Xi Jinping’s China

S P SETH

The Party is over—that is the 19h National Congress of the Communist Party of China. It was done with fanfare, though it was widely expected to deliver a thumping endorsement of Xi Jinping, now in the same league as Mao Zedong. It was sad to see his predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, trailing behind Xi in the staged procession on the dais looking like pathetic figures from a distant past acknowledging, by their presence, their downgrading and by the same act bestowing even greater legitimacy on the new order enshrining Xi’s pre-eminence. At one time, in the TV pictures, Hu Jintao sought to talk to XI about something or the other but the new ‘emperor’ just had no time for his immediate predecessor.

From all the accounts of Xi’s great achievements in the five years he has been the general secretary of the CPC and president of China, it would appear that the intervening period between Deng Xiaoping’s death and Xi’s ascension was time lost. And before the party conference, there was a lot of build up to highlight all these achievements. Indeed, an advertising supplement from Chinese authorities in the Sydney Morning Herald featured a report of an entire exhibition at the Beijing Exhibition Hall on September 25. The report said, “The exhibition showcased the country’s progress over the past five years under the leadership of the CPC with Mr Xi as the core.” With Xi at the “core”, he is now the personification of the CPC and, for that matter, the state because the two tend to be indistinguishable. And he has a Dream to make China great again.

Xi Jinping now has his own, “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” enshrined in the Party constitution. And this will be: “A guide to action for the entire party and all the Chinese people to strive for.” And with this as a guide, China will achieve global leadership by the middle of the century, with CPC still at the helm of affairs. There will be none of this ‘nonsense’ about Western democracy, human rights, freedom of speech and that kind of stuff. China will strive for social stability and orderly growth.

In his speech to the National Congress, Xi sought to broadly lay down China’s broad trajectory. He said that now that China had met the basic needs of its people, it would next work to become a “great modern socialist country” and, by 2035, a global leader in innovation. A second phase, of becoming a global leader in “national strength and international influence”, would take until the middle of the century.

This will go hand-in-hand with transitioning China from rapid growth to high quality development. Which would mean integrating advanced manufacturing, internet, big data and artificial intelligence into the “real economy.” In all this hoopla, there was no mention of the other China of nearly 500 million people, about 40 per cent of China’ population, that live on less than $5.50 per day, according to the World Bank.

China has undoubtedly made great economic strides. But it is necessary to keep a balanced perspective, as pointed out by the governor of People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiochuan, who has reportedly said, “If we are too optimistic when things go smoothly, tensions build up, which could lead to a sharp correction, what we call ‘Minsky moment’”, referring to the late American economist, Hyman Minsky who cautioned against too much money in the system fueling speculation that might lead to financial collapse. Zhou said that China’s debt was very high. According to the World Bank, China’s overall debt to GDP ratio, both public and private, was 304 per cent. Which led financial rating agencies, Moody and Standard and Poor to downgrade China’ sovereign debt rating.  

Be that as it may, China is determined to push ahead. In the area of global fight against climate change, for instance, Xi promised a “revolution in energy production” by building an energy sector that was “clean, low carbon, safe and efficient”. At a time when Trump is dumping climate change and open markets, China is promoting its credentials.

XI was very emphatic on the question of safeguarding China’ sovereign interests with a modernizing military force. He said that, “No one should expect China to swallow anything that undermines its interests…”, like China’s “steady progress” of construction of islands in the South China Sea. Dwelling on China’s  “core” national assets, Xi issued a warning against Taiwan’s independence in any form.

Within the country, he announced the continuation of the anti-corruption campaign, which has helped to get rid of his political foes.

And as of now, with the Party Congress now over, Xi is the undisputed ruler of China, with a Standing Committee and Politburo ready to do his bidding. Indeed, he has not even chosen or announced his political successor who, by convention, should succeed him after his second term, in 2022. Which has given currency to the view that Xi might choose to stay on as the party’s general secretary and the country’s president for an indeterminate period.

During Xi’s presidency, what has perhaps attracted most attention internationally is his much trumpeted One Belt, One Road project to connect the world through a network of road, rail, air, and maritime channels, with all ending up in China. It is the new vision to revive China’s glory as part of the Chinese Dream, with China once again as the Middle Kingdom. With China prepared to lend money for many of these incipient projects, it has excited interest and excitement among some countries.

But Australia has chosen to stay out of it for strategic reasons.  Interestingly, Lobsang Sangay, who was elected Tibet’s political leader by Tibetan diaspora some years ago, evoked his homeland’s example as a warning to the misplaced enthusiasm about this much hyped up Chinese project. Speaking recently at the National Press Club here in Canberra, he reportedly cautioned Australia, and by implication other countries, against the Chinese sponsored One Belt, one Road project, citing Tibet as a case study of how it was annexed through one such highway project. Sangay’s address is worth quoting at some length.

He said, “If you understand the Tibetan story, the Chinese government [before the military takeover in the fifties] started building a road—our first ever highway in Tibet.

“Now we were promised peace and prosperity with the highway, and our parents and grand parents joined in building the road… so my parents told me the Chinese soldiers with guns were so polite, so nice, the kids used to taunt them and taunt them, they always smiled… Then they built the road.

“Once the road reached Lhasa—the capital city of Tibet--- first trucks came, then tanks came. Soon, Tibet was occupied.”

He continued, “Then another strategy they deployed was divide and rule, co-opting our ruling elite… They were paid, I think, in Australian context, huge consultation fees [a reference to how China is using this strategy in Australia to co-opt some of its elites].”

He elaborated: “So what you see in Australia and around the world—co-optation of ruling elites, getting high consultation fees, business leaders supporting the Chinese line of argument---we have seen all that in Tibet. It started with the road. So that was the consequence of One Belt, One Road in Tibet.” And now it will be the world. Sixty-eight countries reportedly have signed up with the Chinese project and Beijing is lining up more countries. The estimated cost is anywhere from $1 trillion to 4 trillion.

Take Pakistan’s case. The Dawn newspaper exposed a detailed 231-page Chinese plan for its 15-year infrastructure roll out in Pakistan. Dawn’s Khurram Husain described it (as quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald}, as “a deep and broad-based penetration of most sectors of Pakistan’s economy as well as its society by Chinese enterprises and culture.”

  

China and the Asia-Pacific region

S P SETH

From China’s viewpoint, South China Sea is virtually its waterway. Beijing has claimed sovereignty over its island chains, and reinforced it with building military structures and facilities over old and newly dredged islands. Surely, the US is challenging this with occasional naval patrols to assert the right of freedom of navigation. This tends to outrage China.  Some regional countries contest China’s sovereignty, but they have been effectively silenced with its overwhelming military power, its dominant trade and investment role in regional economies and due to regional disunity.

Take the case of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has ceased to be effective as a regional voice because some of its member nations are beholden to China for economic and political reasons. The Philippines, which had its sovereignty claim vindicated by the international judicial process, simply decided not to pursue it, as President Rodrigo Duterte sought friendly ties with China for economic and political reasons. With other regional countries, like Vietnam, China’s military prowess seems to be prevailing.

Indonesia is also a sovereignty contestant with China in South China Sea. But it has generally sought to avoid public controversy, believing that its case is self-proven. But this is far from the case. Jakarta has lately sought to assert its position.  As Joe Cochrane of the New York Times recently reported from Jakarta, “Indonesia’s increasingly aggressive posture in the region—including a military build up in its nearby Natuna Islands and the planned deployment of naval warships—comes as other [regional] nations are being more accommodating to China’s broad territorial claims in the South China Sea.” Indeed: “The two countries had three maritime skirmishes in 2016, involving warning shots, including one in which Indonesian warships seized a Chinese fishing boat and its crew.”

China is not amused and has said that its nine-dash line that delineates its sovereignty claims in South China Sea does include “traditional fishing grounds” within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. How far Indonesia will go to press and pursue its claims would remain to be seen, as Jakarta is dependent on China for investments and trade, not to speak of China’s military power. But at a time when China is, more or less, becoming the accepted regional heavyweight, Indonesia’s public airing of its sovereignty dispute with China is intriguing.

China appears to be getting used to the idea of being the dominant regional power, though the US now and then has been challenging its claims “with naval maneuvers through waters claimed by Beijing.” Indonesia is now taking up the issue, which is not helpful to China’s claim to regional primacy. There is always the prospect of a regional alliance as a counterweight to China’s dominance. It already exists in a way as Japan and Australia are US allies. Even though these alliances are not primarily directed against China, they claim to maintain regional stability and security. With Japan, China has sovereignty dispute in East China Sea and there have been some close naval encounters between them. The US has indicated that it stands by Japan, though in what circumstances and what shape it might take is not quite clear.

Another regional country that often annoys China is Australia with its security alliance with the US. Even though Australia and China do not have any sovereignty dispute like some other regional countries, Canberra is concerned about Beijing’s regional forays into South China Sea as likely to upset existing regional order that has served well both in terms of regional security and trade among nations, including China. China’s control of South China Sea and island chains might upend the regional order and that, the argument goes, is in nobody’s interests, including China.

Australia is a strong proponent of this view and favors the continuance of a strong US presence and role, while China is inclined to view the US as an external power meddling in somebody else’ backyard. It is especially galling to Beijing that even though China is Australia’s largest trading partner and an important source of its economic prosperity, Canberra is still refusing to accept what China believes is the new order of things.

Even something like press reports about the possible appointment of Admiral Harry Harris as US ambassador to Australia, has brought a tough response from Beijing. Admiral Harris, as commander of the US Pacific Fleet, according to China’s The Global Times newspaper, is “the most prejudiced and Cold War-minded chief of all US pacific commanders since WW11.” Admiral Harris has publicly spoken against China’s “increasing assertiveness” in the South China Sea, and urged freedom of navigation patrols by US naval vessels to challenge China’ territorial claims. Australia had declined invitation to join the US patrols. Beijing would fear that Admiral Harris as US ambassador might seek to pull Australia into line on this and further reinforce the security alliance between the two countries.

In any case, Australia is too much a part of the US alliance system whether or not it formally participates in freedom of navigation patrols.  Every time Australia’s prime minister or foreign minister is critical of China, Beijing feels compelled to respond angrily. For instance, when Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull recently called upon China to cut off its oil supplies to North Korea to rein in its nuclear program, The Global Times devoted an entire editorial to Turnbull’s “indiscreet” and “absurd” comments, calling Australia a “second class citizen of the West.”

Even though China acts like it is the dominant regional power but such intemperate comments seem to suggest that it is not quite sure if it is a given thing. And with Korean peninsula as the new hot flashpoint, there are all sorts of uncertainties. But that is another story.

North Korea: a disaster in waiting

S P SETH

Some times one gets the feeling that the world is on the edge of a disaster. Just one misstep or miscalculation by the US and/or North Korea and there is the real prospect of a nuclear confrontation. Where it might end or how it might end and what the scale of disaster might be is anybody’s guess. But the dreaded nuclear Armageddon is no longer outside the realm of possibility.

The Korean crisis is nothing new, though its present gravity is new after Donald Trump has become the US president. At its genesis is the acute fear and paranoia of the ruling Kim dynasty, compounded and accentuated by its new dictator Kim Jong-un, that the US is all set to overthrow the regime. And that the only thing standing in its way is Pyongyang’s growing nuclear deterrence and arsenal with the clear signals that North Korea will not hesitate to respond with its nuclear and conventional weapons to inflict maximum damage on the US and its allies, South Korea and Japan.

To give credence to its intent, Pyongyang undertakes more nuclear and missile tests. And with the US nuclear armada circling around the Korean peninsula, joined by Japanese naval ships and an array of military exercises between the US, South Korea and Japan, one can imagine the fear and hysteria of the Kim regime. If one stretches the imagery a bit further, a real military confrontation between the two sides might not seem improbable.

The US is signaling that it is keeping its options open, diplomatic as well as military, to impress on Pyongyang that, short of denuclearization, it has no real alternative. It is blowing hot and cold, with President Trump keeping up the military pressure, reinforced with a recent strong message from Admiral Harry Harris, who heads the US Pacific Command, telling the US Congress that he believed that North Korea’s threats needed to be taken seriously.

He reportedly said that, “In confronting the reckless North Korean regime, it’s critical that we’re guided by a strong sense of resolve.” While conceding that North Korean retaliation to any US strikes could cause many casualties in South Korea, he added that there was the risk “of a lot more Koreans and Japanese and Americans dying if North Korea achieves its nuclear aims and does what [North Korea] has said it’s going to do.” In other words, going by what Admiral Harris said, a pre-emptive strike against North Korea, admittedly with its many resultant casualties, might be preferable to letting North Korea perfect its nuclear and missile arsenal.

However, even to consider such a war is beyond any rational thinking, with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, dying from it. And when this is posited with Pyongyang’s declaration that it would react to “a total war” with the United States with a nuclear war, it is sheer madness.

An important part of the US strategy is to ramp up the pressure on China to bring the Kim regime to its senses by denying it fuel, food and trade outlets. China appears to be tightening some of the screws but, according to reports, the trade between the two countries has actually gone up. Beijing seems to be assuring Washington that it is doing all it can while counseling restraint on the US, fearing that matters could easily get out of control with disastrous consequences. It favors negotiations and is seeking to prevail on the US to move away from military maneuvers with South Korea and Japan that appear to Pyongyang as part of an imminent attack on the country.

At the same time, North Korea is being pressured not to go ahead with a nuclear test and more missiles’ testing.

A temporary easing of the situation might lie in the US easing on its military movements and North Korea halting its nuclear and missile testing. The time thus bought might be used to prepare ground for more in depth negotiations.

The US though would want North Korea to denuclearize first, at least freeze its nuclear program, before any negotiations. The US worry is that unless Pyongyang agrees to renounce its nuclear ambitions before hand, any diplomatic parleys will only give North Korea more time to perfect its nuclear and missile capability to be even more dangerous at a later date.

In other words, there is deep distrust on both sides and unless that distrust is bridged, both sides might hurtle into a deadly confrontation with massive casualties. This is where China comes in but, from all the accounts that are emerging of Beijing doing its bits and more, it is only making Pyongyang more adamant that its security and survival depends on its nuclear deterrence.

Another dimension of this crisis is that China is strongly opposed to the deployment of the US anti-missile defence system in Seoul designed to protect South Korea from a North Korean attack. In China’s view, this will expose it to US surveillance and containment. Beijing is now engaged in punishing South Korea by trade sanctions of sorts by curbing imports from that country.

This is going to become a serious issue as time goes by, unless the newly elected South Korean president, who favours engagement with Pyongyang, is able to prevail upon the US to withdraw the newly installed missile defence system. Which will create complications in US-South Korea relations. And considering that South Korea is almost totally dependent on a US security umbrella against an unpredictable North Korean regime, Seoul might not have much leeway in the matter. There are, therefore, no clear signs of any breakthrough on the Korean question in the foreseeable future, even as the threat of a major conflict is ever present.

The only time that a possible way out seemed to have been attempted was under the Clinton administration in 1990s when North Korea was reportedly promised two nuclear reactors, under strict safeguards, for power generation for North Korea.  In the interim, it was to receive fuel oil.

As part of the deal, North Korea allowed American technicians to remove and safely dispose of irradiated fuel rods from its Yongpyon technicians. But when the promised deal was not implemented, Pyongyang sent the US technicians packing, walked away from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and went ahead with its nuclear weapons program.

Since then, North Korea has hunkered down and become even convinced that its only way of survival is to keep building and perfecting its nuclear armoury.

Note: This was first published in Daily times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au

Has Trump softened with China?

S P Seth

Even though China was right, left and center of Trump’s withering criticism as presidential candidate, that stridency was toned down after he took over as president. We had the dramatics of the phone call from Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen congratulating Trump on his election, considered unusual after the US had established diplomatic relations with China in 1979.

He wanted to use Taiwan as a lever to reset US-China relations, indicating that such a concession on the part of the US must have a quid pro quo. But when Beijing stood fast on its unalterable one China principal, Trump quietly retreated from his much touted position that Taiwan was still somehow an unresolved question. This he did in a February phone call with President Xi Jinping.

And during Xi Jinping’s recent US visit, the first such contact between the Chinese leader and the new US president, there was much pomp and ceremony but very little substance. Everything from South China Sea to China’s unfair trade advantage from currency manipulation remained unresolved, though Trump now believes that China is not a currency manipulator

The Chinese agreed to a “hundred-day-plan”—whatever that means-- to address the trade imbalance but there were no details about how this might be achieved. Indeed, President Trump told reporters after the first round of talks that, “We had a long discussion already. So far I have gotten nothing. But we have developed a great friendship.” Apparently, apart from their “great friendship” the two leaders failed to proceed ahead on any of the contentious issues between their two countries.

However, two important developments happened during and immediately after Xi’s US visit. One was the US missile attack from a naval strike force in the Mediterranean on a Syrian air base from which the Bashar al-Assad regime reportedly earlier launched a chemical attack on rebel held territory (denied by the regime and its Russian backers).

Trump informed President Xi of this attack during their after dinner dessert in a lyrical recounting of its power and pinpoint accuracy against the backdrop of the inhuman chemical attack. The US action, according to Trump, was endorsed by Xi.

Whether or not Xi was approving of the US action is not clear as the Chinese have not commented on this; though they didn’t seem supportive of the Russian position of backing Assad completely indicated by their abstention on the subsequent Security Council resolution.

However, if the naval strike on the Syrian air base was intended to strike awe among the Chinese about the US military power that would be questionable, simply because China is not Syria. What might have surprised the Chinese, and indeed other countries, was the willingness of the new US President to challenge Russia, that was supposed to be a new ally in the war against IS. And that would be worrisome, indicating the impulsive nature of the new President.

Much more relevant for the Chinese is President Trump’s policy towards North Korea, propounded at times on Twitter, as with other important pronouncements, impressing on Beijing to use their clout against Pyongyang as they alone have the power to bring sense to the country’s dictator. And if China failed to do this, the US would act on its own. Considering that the US has moved its naval armada closer the Korean peninsula, the message to Beijing and to the world that the US might act alone is rather apocalyptic.

In an interview with The Financial Times, Trump had this to say: “China has great influence over North Korea. And China will either decide to help us with North Korea, or they won’t.” And: “If they do, that will be very good for China, and if they don’t, it won’t be good for anyone.” Trump continued, “If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will. That is all I am telling you.”

To reinforce Trump’s message, the US ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley, warned that the US would “no longer take excuses from China.” And: “They need to show us how concerned they are. They need to put pressure on North Korea. The only country that can stop North Korea is China…We’re going to say what we think, and we’re going to move the ball and that’s what this is about.”

However, Trump’s tone has lately softened on China. He has said that after talking to President Xi he now has a better understanding of China’s difficult situation. The fact that, despite all the implied threats from the US and pressure from China, Pyongyang still went ahead with its most recent missile test—even though it fizzled out--would indicate that North Korea’s dictator is impervious to threats.

Indeed, Trump has even declared that China is no longer a currency manipulator, which might mean that heat might be taken out of the trade issue, averting fear of a trade war.

Indeed, Trump has said of his Chinese counterpart that, “We have a good relationship, we have great chemistry together.” And he added, “I think his wife is terrific.” In contrast, he said of Russia that, “ We’re not getting along with Russia at all.” He described the relationship with Moscow as having hit “an all-time low.”

China is reportedly happy over reversal of some of Trump’s pronouncements of serious charges about currency manipulation. Shen Dingli, an international relations expert from Shanghai’s Fudan University, went so far as to pronounce that, “He [Trump] will be the best US president for China compared with any previous US president”,  adding that: “He is the most friendly US president ever.”

But with Trump, nothing is certain with many of his pronouncements uttered through social media platforms, suggesting ad hoc policymaking. Just ask the Russians. Not so long ago, Putin was Trump’s political idol in some ways. Now, he looks like being in the doghouse. Trump administration is probably the most unpredictable in the annals of the US history.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo. com.au