US allies’ rethink China policy

By S P SETH

During his recent state visit to Australia, China’ Premier, Li Keqiang, kept up the gentle pressure on Canberra to draw closer to Beijing. Australia is a US ally in the region an part of the ANZUS alliance. And with China dredging new islands in the South China and building military facilities to claim almost all of its waters, it is clearly upsetting, if not threatening, regional stability and security. And Australia, like most regional countries, has an important stake in regional peace and stability.

China is pushing ahead with its agenda to establish regional dominance by ignoring the rival territorial claims of some of its regional neighbors. Although Australia tries to be neutral on the issue of contested sovereignty in the region as it is not a claimant, it nevertheless wants the issue resolved peacefully through negotiation based on international norms and law. In other words, it is against unilateral action on China’s part to change the realities in South China Sea. Of late, though, even while maintaining principled position of respect for international law and institutions, Canberra appears to be softening its tone.

The reasons for this are not far to seek. An important one is the realty of China’s power. Second, even though the US is talking the talk against China’s projection of power into the region and South China Sea, it has not been able to match the rhetoric with concrete action. True, it has sent a naval ship or two through the Chinese claimed waters, but it has been lacking in any clear resolve to back up Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia doctrine, declared in a 2011 visit to Canberra. Which would require the deployment of bulk of the US navy in the region to send a strong signal to China that the US was still the predominant regional power and was not going anywhere. This gap in rhetoric and practice has only encouraged China to declare a Chinese version of the Monroe doctrine in the region.

With Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States, and despite the initial strident anti-China rhetoric over trade, currency manipulation and South China Sea, Beijing now appears more confident about its narrative that South China Sea and its islands have been historically part of China. It is so confident, on surface at least, that what it is propounding is not just China’s narrative but to promote regional stability. For instance, during his visit here, Premier Li sought to neatly mix together Chinese and regional interests to support China’s activities in the South China Sea.

He said at a press conference, with a straight face, that, “China never has any intention to engage in militarization in the South China Sea.” As for, “China’s facilities on Chinese islands and reefs [a blanket claim of ownership] [these] are primarily for civilian purposes, and even if there is a certain amount of defense equipment or facilities, it is for maintaining the freedom of navigation and over flight in the South China Sea because without such freedom, or without stability in the South China Sea, the Chinese side would be among the first to bear the brunt of it. ”

But the question is: who is posing a threat to maritime traffic through South China Sea? Before China started to build military facilities and claimed much of South China Sea, international trade was largely flowing smoothly through these waters. It is only after China has started to militarize the islands and reefs that the region is experiencing tensions and instability.

With the US seemingly unsure of how to respond to China’s projection of power, some regional countries are seeking their own accommodation with China’s rising power. The Philippines, under President Rodrigo Duterte, is most notable. Malaysia is another case of leaning in that direction. On its own, no individual Southeast Asian country is able to match or challenge China’s military, economic and military power. Indeed, these countries are now, in varying degrees, susceptible to China’s economic pressure with their increasing dependence on trade and investment from China. South Korea is increasingly feeling the pressure of undeclared Chinese blockade of its trade and services exports.

Australia is coming under continuous, though seemingly gentle pressure, to become part of what one might call, China’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. During Premier Li’s visit here, Premier Li was keen to emphasize the positive in their relationship like their growing trade valued in 2015/16 at A$150 billion, with a very healthy surplus in Australia’ favor. Talking of the deal to expand China’s beef market for Australian exports, Prime Minister Turnbull said that, “Australia is the only country in the world with this market access.” Highlighting the growth of investment, Turnbull added that, … we continue to welcome investment from China with the stock of direct investment growing to A$35 billion by the end of 2015…”

Australia, of course, is part of the ANZUS alliance and hence a US ally, but there are increasingly powerful voices within Australia favoring a closer relationship with China. Paul Keating, a former Australian prime minister, made a strong pitch in a national daily for creating stronger bonds with China.

According to Keating, “The ‘pivot’ or ‘stay-as- we- are’ [policy] has meant that the US is seeking to maintain strategy hegemony in the western Pacific, rather than recognizing the rise of China as a legitimate event, and a state now as large as the US itself.”  He argued that as the world has moved to a position of bipolarity with the US and China, Australia should similarly be developing a policy of cooperation with China, and not of “resigned reluctance.”

 On the South China Sea, Keating felt that anxiety over artificial islands was being exaggerated and they were no challenge to Australia. On the other hand, “If Australia were to have a positive strategic policy of engagement with China rather than a negative one, our influence on China’s behavior would be much greater than it is today.”

As for containing China, he attacked advocacy of enhanced strategic ties between the US, Australia, Japan and India, describing this doctrine of “quadrilateralism” as “reckless on an international scale.”

Of course, Keating doesn’t represent the official policy, which still favors US alliance. But he is not alone in advocating a radical reevaluation of relations with China to suit Australia’s interests in view of China’s rise. And this reevaluation process is gaining ground in the region, even more so after Donald Trump becoming the US President. As Christopher Pyne, Australia’ defense industry minister, has said, while reiterating that Australia remained one of US’ closest allies, “every US ally…is considering how that will operate in the next four years.”

email: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au