US allies’ rethink China policy

By S P SETH

During his recent state visit to Australia, China’ Premier, Li Keqiang, kept up the gentle pressure on Canberra to draw closer to Beijing. Australia is a US ally in the region an part of the ANZUS alliance. And with China dredging new islands in the South China and building military facilities to claim almost all of its waters, it is clearly upsetting, if not threatening, regional stability and security. And Australia, like most regional countries, has an important stake in regional peace and stability.

China is pushing ahead with its agenda to establish regional dominance by ignoring the rival territorial claims of some of its regional neighbors. Although Australia tries to be neutral on the issue of contested sovereignty in the region as it is not a claimant, it nevertheless wants the issue resolved peacefully through negotiation based on international norms and law. In other words, it is against unilateral action on China’s part to change the realities in South China Sea. Of late, though, even while maintaining principled position of respect for international law and institutions, Canberra appears to be softening its tone.

The reasons for this are not far to seek. An important one is the realty of China’s power. Second, even though the US is talking the talk against China’s projection of power into the region and South China Sea, it has not been able to match the rhetoric with concrete action. True, it has sent a naval ship or two through the Chinese claimed waters, but it has been lacking in any clear resolve to back up Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia doctrine, declared in a 2011 visit to Canberra. Which would require the deployment of bulk of the US navy in the region to send a strong signal to China that the US was still the predominant regional power and was not going anywhere. This gap in rhetoric and practice has only encouraged China to declare a Chinese version of the Monroe doctrine in the region.

With Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States, and despite the initial strident anti-China rhetoric over trade, currency manipulation and South China Sea, Beijing now appears more confident about its narrative that South China Sea and its islands have been historically part of China. It is so confident, on surface at least, that what it is propounding is not just China’s narrative but to promote regional stability. For instance, during his visit here, Premier Li sought to neatly mix together Chinese and regional interests to support China’s activities in the South China Sea.

He said at a press conference, with a straight face, that, “China never has any intention to engage in militarization in the South China Sea.” As for, “China’s facilities on Chinese islands and reefs [a blanket claim of ownership] [these] are primarily for civilian purposes, and even if there is a certain amount of defense equipment or facilities, it is for maintaining the freedom of navigation and over flight in the South China Sea because without such freedom, or without stability in the South China Sea, the Chinese side would be among the first to bear the brunt of it. ”

But the question is: who is posing a threat to maritime traffic through South China Sea? Before China started to build military facilities and claimed much of South China Sea, international trade was largely flowing smoothly through these waters. It is only after China has started to militarize the islands and reefs that the region is experiencing tensions and instability.

With the US seemingly unsure of how to respond to China’s projection of power, some regional countries are seeking their own accommodation with China’s rising power. The Philippines, under President Rodrigo Duterte, is most notable. Malaysia is another case of leaning in that direction. On its own, no individual Southeast Asian country is able to match or challenge China’s military, economic and military power. Indeed, these countries are now, in varying degrees, susceptible to China’s economic pressure with their increasing dependence on trade and investment from China. South Korea is increasingly feeling the pressure of undeclared Chinese blockade of its trade and services exports.

Australia is coming under continuous, though seemingly gentle pressure, to become part of what one might call, China’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. During Premier Li’s visit here, Premier Li was keen to emphasize the positive in their relationship like their growing trade valued in 2015/16 at A$150 billion, with a very healthy surplus in Australia’ favor. Talking of the deal to expand China’s beef market for Australian exports, Prime Minister Turnbull said that, “Australia is the only country in the world with this market access.” Highlighting the growth of investment, Turnbull added that, … we continue to welcome investment from China with the stock of direct investment growing to A$35 billion by the end of 2015…”

Australia, of course, is part of the ANZUS alliance and hence a US ally, but there are increasingly powerful voices within Australia favoring a closer relationship with China. Paul Keating, a former Australian prime minister, made a strong pitch in a national daily for creating stronger bonds with China.

According to Keating, “The ‘pivot’ or ‘stay-as- we- are’ [policy] has meant that the US is seeking to maintain strategy hegemony in the western Pacific, rather than recognizing the rise of China as a legitimate event, and a state now as large as the US itself.”  He argued that as the world has moved to a position of bipolarity with the US and China, Australia should similarly be developing a policy of cooperation with China, and not of “resigned reluctance.”

 On the South China Sea, Keating felt that anxiety over artificial islands was being exaggerated and they were no challenge to Australia. On the other hand, “If Australia were to have a positive strategic policy of engagement with China rather than a negative one, our influence on China’s behavior would be much greater than it is today.”

As for containing China, he attacked advocacy of enhanced strategic ties between the US, Australia, Japan and India, describing this doctrine of “quadrilateralism” as “reckless on an international scale.”

Of course, Keating doesn’t represent the official policy, which still favors US alliance. But he is not alone in advocating a radical reevaluation of relations with China to suit Australia’s interests in view of China’s rise. And this reevaluation process is gaining ground in the region, even more so after Donald Trump becoming the US President. As Christopher Pyne, Australia’ defense industry minister, has said, while reiterating that Australia remained one of US’ closest allies, “every US ally…is considering how that will operate in the next four years.”

email: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au

  

Trump and US-China relations

S. P. SETH

The US-China relations are entering a dangerous phase. So far, it has been a case of controlled management with probing signals from both sides of testing boundaries. The latest was the case of an underwater US drone operated by a US naval vessel carrying research in international waters of the South China Sea, much of which China claims as its own. This is where China has claimed almost all of the contested islands and has dredged new ones with military facilities and structures. The US is challenging Beijing’s control with its naval ships seeking to exercise freedom of navigation through international waters. Apparently, the drone in question was not on any dangerous mission, said to be involved in scientific research. China seized the drone, and the US demanded its return. A Pentagon spokesman said that, “It [the drone] is ours, and it is clearly marked as ours and we would like it back. And we would like this not to happen again.” Which China agreed to do, putting its own spin on it.

A statement from China’s defence ministry sought to make their action in seizing the drone--a piece of “unidentified equipment”, as they called it—as a matter of checking it for navigational safety. It said, “China decided to return it to the US side in an appropriate manner, and China and the US have all along been in communication about it.” But: “During this process, the US side’s unilateral and open hyping up is inappropriate, and is not beneficial to the smooth resolution of the issue.” And then there is the significant rider that China was “resolutely opposed” to the long-standing surveillance “in the presence of” Chinese waters by US ships and aircraft. In other words, the drone was operating in Chinese waters by US naval vessels and next time China might not be as sanguine. It is reported in some western media that though the US drone and surveillance program is unclassified, the US relied increasingly on the oceanographic data supplied by such drones to help track China’s growing and increasingly sophisticated fleet of submarines. In other words, next time around it might create some incident.

And next time around, it will be the Trump administration dealing with the situation. And if President-elect Trump’s response to the incident is any guide from his twitter reaction, it will be much more colourful. Trump said in his tweet, “ China steals United States Navy research drone in international waters—rips it out of water and takes it to China in an unprecedented act”, and Trump didn’t seem keen on getting it back.

Beijing’s reaction to this is not spelled out. They are probably waiting to see him take over as President before they come to any definite conclusion, although they did react, though in a measured and diplomatic way initially, to the telephone conversation he had with Taiwan’s leader, Tsai Ing-wen, congratulating him on his election victory. This seemed to overturn the One China principle that has been the foundation of US-China diplomatic normalization since the seventies. The two countries established formal diplomatic relations in 1979. Beijing lodged “stern representations”, urging the US to adhere to the One China principle and “prudently” handle affairs in relation to Taiwan, which China regards as its breakaway province. Indeed, initially they even tried to blame it on Ms Tsai, with China’s foreign minister suggesting the call was the result of Taiwan’s “petty tricks.”

When Trump was criticized both at home and in China over the phone conversation, he characteristically reacted sharply, first to his internal critics and then to China. He said that the initiative for the call came from Taiwan’s leader as a courtesy call. And he questioned the double standards of his domestic critics, questioning why decades of US military arms sales to Taiwan had not attracted such scrutiny? As for China’s representation, he responded with more tweets, saying he wouldn’t be told by Beijing who he should and should not talk to. In any case, did China ask the US about its policies that impinged on crucial US interests, pointing out: “Did China ask us if it was OK to devalue their currency (making it hard for our companies to compete), heavily tax our products going into their country or to build a massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea? I don’t think so.”

And this was followed by an interview on the US Fox news questioning the rationale of the US’ Taiwan policy. Trump said, “I don’t know why we have to be bound by a one-China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.” And he added, “We’re being hurt very badly by China with devaluation; with taxing us heavy at the borders when we don’t tax them; with building a massive fortress in the middle of the South China Sea, which they shouldn’t be doing; and, frankly, with not helping us at all with North Korea.” This is the Trump who wants to run US-China relations, or any other foreign policy issue, as transactions/deals with give and take to maximize US gains.

And as he sees it, in US-China relations the US is giving away about everything but not getting anything in return. Therefore, if he means what he says, the US’ China policy would appear to be in a for a major overhaul, including China’s ‘core’ issue of regarding Taiwan as a breakaway province with China as the sole sovereign nation. By raising all these issues, Trump is seeking to create substantial leverage-- and Taiwan is a big one-- to refashion relations with China.

Was it an impulsive/irrational response in putting the Taiwan issue once again in the limelight by his telephone conversation with the Taiwanese leader, Tsai Ing-won? According to some accounts it was calculated and well thought. It has put China off guard. They had thought, according to some accounts emanating from China, that the incoming Trump presidency would be too preoccupied with the country’s parlous domestic situation, hopefully giving China even more political space to strengthen its international stature, particularly in the South China Sea, and with regional countries. But now China might have to go back to the drawing board to figure out the contours of a new US policy. And that policy might become more pro-active than reactive, with his close advisers on foreign and defence affairs sharing Trump’s slogan of “Making America Great Again.”

Will China do some retreating? Going by the thrust of China’s policy so far of standing for its ‘core interests’ in Taiwan and South China Sea, Beijing is unlikely to retreat and we might be in for some stormy times ahead.

Note: This article first appeared in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au

US, China and Philippines

S P SETH

The Philippines President, Rodrigo Duterte’s, recent China visit created international headlines, as he seemed to upbend his country’s long time relationship with the United States. Duterte was angry at the US criticism of his no-holds-barred policy of eliminating druggies, both users and pushers, and sought to pre-emptively warn off Obama against raising the issue on the sidelines of a regional conference both were attending. Duterte felt that Obama would have no right to lecture the president of a sovereign country like the Philippines. Therefore, there were signs that the new political order in the Philippines was going to be different, indeed radically different, when it came to the country’s relationship with the United States. And this would be reflected in refashioning Manila’s relationship with China.

And if Duterte’s rhetoric during his China visit were truly reflected in the Philippines’ relationship with both China and the United States, by way of a new friendly relationship with China and aggressive disawoval of long-standing multifaceted and deep ties with the United States, it would not only shake up bilateral Washington-Manila connection but also the existing regional political and security architecture.

And to understand this, one need to go over, even if cursorily, what the visiting  president said in Beijing, unless one were to simply dismiss President Duterte as raving mad to radically alter his country’s long ties with the US, including their security alliance, going as far back as early fifties. More so, when the Philippines’ relations with China had earlier soured so badly over the issue of sovereignty claims in South China Sea that Manila had taken Beijing to the arbitration tribunal in the Hague that had upheld its claim. Duterte became president against such backdrop of hostility between the Philippines and China, with the US committed to the Philippines all the way.

Despite all this, the new president, during his China visit, declared with gusto, it would appear, his country’s “separation’ from the United States. It is worth quoting Duterte at some length on his views and the proposed policy change he  indicated. He said, “No more American influence. No more American [military exercises]. It’s time to say goodbye, my friend. Your stay in my country was for your own benefit.” He is nursing strong personal hurt over criticism of his policy of eliminating the country’s drug culture as he said, “I will not go to America any more. I will just be insulted there”, once again referring to the US President Barack Obama as the “son of a whore”.

And he seemed to blame the US for the Philippines’ anti-China policy before he became president. In his words, “What kept us from China was not our making. I will chart a new course.” On the contentious issue of South China sovereignty, his new policy will delight China and take the wind out of the US’ strategy of building up a regional coalition to contain China. Duterte simply dismissed the Hague court award against China as “a piece of paper with four corners.” Elaborating, he said, “The arbitral award gives us the right. China has the historical right. And they’re insisting. In this situation, do we argue, or do we just talk? I would say, let us put it off to some other day.”

 In his speech at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Duterte heaped insult, unusual in diplomatic parlance, on the Americans. He said, “Americans are loud, sometimes rowdy. Their larynx is not adjusted to civility”, even as he mimicked American accent. He called them “discourteous people”, adding that it is wise not to do business with them because “that is the surest way of losing your money.”

And he seemingly announced a new international alignment to include China, Russia and the Philippines. Duterte said, “I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow and maybe I will go to Russia and talk to Putin and tell him there are three of us against the world---China, Philippines and Russia. It’s the only way.” His four-day visit to china included 400 business people. And China didn’t disappoint him; on paper at least as, according to the Philippines’ trade secretary, Ramon Lopez, deals worth $13.5 billion dollars were signed during the trip. The idea seems to be to restructure Philippines’ economic relationship to tap into Chinese investments in infrastructure, and an expanded access into that market.

This kind of proposed restructuring of an overall relationship, where the Philippines has before been in a virtual dependency situation with the United States from colonial times since 1898 and then after gaining independence in 1946, is rather unusual. Therefore, it will be a difficult, even problematic exercise. So far, according to reports in the US press, the US hasn’t been formally notified of the level or kind of “separation” President Duterte has publicly announced. And going by the long established ties between the two countries over decades, it will be a herculean task for Philippines’ establishment to root out the old connections and replace them with a China centric order.

Despite resentment at many levels in the Philippines over the US’ perceived condescending and arrogant behavior, into which Duterte is tapping as well as his own personal experience at times, the US is a known quantity with many people in the Philippines enmeshed into multiple ties and experiences. The New York Times quoted Roilo Golez, national security adviser to a former president in the Philippines as saying, “ Practically every family here has a relative in the U.S. They don’t dream of going to China and living there.” About 4 million Filipinos and Filipino-Americans are said to live in the United States, and their remittances back home are an important part of the country’s economy. And another major sector of the economy, call centres largely serving American companies, reportedly employ more than one million Filipinos.

For Duterte to imagine that the Philippines might be able to almost swap its present relationship with the US and replace it with China, is likely to be a painful experience, to put it mildly. And, in his sober moments, Duterte seems aware of some of the difficulties and dangers. On return home from Beijing, for instance, he reportedly sought to soften his call for “separation” to clarify that it didn’t mean cutting diplomatic relations: “Because the Filipinos in the United States will kill him”, apparently pointing to the magnitude of the linkages between the people of the two countries.

However, Duterte’s Beijing visit and his call for reshaping his country’s relations to make China the centre of gravity is likely to have important repurcushions for regional politics. It might set a precedent for China’s other neighbours, with issues of contested sovereignty, to see the writing on the wall, as if, and make their own accommodation with Beijing.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au

  

Flashpoint South China Sea

S P SETH

Nobody really knows how the South China Sea sovereignty issue will be sorted out. It featured in one way or the other at the recent Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting and the follow up East Asia summit in Laos. So far, China is resolute about its sovereignty claims regarding islands/islets/rocks that scatter around these waters. Indeed, it has dredged out new ones and has justified building airfields and other military structures as security measures to defend its sovereignty. Beijing has flatly rejected the recent ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague, which favoured the Philippines that had sought the court’s arbitration on China’s construction of military structures on Mischief Reef in the Spratly archipelago, claimed by Manila. In a sweeping judgment on China’s sovereignty claims, it rejected its “nine dash line” that tends to turn almost all of South China Sea into its exclusive lake.

An adverse finding from Hague court was expected but not with such vehemence. It said, “The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’”. And it found that the artificial islands that China has been building did not create extended maritime zones as they couldn’t naturally sustain human habitation. It, therefore declared that “certain sea areas [which China claimed] are within the excusive economic zone” of the rival claimant, the Philippines. And worse still, the tribunal found that “China had caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species.”

Not surprisingly, and considering that China had boycotted the tribunal, Beijing said that the ruling of the court, “is null and void and has no binding force.” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, said that the ruling has placed the South China Sea “in a dangerous situation of intensifying tension and confrontation.” And he called the unilaterally initiated (by the Philippines) case and the resultant ruling a “sheer political farce in the disguise of law…” He added that, “The attempts of any power to harm or deny China’s sovereignty and maritime interests in any form will be futile.”

And to this end, China is not averse to showing its military muscle by making it clear that it would use all the necessary measures to protect its sovereignty in South China as it sees it. China has been holding military exercises, and reportedly even cut off outside access to parts of South China Sea to host these exercises. It has also conducted combat air patrols in the region, which are slated to become a “regular” feature in the future, according to its state news agency, Xinhua. In other words, Beijing is steadfast on its position and is leaving no one in doubt that it means what it says.

China’s regional neighbours, at odds with China over the sovereignty issue, are reluctant to put up a united front. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), for instance, has not been able to put up a joint front on this issue as they look to China for trade and investment. Besides, China is politically and militarily powerful. The diplomatic option, sought to be exercised by the Philippines, has apparently failed, as China doesn’t accept the Hague court’s authority and writ. In any case, China’s position is clear that it has sovereignty over the islands and over much of the South China Sea waters.  

The only way to confront China would be to team up with the United States. The US is trying to rally regional countries to exercise their right of freedom of navigation through Chinese-claimed waters and islands, which the US has done on a few occasions and is determined to continue doing. China has said that it might declare an air-defence identification zone requiring aircraft passing through the area to identify themselves. However, the US and its allies, Australia, for instance, might ignore this, potentially leading to military confrontation.

Beijing believes that the US is creating trouble in China’s backyard. It regards the US as an outside power that should stay out of regional affairs. But for the US ‘interference’, in Beijing’s view, the region will be peaceful based on China’s ‘historical’ sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and much of the waters surrounding them. The US, on the other hand, rejects China’s contention that it is an outside power seeking to stir up trouble, citing its large Pacific coast and vital economic, strategic and political interests. During a recent Australia visit, US vice-president, Joe Biden, was adamant that the US would remain a Pacific power. As if addressing China and regional doubters about the US stamina and determination, he said in Sydney, “We are not going anywhere. And that is vital because our presence in the region… is essential to maintaining peace and stability, without which the economic growth and prosperity I believe would falter.”

And he added, “America is the linchpin and we want to ensure the sea lanes are secure, the skies remain open. That is how to maintain the free flow of commerce, that is the life blood of this region.” To fortify the US resolve, Biden went on to say, “We have the most capable ground forces in the world and unmatched ability to project naval and air power to any and every corner of the globe, and simultaneously.” Talking specifically of US commitment to Pacific region, Biden said, “And we’ve committed to put over 60 per cent of our fleet and our most advanced military capabilities in the Pacific by 2020.” 

Biden’s choice of Australia to reiterate this commitment is interesting, as it was here that President Obama had announced the US “pivot to Asia” in 2011 during his visit to Australia. In a sense, it is designed to bolster the flagging confidence of regional countries that are not keen to confront China, being unsure of the US’ resolve and staying power. There is a sense, rightly or wrongly, that the US is a declining power and is over-stretched, while China is in ascendance. As if to calm some of the frayed nerves in Australia about US politics with Donald Trump as Republican presidential nominee, Biden said, “Don’t worry about our election. The better angels in America will prevail.” But that is more a prayer than a policy prescription.

The point, though, is that both China and the US are committed to their respective positions. Which is that China has sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and will defend it with all its power. The US, on the other hand, is determined to challenge this by exercising the right of free navigation through Chinese-claimed South China Sea islands and surrounding waters. And if they mean what they say, one cannot rule out military confrontation at some point,  with unpredictable results.

Note: This article was first printed in the Daily Times.

Contact; sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au