Saturday, December 21, 2013

More trouble between China and Japan
S P SETH

Since I last wrote on this subject (Daily Times, November 20), the situation has further deteriorated requiring just a spark to ignite a bonfire. I am referring here to the sovereignty dispute between China and Japan over an outcrop of uninhabited rocks jutting out of the East China Sea, which Japan and China respectively call Senkaku and Diaoyu islands. Late last month, China declared an “air defence identification zone” covering a vast swathe of East China Sea over and around the disputed islands, including some in South Korea-claimed maritime zone. What it means in effect is that any foreign aircraft entering China’s zone will be required to notify Chinese authorities of their flight plans as well as maintain radio contact or else face unspecified “defensive emergency measures”.

With Japan adamant about its sovereignty over the disputed islands, China apparently decided to force the issue with its air defence zone. Whether or not this policy was clearly thought through with a follow up Plan B in the event that China’s directive was flouted, is not quite clear. Indeed, the US, Japan and South Korea all decided to ignore the Chinese identification zone by flying their military aircraft without communicating their flight plans, with one important difference though. Which is that the US authorities have advised their civilian airlines to comply with the Chinese directive but insisting that this does not mean the US acceptance of China’s position. Japan, though, has advised its airlines to ignore the Chinese directive. After appearing to fumble on its follow up response, Beijing is slowly refining its approach which is a combination of avoiding any military action while reinforcing their position with scrambling fighter jets and carrying out “routine patrols”. Beijing seems to be conveying the message that it has the capacity to enforce its security environment if it were threatened.

An important motive for China to declare its “air defence identification zone”, apart from putting Japan on notice, likely was to test the limits of the US resolve, in what Beijing considers essentially a bilateral territorial issue between China and Japan. The US has tried not to take a formal position on the sovereignty issue but has acknowledged Japan’s administrative control as well as stating unequivocally that the Senkaku islands are covered under the US-Japan security pact. In other words, the US will be bound militarily to protect Japan if these islands came under attack from China. During his recent Japan visit, later followed by trips to China and South Korea, the US Vice President, Joe Biden, was critical of China’s action as an effort to “unilaterally change the status quo”, saying that it had raised “the risk of accidents and miscalculation.” China, though, has reportedly called the new zone a fact of life that the world needed to accept.

 China’s action has also invited criticism from Australia as a close ally of both the US and Japan. And it invited a strong reaction from Beijing and a stern warning to Canberra to “correct” its mistake and avoid damaging their bilateral relationship. Australia appeared unfazed at the Chinese reaction, with its Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, arguing that Canberra has a stake in the region and therefore, opposes “action by any side [referring obviously to China] that we believe could add to the tensions or add to the risk of a miscalculation in disputed territorial zones in the region.” Indeed, Australia has taken a very strong stand despite some concern that it could seriously affect economic ties with its largest trading partner. But Prime Minister Tony Abbot pointed out “China trades with us because it is in China’s interest to trade with us.”

Abbot has been much more forthright in both emphasizing the centrality of Australia’s defence ties with the US and Japan as well as the dangers arising from China’s unilateral move to change the status quo. To quote Abbot, “We are a strong ally of the United States, we are a strong ally of Japan, we have a very strong view that international disputes should be settled peacefully and in accordance with the rule of law and where we think this is not happening, or it is not happening appropriately, we will speak our mind.” In China’s view, this trilateral US-Japan-Australia nexus amounts to containing China. There is a strong sense in China that a number of regional countries simply can’t stand its rise. As Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Peking University reportedly said, “Whatever China does, it always attracts critics. Let the critics go on, and we’ll do what we do.” He added, “China is going through its rise--- we just have too many jealous neighbours.” In other words, China is not going to worry too much about its neighbours and, for that matter, the United States.

There are two important factors guiding this national view. First is China’s strong sense of humiliation in the past by foreign powers, focusing most on Japan for its wartime crimes. What follows from this is that China must be strong and united and not show any weakness in pursuing its “core” interests, including in the East China Sea. China is, therefore, keen to prove to itself and to the world that it is not going to be trifled with any more, and must re-establish its pre-eminent ‘historical’ role in the region. The problem, though, is that China’s perception of its ‘historical’ role is coming into conflict with the concept and reality of today’s nationalism, which is at the core of international relations. Some of China’s neighbours, that might or might not have been tributaries at one time of China’s Middle Kingdom, as it was then known, are now independent and they contest China’s ‘historical facts’.

In the meantime, the US has been doing some tight rope walking. Its earlier call on China to “rescind” its decision on air flight zone doesn’t appear to have been repeated. On the question of civilian flights, as noted earlier, the US authorities have advised their airlines to notify their flight plans as required by the new Chinese directive, but without conceding China’s territorial position. During his recent visit to Japan, China and South Korea, Biden seemed keen to contain any escalation over over-lapping air defence zones of these three countries. While eschewing any counter-measures, military or otherwise, Biden was at pains to emphasize to its regional allies that the US’ Asia-Pacific “pivot” or rebalancing, as it is now called, remains solid.


In other words, the US nexus of security alliances with its Asian partners remains a corner store of its Asian policy. At the same time, Beijing has been told that US-China relationship is crucial for Asia-Pacific region. These signals might appear contradictory and they are, but the US believes that it can somehow pull through its policy of competing and contending with China while still creating sufficient common ground to maintain peace in the region. It is a herculean task, and if the experience of history is anything to go by, it is unlikely to work over a period of time. 
Note: This article first appeared in the Daily Times.
Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au