Need for balance in projecting China’s rise
By S.P.SETH
The symbolism of China’s growing power is dramatized in the French President Nicolas Sarkozy‘s recent China visit as an exercise in smoothing relations with that country.
Their relations reached a crisis point in 2008 over a series of events such as protests in Paris over Chinese Olympic torch relays, criticism of China’s human rights in Tibet and, above all, President Sarkozy’s meeting with the visiting Dalai Lama.
Beijing reacted strongly by downgrading economic and political relations with France.
Beijing was apparently telling France and the world that any country officially hosting the Dalai Lama would have to be prepared to stand up to China or else face political and economic sanctions.
Taiwan is the only country that recently managed to squeeze in the Dalai Lama’s visit when it was hit by a typhoon. He had been invited to offer spiritual solace, sought by the affected people and their political leaders who, incidentally, largely belonged to the opposition Democratic Progressive Party.
Understandably, China didn’t want to give President Ma Ying-jeou’s opponents more political fuel to damage the ruling Kuomintang party. President Ma is their best political bet in Taiwan’s competitive political landscape.
But coming back to the French President Sarkozy’s China visit, undoubtedly it is an important symbol of China’s Middle Kingdom syndrome, and an effective exercise of Beijing’s coercive diplomacy.
However, It doesn’t square with the reality of Chinese power and prosperity. In terms of raw military power, the United States still remains the most powerful country in the world.
As for economic prosperity, in per capita terms its people are way behind the West, and Japan, and likely to take a long time to reach there, if ever.
But its spectacular economic growth from a very low base, and the vastness of China, has created the perception of a new superpower likely to overtake the United States in the next two to three decades.
More and more experts and policy makers are coming to this view. Which has led them to argue in favor of accommodating and integrating China increasingly into the framework of the existing international institutions, largely shaped by the United States and Western countries in the post World War 11 period.
This way, it is believed, that the transition to a new world order, with China as its crucial component, might be achieved peacefully.
According to China scholar Marc Lanteigne, “What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers [like Germany and Japan], is that not only is it ‘growing up’ within the milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country’s development of global power status.”
It is true China has made best use of the existing international institutions to exponentially increase exports (though the global economic crisis has limited that prospect), amass trade surpluses of $2.4 trillion (and rising) and significantly increase its international profile.
But, at the same time, it is also true that, when constrained in its role as an emerging global power, it doesn’t feel the need to abide by some accepted international norms. Which is frustrating for international community.
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia best expressed this frustration in a recent speech at the Australian National University (ANU).
He reportedly said, “It doesn’t help, for example, that China associates with regimes around the world that others seek to isolate because of their assault on the integrity of international system—from Sudan to Burma.”
He went on, “China can—and should—do more to support international efforts against destabilizing regimes and on global security challenges such as Afghanistan and Iran”, as well as North Korea.
Beijing is prepared to operate within the multilateral framework of international institutions as long as it suits China.
At the same time it likes the operational flexibility to promote its interests as a competitive centre of power, if not the only centre of power.
Indeed, in recent history, no country with global aspirations has been satisfied with a role within an existing global system. The examples of Germany and Japan are illustrative.
China is already engaged in a wild grab for resources anywhere and everywhere in the world.
And as John Mearsheimer, an American scholar of realpolitik, has written, “If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.”
The first part of China’s story is its spectacular economic growth to eventually become a centre of power.
But there is an important caveat here, which is generally ignored in this big picture.
The caveat is whether a one-party state of China’s size will be able to maintain its monopoly power over a period of time.
We are already seeing signs of widespread social unrest in various forms and in different places, and its suppression with brute state power.
According to Bao Tong, a famous dissident, “Every four minutes there is a protest of more than 100 people” In China. In other words, so many “little Tiananmen” are happening everyday, so says Bao.
But these lack organization. The Party’s greatest fear is that human rights activists and intellectuals might fill the organizational gap at some point when social discontent reaches a critical point.
Hence, there is a systematic suppression of such elements.
But for how long?
There are so many issues agitating the people, from widespread corruption, nepotism, land grab, use of gangsters, particularly by the local and regional authorities, to silence its critics, police brutality, and the list goes on.
To take one example: China’s showcase World Expo in Shanghai reportedly involved clearing 2.6 square kilometers along the Huangpu River.
Which meant moving 18,000 families and 270 factories, including the Jiang Nan Shipyard, which employs 10,000 workers.
Only an authoritarian regime of China’s ilk can spend $45 billion or more for such an event, causing so much distress and suffering to its own people removing them from settled lives and livelihood.
There are so many big and small examples of such scant regard for people, when the government is bent on having its way.
What it means is that anyone making a projection of China’s future and its international status must take into account the fragility of the country’s internal situation.
It is a one-party band with no legitimate channels for people to express their frustration and anger and to seek justice.
In such a situation with anger and frustration constantly building up, and with no safety valve by way of popular forums and institutions to channel people’s wrath, there is every danger of a blow up at some point.
The symbolism of China’s growing power is dramatized in the French President Nicolas Sarkozy‘s recent China visit as an exercise in smoothing relations with that country.
Their relations reached a crisis point in 2008 over a series of events such as protests in Paris over Chinese Olympic torch relays, criticism of China’s human rights in Tibet and, above all, President Sarkozy’s meeting with the visiting Dalai Lama.
Beijing reacted strongly by downgrading economic and political relations with France.
Beijing was apparently telling France and the world that any country officially hosting the Dalai Lama would have to be prepared to stand up to China or else face political and economic sanctions.
Taiwan is the only country that recently managed to squeeze in the Dalai Lama’s visit when it was hit by a typhoon. He had been invited to offer spiritual solace, sought by the affected people and their political leaders who, incidentally, largely belonged to the opposition Democratic Progressive Party.
Understandably, China didn’t want to give President Ma Ying-jeou’s opponents more political fuel to damage the ruling Kuomintang party. President Ma is their best political bet in Taiwan’s competitive political landscape.
But coming back to the French President Sarkozy’s China visit, undoubtedly it is an important symbol of China’s Middle Kingdom syndrome, and an effective exercise of Beijing’s coercive diplomacy.
However, It doesn’t square with the reality of Chinese power and prosperity. In terms of raw military power, the United States still remains the most powerful country in the world.
As for economic prosperity, in per capita terms its people are way behind the West, and Japan, and likely to take a long time to reach there, if ever.
But its spectacular economic growth from a very low base, and the vastness of China, has created the perception of a new superpower likely to overtake the United States in the next two to three decades.
More and more experts and policy makers are coming to this view. Which has led them to argue in favor of accommodating and integrating China increasingly into the framework of the existing international institutions, largely shaped by the United States and Western countries in the post World War 11 period.
This way, it is believed, that the transition to a new world order, with China as its crucial component, might be achieved peacefully.
According to China scholar Marc Lanteigne, “What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers [like Germany and Japan], is that not only is it ‘growing up’ within the milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country’s development of global power status.”
It is true China has made best use of the existing international institutions to exponentially increase exports (though the global economic crisis has limited that prospect), amass trade surpluses of $2.4 trillion (and rising) and significantly increase its international profile.
But, at the same time, it is also true that, when constrained in its role as an emerging global power, it doesn’t feel the need to abide by some accepted international norms. Which is frustrating for international community.
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia best expressed this frustration in a recent speech at the Australian National University (ANU).
He reportedly said, “It doesn’t help, for example, that China associates with regimes around the world that others seek to isolate because of their assault on the integrity of international system—from Sudan to Burma.”
He went on, “China can—and should—do more to support international efforts against destabilizing regimes and on global security challenges such as Afghanistan and Iran”, as well as North Korea.
Beijing is prepared to operate within the multilateral framework of international institutions as long as it suits China.
At the same time it likes the operational flexibility to promote its interests as a competitive centre of power, if not the only centre of power.
Indeed, in recent history, no country with global aspirations has been satisfied with a role within an existing global system. The examples of Germany and Japan are illustrative.
China is already engaged in a wild grab for resources anywhere and everywhere in the world.
And as John Mearsheimer, an American scholar of realpolitik, has written, “If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.”
The first part of China’s story is its spectacular economic growth to eventually become a centre of power.
But there is an important caveat here, which is generally ignored in this big picture.
The caveat is whether a one-party state of China’s size will be able to maintain its monopoly power over a period of time.
We are already seeing signs of widespread social unrest in various forms and in different places, and its suppression with brute state power.
According to Bao Tong, a famous dissident, “Every four minutes there is a protest of more than 100 people” In China. In other words, so many “little Tiananmen” are happening everyday, so says Bao.
But these lack organization. The Party’s greatest fear is that human rights activists and intellectuals might fill the organizational gap at some point when social discontent reaches a critical point.
Hence, there is a systematic suppression of such elements.
But for how long?
There are so many issues agitating the people, from widespread corruption, nepotism, land grab, use of gangsters, particularly by the local and regional authorities, to silence its critics, police brutality, and the list goes on.
To take one example: China’s showcase World Expo in Shanghai reportedly involved clearing 2.6 square kilometers along the Huangpu River.
Which meant moving 18,000 families and 270 factories, including the Jiang Nan Shipyard, which employs 10,000 workers.
Only an authoritarian regime of China’s ilk can spend $45 billion or more for such an event, causing so much distress and suffering to its own people removing them from settled lives and livelihood.
There are so many big and small examples of such scant regard for people, when the government is bent on having its way.
What it means is that anyone making a projection of China’s future and its international status must take into account the fragility of the country’s internal situation.
It is a one-party band with no legitimate channels for people to express their frustration and anger and to seek justice.
In such a situation with anger and frustration constantly building up, and with no safety valve by way of popular forums and institutions to channel people’s wrath, there is every danger of a blow up at some point.
