China’s white paper on defense
By Sushil Seth

China’s new white paper on defense makes the usual points that its defense policy is “defensive in nature”, and that it “will never seek hegemony, nor will it adopt the approach of military expansion now or in the future, no matter how its economy develops.”
But this doesn’t square with its assertion lately of a fairly outright, even outrageous, twenty-first century Monroe doctrine.
For instance, its assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea, ignoring earlier promises of a peaceful dialogue amid competing claims to some of the island chains by its neighbors, was hardly a defensive exercise.
By declaring territories and seas as its sovereign domain and then backing it up with the projection of force and/or diplomatic coercion, is not exactly defensive. It is provocative and aggressive.
And to keep on harping that “China will never seek hegemony” frankly becomes dangerously tedious.
At the same time, a double-digit increase in military expenditure of nearly 13 per cent (on top of similar increases in the past) to estimated $92 billions, doesn’t inspire confidence in China’s “peaceful rise”.
China concedes that the situation in Asia-Pacific region is generally stable but worries about the regional flash points, like the Korean peninsula.
It is important to realize that the instability in Korea is due to the dangerous antics of China’s neighbor and ally, North Korea, for two reasons.
First: Pyongyang’s nuclear policy has introduced a highly combustible element in a regional environment still unresolved since the 1950s Korean War.
Second: to compound it further, North Korea is continuing its policy of dangerous brinkmanship against South Korea.
This is not to suggest that China’s is encouraging Pyongyang on this course.
However, it is not effectively using its considerable leverage with North Korea by way of its political and economic dependence on China.
And unless this is done as part of a strategic consensus between regional powers, including the United States, Korean peninsula will continue to be a dangerous flash point.
The white paper also identifies Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan as challenges because of “separatism”. The first two are self-inflicted.
The unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang arises from China’s harsh policies to obliterate the ethnic and cultural identity of these regions.
It is doing this by changing the ethnic mix in these regions by settling a large number of Han Chinese in these regions.
And it is disallowing or curtailing their language, religious beliefs and practices.
At the same time, Beijing has turned upside down the economies of these regions, with local people denied new economic opportunities.
In other words, China can’t blame the local people for fighting against injustice; even when the odds are so heavily stacked against them
The situation in Taiwan is entirely different. Taiwan is a sovereign state and has sought to forge its destiny as a democratic political entity.
And it has managed to continue on this course despite threats from the mainland, including the targeting of 1000 or more missiles at Taiwan.
China’s insistence that Taiwan is part of China is indeed at the root of all the problems between the two countries. Once China accepts the reality of Taiwan’s separate existence, there will be enormous scope for development of relations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
An encouraging feature in the white paper, particularly after the discord of last year due to China’s aggressive regional posture, is that Beijing is undertaking to pursue a policy of greater military dialogue with the United States.
Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng reportedly said at a news conference: “China attaches importance to its military relationship with the United States…The Chinese military is now taking steps to advance exchanges with the US military this year.”
The relations with the United States had taken a dive after its decision to sell weapons to Taiwan. Beijing retaliated by suspending military exchanges with the United States.
The relationship deteriorated further over a whole range of issues last year; including the US-South Korean joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea.
The problem is that China has come to regard the Asia-Pacific region and its waters as either its sovereign territory or sphere of influence.
Therefore, it is not happy with the United States continuing to assert its political, economic and strategic interests in the region along with its allies.
With China so keen to assert its regional primacy, the US’ determination to maintain a strong commitment to the region, doesn’t square well with Beijing’s ambitions.
This is what Colonel Geng Yansheng apparently meant when he reportedly said at a news conference that “there is no denying that in developing military relations [with the U.S] we still face difficulties and challenges.”
Indeed they do because the United States is not likely to make it easy for China to create a new Middle Kingdom in Asia-Pacific.
Beijing has to realize that a cooperative relationship between the United States and China is a prerequisite for regional stability and prosperity.
The problem, though, is that China has come to believe that the United States is a declining power.
At the same time, they also believe that China is a rising superpower and there should be no compromising on this goal.
Beijing might entertain tactical shifts to better advance their ultimate goal but without losing sight of it.
If that were the case, the US-China relationship is unlikely to enter a cooperative phase except for China’s tactical reasons.
China might be over-reaching itself in seeking to edge out the United States from Asia-Pacific.
It has tremendous internal problems and contradictions. The way it is engaged in rooting out dissidence—the most prominent recent example being the detention of the famous artist, Ai Weiwei—and censoring all access and reference to the Middle Eastern popular uprisings, is indicative of the fragility of the regime.
Beijing might, therefore, be well advised to spend more energy on political reforms at home than crafting an expansive defense policy to assert its dominance.

A post-Dalai Lama blueprint for Tibet

By Sushil Seth
The Dalai Lama recently announced that he would be relinquishing his political role as head of the Tibetan government-in-exile based in the Indian hill town of Dharamsala.
The Dalai Lama is the spiritual and political head of the Tibetan people. While he will still continue to be the spiritual leader, a new elected prime minister will soon take over the political role.
Obviously, the Dalai Lama is conscious of his mortality and is taking steps to split the two roles to ensure that the struggle for Tibetan identity doesn’t live and die with him.
This move will upset China, even though Beijing might ignore it on surface.
The next step probably will be the anointment of a new Dalai Lama, who will take over as his successor.
The formality of finding one after his death in the traditional way might have to be dispensed with because Tibet is under Chinese rule
Indeed, Beijing is waiting for the Dalai Lama to die, enabling them to find a new one to fit into their mould.
The Dalai Lama is acutely aware of this, which explains why he would be keen to make arrangements for his political and spiritual succession.
This is important because his successors, both in their political and spiritual roles, will carry his enormous moral authority.
China obviously hopes that with the passing away of the Dalai Lama in the not-too-distant future, the Tibetan issue will fade away and eventually disappear.
They believe that as China continues to grow in power, the Tibetan cause will have fewer and fewer supporters among the comity of nations for fear of offending China.
And it will help when the Dalai Lama is no longer on the scene.
His charisma, charm and sincerity have kept the Tibetan issue alive and kicking.
China, therefore, believes that Tibet will lose whatever appeal it might still have with people all over the world when the Dalai Lama is not around.
Which is shortsighted. Indeed the Dalai Lama has sought, over the years, to resolve the issue of Tibet’s status peacefully by seeking autonomy, not independence.
Through many hours of fitful talks over the years between his representatives and China, his demand has been for internal autonomy with Beijing in control of its foreign and defense affairs.
With internal autonomy, Tibetans should be able to maintain their ethnic and cultural identity.
Which is not too much to ask, and Beijing shouldn’t have problem with it.
But it does.
First: they don’t trust the Dalai Lama as he seeks some political and cultural space for his people without challenging China’s sovereignty.
Beijing simply wants submission with the right to define and regulate how the Tibetans should and would live within their own territory. This is precisely what they are doing now.
Because the Dalai Lama seeks better terms for his people, he is denounced as a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’.
Therefore, China has never been serious about talks with the Dalai Lama’s representatives to resolve the Tibetan issue.
Indeed, a solution on the basis of genuine autonomy will be a lasting one with the imprimatur of the Dalai Lama’s moral authority and acceptable to the Tibetan people.
But China is not concerned with the moral and popular dimensions of the Tibetan cause. They have been busy all these years to cut at the roots of such considerations.
For instance, they have sliced and spliced Tibet, with parts of it joined to the neighboring Han-dominated provinces. Thus, Tibet proper is now a shrunken area.
Its population of 6 million is now scattered around, to reduce the Tibetan potential to create ‘trouble’.
What is left of Tibet is now mixed up with the Han Chinese, settled there in large numbers with incentives.
In this way, the Tibetans will soon become a minority in their own geographical space, if it hasn’t already happened.
As it is, there are severe restrictions on their cultural space to limit the learning of their language, practicing their religion and observance of their traditions.
It is hoped that, over time, they will cease to be a distinct entity except for ceremonial purposes when the state wants to exhibit them as part of China’s “harmonious” society.
The character of Tibet’s economy has changed so drastically that, short of assimilation, they will remain marginalized to live a miserable existence.
They are now subject to so much surveillance, both electronic and through the massive presence of security forces, that they live in fear.
China’s leadership tends to resort to over-kill, both figuratively and metaphorically, when they fear rupture of their so-called “harmonious” society.
And they have an aversion to peaceful dialogue to sort out national issues.
They fear that such an approach will open a Pandora’s box of unresolved issues with their people.
Which explains their paranoia of the people’s revolution in the Middle East overtaking China, if people were exposed to the news from that part of the world.
Tibet has been at the receiving end of this paranoia for many years.
China’s oligarchs believe that if they decide that a problem doesn’t and shouldn’t exist, it bloody well will be swept away by the brute use of power.
But with Tibet, the unrest continues to erupt in big or small ways despite all the repression in that region. It keeps coming back to haunt China.
As Pico Iyer has quoted the Dalai Lama in his article for the New York Review of Books: “Manpower, military power, monetary power, that is already there in China.”
What is lacking, though, “is moral power, moral authority”.
And without that, at a deeper level there is a big vacuum. And that is where the old Tibetan Buddhist traditions could help.
But try telling this to the Chinese leadership, especially associating it with the Dalai Lama.
China’s leaders are drunk with power. They have no time for morality and tranquility.
Tibet for them is just a sideshow.
But they don’t realize that sideshows too can occupy centre stage when the central authority is weakened, as happened so often in Chinese history.
The replacement of the Dalai Lama’s political power by a secular democratic government will become a legitimate organ of channeling Tibetan identity both among the exiled Tibetans and those at home.
And once, he has also designated his spiritual successor, the struggle for Tibetan autonomy will be set for the post-Dalai Lama period.
On surface, China might prefer to ignore it.
But arrangements for institutional succession are important for Tibet, especially when they carry the Dalai Lama’s imprimatur.

A post-Dalai Lama blueprint for Tibet

By Sushil Seth

The Dalai Lama recently announced that he would be relinquishing his political role as head of the Tibetan government-in-exile based in the Indian hill town of Dharamsala.

The Dalai Lama is the spiritual and political head of the Tibetan people. While he will still continue to be the spiritual leader, a new elected prime minister will soon take over the political role.

Obviously, the Dalai Lama is conscious of his mortality and is taking steps to split the two roles to ensure that the struggle for Tibetan identity doesn’t live and die with him.

This move will upset China, even though Beijing might ignore it on surface.

The next step probably will be the anointment of a new Dalai Lama, who will take over as his successor.

The formality of finding one after his death in the traditional way might have to be dispensed with because Tibet is under Chinese rule

Indeed, Beijing is waiting for the Dalai Lama to die, enabling them to find a new one to fit into their mould.

The Dalai Lama is acutely aware of this, which explains why he would be keen to make arrangements for his political and spiritual succession.

This is important because his successors, both in their political and spiritual roles, will carry his enormous moral authority.

China obviously hopes that with the passing away of the Dalai Lama in the not-too-distant future, the Tibetan issue will fade away and eventually disappear.

They believe that as China continues to grow in power, the Tibetan cause will have fewer and fewer supporters among the comity of nations for fear of offending China.

And it will help when the Dalai Lama is no longer on the scene.

His charisma, charm and sincerity have kept the Tibetan issue alive and kicking.

China, therefore, believes that Tibet will lose whatever appeal it might still have with people all over the world when the Dalai Lama is not around.

Which is shortsighted. Indeed the Dalai Lama has sought, over the years, to resolve the issue of Tibet’s status peacefully by seeking autonomy, not independence.

Through many hours of fitful talks over the years between his representatives and China, his demand has been for internal autonomy with Beijing in control of its foreign and defense affairs.

With internal autonomy, Tibetans should be able to maintain their ethnic and cultural identity.

Which is not too much to ask, and Beijing shouldn’t have problem with it.

But it does.

First: they don’t trust the Dalai Lama as he seeks some political and cultural space for his people without challenging China’s sovereignty.

Beijing simply wants submission with the right to define and regulate how the Tibetans should and would live within their own territory. This is precisely what they are doing now.

Because the Dalai Lama seeks better terms for his people, he is denounced as a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’.

Therefore, China has never been serious about talks with the Dalai Lama’s representatives to resolve the Tibetan issue.

Indeed, a solution on the basis of genuine autonomy will be a lasting one with the imprimatur of the Dalai Lama’s moral authority and acceptable to the Tibetan people.

But China is not concerned with the moral and popular dimensions of the Tibetan cause. They have been busy all these years to cut at the roots of such considerations.

For instance, they have sliced and spliced Tibet, with parts of it joined to the neighboring Han-dominated provinces. Thus, Tibet proper is now a shrunken area.

Its population of 6 million is now scattered around, to reduce the Tibetan potential to create ‘trouble’.

What is left of Tibet is now mixed up with the Han Chinese, settled there in large numbers with incentives.

In this way, the Tibetans will soon become a minority in their own geographical space, if it hasn’t already happened.

As it is, there are severe restrictions on their cultural space to limit the learning of their language, practicing their religion and observance of their traditions.

It is hoped that, over time, they will cease to be a distinct entity except for ceremonial purposes when the state wants to exhibit them as part of China’s “harmonious” society.

The character of Tibet’s economy has changed so drastically that, short of assimilation, they will remain marginalized to live a miserable existence.

They are now subject to so much surveillance, both electronic and through the massive presence of security forces, that they live in fear.

China’s leadership tends to resort to over-kill, both figuratively and metaphorically, when they fear rupture of their so-called “harmonious” society.

And they have an aversion to peaceful dialogue to sort out national issues.

They fear that such an approach will open a Pandora’s box of unresolved issues with their people.

Which explains their paranoia of the people’s revolution in the Middle East overtaking China, if people were exposed to the news from that part of the world.

Tibet has been at the receiving end of this paranoia for many years.

China’s oligarchs believe that if they decide that a problem doesn’t and shouldn’t exist, it bloody well will be swept away by the brute use of power.

But with Tibet, the unrest continues to erupt in big or small ways despite all the repression in that region. It keeps coming back to haunt China.

As Pico Iyer has quoted the Dalai Lama in his article for the New York Review of Books: “Manpower, military power, monetary power, that is already there in China.”

What is lacking, though, “is moral power, moral authority”.

And without that, at a deeper level there is a big vacuum. And that is where the old Tibetan Buddhist traditions could help.

But try telling this to the Chinese leadership, especially associating it with the Dalai Lama.

China’s leaders are drunk with power. They have no time for morality and tranquility.

Tibet for them is just a sideshow.

But they don’t realize that sideshows too can occupy centre stage when the central authority is weakened, as happened so often in Chinese history.

The replacement of the Dalai Lama’s political power by a secular democratic government will become a legitimate organ of channeling Tibetan identity both among the exiled Tibetans and those at home.

And once, he has also designated his spiritual successor, the struggle for Tibetan autonomy will be set for the post-Dalai Lama period.

On surface, China might prefer to ignore it.

But arrangements for institutional succession are important for Tibet, especially when they carry the Dalai Lama’s imprimatur.