Has Trump softened with China?

S P Seth

Even though China was right, left and center of Trump’s withering criticism as presidential candidate, that stridency was toned down after he took over as president. We had the dramatics of the phone call from Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen congratulating Trump on his election, considered unusual after the US had established diplomatic relations with China in 1979.

He wanted to use Taiwan as a lever to reset US-China relations, indicating that such a concession on the part of the US must have a quid pro quo. But when Beijing stood fast on its unalterable one China principal, Trump quietly retreated from his much touted position that Taiwan was still somehow an unresolved question. This he did in a February phone call with President Xi Jinping.

And during Xi Jinping’s recent US visit, the first such contact between the Chinese leader and the new US president, there was much pomp and ceremony but very little substance. Everything from South China Sea to China’s unfair trade advantage from currency manipulation remained unresolved, though Trump now believes that China is not a currency manipulator

The Chinese agreed to a “hundred-day-plan”—whatever that means-- to address the trade imbalance but there were no details about how this might be achieved. Indeed, President Trump told reporters after the first round of talks that, “We had a long discussion already. So far I have gotten nothing. But we have developed a great friendship.” Apparently, apart from their “great friendship” the two leaders failed to proceed ahead on any of the contentious issues between their two countries.

However, two important developments happened during and immediately after Xi’s US visit. One was the US missile attack from a naval strike force in the Mediterranean on a Syrian air base from which the Bashar al-Assad regime reportedly earlier launched a chemical attack on rebel held territory (denied by the regime and its Russian backers).

Trump informed President Xi of this attack during their after dinner dessert in a lyrical recounting of its power and pinpoint accuracy against the backdrop of the inhuman chemical attack. The US action, according to Trump, was endorsed by Xi.

Whether or not Xi was approving of the US action is not clear as the Chinese have not commented on this; though they didn’t seem supportive of the Russian position of backing Assad completely indicated by their abstention on the subsequent Security Council resolution.

However, if the naval strike on the Syrian air base was intended to strike awe among the Chinese about the US military power that would be questionable, simply because China is not Syria. What might have surprised the Chinese, and indeed other countries, was the willingness of the new US President to challenge Russia, that was supposed to be a new ally in the war against IS. And that would be worrisome, indicating the impulsive nature of the new President.

Much more relevant for the Chinese is President Trump’s policy towards North Korea, propounded at times on Twitter, as with other important pronouncements, impressing on Beijing to use their clout against Pyongyang as they alone have the power to bring sense to the country’s dictator. And if China failed to do this, the US would act on its own. Considering that the US has moved its naval armada closer the Korean peninsula, the message to Beijing and to the world that the US might act alone is rather apocalyptic.

In an interview with The Financial Times, Trump had this to say: “China has great influence over North Korea. And China will either decide to help us with North Korea, or they won’t.” And: “If they do, that will be very good for China, and if they don’t, it won’t be good for anyone.” Trump continued, “If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will. That is all I am telling you.”

To reinforce Trump’s message, the US ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley, warned that the US would “no longer take excuses from China.” And: “They need to show us how concerned they are. They need to put pressure on North Korea. The only country that can stop North Korea is China…We’re going to say what we think, and we’re going to move the ball and that’s what this is about.”

However, Trump’s tone has lately softened on China. He has said that after talking to President Xi he now has a better understanding of China’s difficult situation. The fact that, despite all the implied threats from the US and pressure from China, Pyongyang still went ahead with its most recent missile test—even though it fizzled out--would indicate that North Korea’s dictator is impervious to threats.

Indeed, Trump has even declared that China is no longer a currency manipulator, which might mean that heat might be taken out of the trade issue, averting fear of a trade war.

Indeed, Trump has said of his Chinese counterpart that, “We have a good relationship, we have great chemistry together.” And he added, “I think his wife is terrific.” In contrast, he said of Russia that, “ We’re not getting along with Russia at all.” He described the relationship with Moscow as having hit “an all-time low.”

China is reportedly happy over reversal of some of Trump’s pronouncements of serious charges about currency manipulation. Shen Dingli, an international relations expert from Shanghai’s Fudan University, went so far as to pronounce that, “He [Trump] will be the best US president for China compared with any previous US president”,  adding that: “He is the most friendly US president ever.”

But with Trump, nothing is certain with many of his pronouncements uttered through social media platforms, suggesting ad hoc policymaking. Just ask the Russians. Not so long ago, Putin was Trump’s political idol in some ways. Now, he looks like being in the doghouse. Trump administration is probably the most unpredictable in the annals of the US history.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo. com.au

US allies’ rethink China policy

By S P SETH

During his recent state visit to Australia, China’ Premier, Li Keqiang, kept up the gentle pressure on Canberra to draw closer to Beijing. Australia is a US ally in the region an part of the ANZUS alliance. And with China dredging new islands in the South China and building military facilities to claim almost all of its waters, it is clearly upsetting, if not threatening, regional stability and security. And Australia, like most regional countries, has an important stake in regional peace and stability.

China is pushing ahead with its agenda to establish regional dominance by ignoring the rival territorial claims of some of its regional neighbors. Although Australia tries to be neutral on the issue of contested sovereignty in the region as it is not a claimant, it nevertheless wants the issue resolved peacefully through negotiation based on international norms and law. In other words, it is against unilateral action on China’s part to change the realities in South China Sea. Of late, though, even while maintaining principled position of respect for international law and institutions, Canberra appears to be softening its tone.

The reasons for this are not far to seek. An important one is the realty of China’s power. Second, even though the US is talking the talk against China’s projection of power into the region and South China Sea, it has not been able to match the rhetoric with concrete action. True, it has sent a naval ship or two through the Chinese claimed waters, but it has been lacking in any clear resolve to back up Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia doctrine, declared in a 2011 visit to Canberra. Which would require the deployment of bulk of the US navy in the region to send a strong signal to China that the US was still the predominant regional power and was not going anywhere. This gap in rhetoric and practice has only encouraged China to declare a Chinese version of the Monroe doctrine in the region.

With Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States, and despite the initial strident anti-China rhetoric over trade, currency manipulation and South China Sea, Beijing now appears more confident about its narrative that South China Sea and its islands have been historically part of China. It is so confident, on surface at least, that what it is propounding is not just China’s narrative but to promote regional stability. For instance, during his visit here, Premier Li sought to neatly mix together Chinese and regional interests to support China’s activities in the South China Sea.

He said at a press conference, with a straight face, that, “China never has any intention to engage in militarization in the South China Sea.” As for, “China’s facilities on Chinese islands and reefs [a blanket claim of ownership] [these] are primarily for civilian purposes, and even if there is a certain amount of defense equipment or facilities, it is for maintaining the freedom of navigation and over flight in the South China Sea because without such freedom, or without stability in the South China Sea, the Chinese side would be among the first to bear the brunt of it. ”

But the question is: who is posing a threat to maritime traffic through South China Sea? Before China started to build military facilities and claimed much of South China Sea, international trade was largely flowing smoothly through these waters. It is only after China has started to militarize the islands and reefs that the region is experiencing tensions and instability.

With the US seemingly unsure of how to respond to China’s projection of power, some regional countries are seeking their own accommodation with China’s rising power. The Philippines, under President Rodrigo Duterte, is most notable. Malaysia is another case of leaning in that direction. On its own, no individual Southeast Asian country is able to match or challenge China’s military, economic and military power. Indeed, these countries are now, in varying degrees, susceptible to China’s economic pressure with their increasing dependence on trade and investment from China. South Korea is increasingly feeling the pressure of undeclared Chinese blockade of its trade and services exports.

Australia is coming under continuous, though seemingly gentle pressure, to become part of what one might call, China’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. During Premier Li’s visit here, Premier Li was keen to emphasize the positive in their relationship like their growing trade valued in 2015/16 at A$150 billion, with a very healthy surplus in Australia’ favor. Talking of the deal to expand China’s beef market for Australian exports, Prime Minister Turnbull said that, “Australia is the only country in the world with this market access.” Highlighting the growth of investment, Turnbull added that, … we continue to welcome investment from China with the stock of direct investment growing to A$35 billion by the end of 2015…”

Australia, of course, is part of the ANZUS alliance and hence a US ally, but there are increasingly powerful voices within Australia favoring a closer relationship with China. Paul Keating, a former Australian prime minister, made a strong pitch in a national daily for creating stronger bonds with China.

According to Keating, “The ‘pivot’ or ‘stay-as- we- are’ [policy] has meant that the US is seeking to maintain strategy hegemony in the western Pacific, rather than recognizing the rise of China as a legitimate event, and a state now as large as the US itself.”  He argued that as the world has moved to a position of bipolarity with the US and China, Australia should similarly be developing a policy of cooperation with China, and not of “resigned reluctance.”

 On the South China Sea, Keating felt that anxiety over artificial islands was being exaggerated and they were no challenge to Australia. On the other hand, “If Australia were to have a positive strategic policy of engagement with China rather than a negative one, our influence on China’s behavior would be much greater than it is today.”

As for containing China, he attacked advocacy of enhanced strategic ties between the US, Australia, Japan and India, describing this doctrine of “quadrilateralism” as “reckless on an international scale.”

Of course, Keating doesn’t represent the official policy, which still favors US alliance. But he is not alone in advocating a radical reevaluation of relations with China to suit Australia’s interests in view of China’s rise. And this reevaluation process is gaining ground in the region, even more so after Donald Trump becoming the US President. As Christopher Pyne, Australia’ defense industry minister, has said, while reiterating that Australia remained one of US’ closest allies, “every US ally…is considering how that will operate in the next four years.”

email: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au