China not happy with Australia’s upgraded US ties

By S.P.SETH

During his first China visit recently, Australia’s new foreign minister, Bob Carr, received an earful of Chinese reprimand over the country’s enhanced strategic ties with the United States. With President Barack Obama’s increased focus on Asia-Pacific in the US foreign and strategic priorities, Australia has become even more important in the US scheme of things. As part of this the US will have base facilities in the country’s north and west for deployment of US troops and other assets.

There are also reports that Australia’s Cocos Island in the Indian Ocean might be developed into a base for US surveillance and other activities. There is no doubt that all these developments are designed against a perceived Chinese threat, even though this is formally denied.

China obviously is not happy, believing that Australia is becoming part of the US strategy to contain China. And Bob Car was told unmistakably that China was not impressed with such an outdated throwback to the Cold War era.

Australia’s foreign minister had to do some explaining, not only to China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, but also to Lieutenant General Wei Fenghe, deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, as well as to Wang Jiarui,  director of the International Department of the Communist Party. This was a way of conveying the intensity of China’s concern at government, military and the party levels.

In Bob Carr’s words, “The most objective way of saying it is my three Chinese partners today invited me to talk about enhanced Australian defense co-operation with the United States.”

He added, “ I think their view can be expressed that the time for Cold War alliances have long since past.”

Putting forth Canberra’s viewpoint, Carr explained, “ … that an American presence in the Asia-Pacific has helped underpin stability there and created a climate in which the peaceful economic development ---including that of China, has been able to occur.”

Obviously, Bob Carr’s explanations didn’t cut much ice with his Chinese partners. Australia will now be viewed with even greater suspicion as part of a containment ring, including Japan.

Even though China is now Australia’s largest trading partner, their relationship leaves much to be desired. Ironically, the relationship started to deteriorate sharply under Australia’s then newly elected mandarin-speaking Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, who described himself as “a brutal realist on China.”

He offended the Chinese leadership by publicly advising them to hold dialogue with the Dalai Lama. And it was under him, as  Prime Minister, that Australia’s 2009 White Paper on defense saw China as an increasing threat to regional stability, recommending a significant increase in Australia’s defense profile, including doubling of its submarine fleet.

The tensions increased when Australia granted a visa to the exiled Uighur leader, Rebiya Kadeer, to visit Australia in 2009.

 On top of it all, China was unhappy because its concerted efforts to invest in Australian resource companies were denied, in some cases, on grounds of national interest. The same argument has prevailed more recently against the Chinese communications giant, Huawei’s, seeking to build Australia’s National Broadband Network (NBN).

In its worldwide search to secure resource materials for its economic development, Australia is for China a huge and tempting quarry, not to speak of its vast agricultural lands. China is hungry to get a hold on it for two reasons.

First, of course, is the need for uninterrupted access to needed raw materials. Australia is a stable political and social entity that makes it an attractive proposition.

Second: with its control of Australian resources China will also be able to keep a lid on price rises of these materials, such as iron ore and coal.

As an analogy, Japan’s quest, during WW11, to impose a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere among its neighbors, comes into mind. Though the two situations are different but the goal is identical.

Which is to have access to natural resources and materials to make China into an economically and politically powerful nation. And Australia has plenty of them.

This is where economic and strategic factors converge for China, creating fears in Australia and other regional countries about its intentions.

China looks like creating its own version of the Japanese East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, kind of a new Middle Kingdom. And the regional countries are not looking forward to it.

 It is not just Australia that is seeking insurance against a Chinese threat through enhanced defense ties with the United States; other regional countries are doing it too.

The Philippines, for instance, is presently in a tense military stand off with China over the Scarborough Shoal, with China claiming the whole of South China Sea as its territorial lake. Even though some of the South China Sea Islands are closer to neighboring Southeast Asian countries, as is Scarborough Shoal to the Philippines, China claims everything by virtue of its sovereign claim of the Sea. And it is not prepared to countenance negotiations and/or mediation.

And with its presumed sovereign claim of the South China Sea, Beijing might one day interfere with or impede the freedom of navigation through one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.

As Peter Hartcher, international editor of the Sydney Morning Herald wrote in a recent column, “ Its [China’s] willfulness troubles other countries. Australia is only one of many Asia-Pacific states that looks to US for reassurance in the face of doubts about China’s intentions.”

He adds, “If it angers China, it is within its power to ease those doubts…”

But don’t count on it. On the other hand, China seems intent on going its own way.

US-China tussle for power

By S P SETH

The recent China visit of the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and  Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, was overshadowed by the furore caused following the escape to the US embassy in Beijing of the blind Chinese human rights activist, Chen Guangcheng, to seek asylum. Chen has been a prickly thorn on the government’s side, having internationally embarrassed China by exposing cases of forced abortions and sterilization in the rural areas as part of China’s one-child policy. After serving a 4-year prison term on charges of “sedition”, he was under house arrest when he made a risky escape for asylum to the US embassy. Not surprisingly it caused a crisis of sorts in US-China relations, with Clinton and Geithner right in the middle of it during their visit.

Which only shows the fragility of US-China relations, with Beijing accusing the US of interfering in its internal affairs. However, according to some recent reports, this latest conundrum might be managed, with the Chinese government allowing Chen to go to the US for studies with his wife and two children. It might be a convenient end to a difficult diplomatic crisis. But it would be highly embarrassing for China to allow this, being tantamount to admitting that Chen’s earlier imprisonment on “sedition” charges was a political act.

Even though Beijing is averse to admitting that it has a human rights problem, it does at times say that its human rights situation is improving. Which, by implication, means that there has been a problem in this area. The US obviously pushes this button to promote democracy in China, with tolerance for dissent and freedom. With its economic success, China, however, has increasingly taken a more assertive position, even promoting its path as an alternative model for the world. As the US and China increasingly take opposite positions on a whole host of issues, their disagreement is likely to become shriller, with less scope for peaceful management of their relations.

If diplomacy is the art of managing relations between nations, the US and China will need to work harder. With both keen to assert their primacy in the Asia-Pacific region, the scope for managing their ambitions is likely to become tougher. China has sovereignty claims on South China Sea, it contests maritime boundaries with Japan in the East China Sea, and is having problems with Vietnam, the Philippines and other regional countries over their competing claims in the South China Sea island chains. Which has led to naval incidents between China and some of its Asian neighbors.

Presently, the relations between China and the Philippines are quite tense over the disputed Scarborough shoal, a chain of reefs and uninhabited islands in the South China Sea. The South China Sea is rich in oil, gas and fishery. A Le Monde report has quoted a Chinese study which says that the area could contain the equivalent of 213 billion barrels of oil: 80 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s established reserves. No wonder there are a number of claimants to such potential wealth. China and the Philippines have done some show of military muscles, and the public opinion in the Philippines is quite exercised over China’s blanket sovereignty claim. And it is a US ally.

Although the US is ostensibly not taking sides on these issues, it has further strengthened its strategic ties with the Philippines, Vietnam and other regional countries. Now that the US is disengaging from Afghanistan, it has signaled its intention to become more focused on the Asia-Pacific region. Which hasn’t gone well with China.

Apart from its problematic relations with some of its regional neighbors, China is lately having more than its usual internal tensions; the most recent being the Chen affair. Chen was helped in his escapade to the US embassy by some of his activist friends who are now in trouble with the authorities. The sensitivity of the internal situation was graphically demonstrated following the Arab Spring when the Chinese authorities blocked access on the internet to material regarding popular upsurge in Tunisia and Egypt, fearing a contagion effect in China.

And recently, there was the Bo Xilai affair, when the Chongqing Party boss was removed from all his posts and his wife arrested on suspected murder of a British resident of that city. Bo was starting to threaten the Party hierarchy by raising the banner of revolutionary spirit of the Mao Zedong era. And the embers of the fire, lit by Bo, are not completely extinguished.

It is such sensitivity and resistance to political reform by relaxing the Party’s monopoly over power that gives the US a certain moral and political advantage over China. But this only makes China even more resolute on maintaining and asserting the Party’s control within the country. The Party leadership fears that the US is using democracy and human rights as an attempt to foment internal trouble in their country to the point of destabilizing China. This is another problematic issue in China-US relationship among a number of other issues clouding their relationship.

The core issue is the contest for primacy in the Asia-Pacific region between the US and China. Until now, the US has ruled the waves in Asia-Pacific, as in much in the rest of the world. Militarily, the US is still the most powerful country in the world. In the Asia-Pacific region, though, China is seeking to displace it through a mix of its economic, political and military muscle. Indeed, China believes it is none of the US’ business to be poking around in its neighborhood where, in Beijing’s view, China’s primacy, historically and geo-strategically, is well enshrined. Indeed, from this viewpoint, China’s loss of regional primacy during the last over 150 years was simply an aberration. Therefore, a new and stronger China feels justified to reclaim its old domain… so to say.  Which would explain their sovereignty claims over South China Sea and parts of East China Sea and other bits.

But in a world of nation states, historical claims of dominance by old or new empires are more an obstacle than a solution of contentious issues. This brings China into conflict with some of its regional neighbors, and with the United States as the established dominant power as well as an ally of some of China’s Asian neighbors. One way out of this complex web of relations between China and the United States might be to work out some sort of a mechanism to share power over the head of regional countries. But there are problems here because the regional countries might not like the idea of being a pawn in US-China relations. These countries are not inconsequential, like Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and so on--- not to speak of Japan. They can forge their own alliances/partnerships to sabotage such plans, if they were ever contemplated.

In any case, China or, for that matter, the United States does not look like sharing power except on its own terms. Which essentially would mean that China or the United States will have to make way for the other. China, as the rising power, would certainly not like to give ground on any of its “core” strategic interests. The US, on the other hand, wants China to be a responsible stakeholder, which essentially means that Beijing shouldn’t rock the boat. These are irreconcilable positions, and spell trouble for the region.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.