and its allies would require North Korea to abandon its nuclear program first under a rigorous process of international verification. Only after that Pyongyang will become entitled to diplomatic recognition as well as trade and aid provision. This remains the sticking point, with seemingly no way out.
In any case, the immediate concern for the region and its principal stakeholders, like the US, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea, is the unpredictable nature of how the political transition in North Korea might pan out. Because: any internal implosion has the potential of plunging the region into a turbulent crisis that might involve the US and China on opposing sides. Hopefully, it will not come to that as the world can hardly afford another area of instability and confrontation.