China-Japan showdown likely

S P SETH

The spat between China and Japan over disputed sovereignty on a group of small islands in East China Sea, called Senkakus  by the Japanese and Diaoyus in China, is taking dangerous overtones. China is sending planes and surveillance vessels to test its claims, with Japan taking counter measures. Taiwan too has entered the fray, as the alternative China, with Japanese firing water cannons at a Taiwanese boat carrying a group of activists wanting to land on the disputed islands. The situation is further complicated with the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, recently coming out clearly on Japan’s side, stating that the islands ”are under the administration of Japan” and hence protected under the 1960 US-Japan security treaty. In other words, Japan can invoke this treaty if China were to take military action to wrest the islands from Japan.

The US position is not surprising. What is surprising is that it has been so clearly enunciated by the US secretary of state, while China was hoping that it might at least continue the pretence of neutrality, calling upon both countries to resolve it through peaceful means. Not surprisingly, China “resolutely opposes” Clinton’s remarks; its news agency, Xinhua, calling it “foolish” for Washington “ to throw support behind Japan” in the islands’ dispute. China has been brimming with confidence, but US’ open support for Japan will compound the dangers.

Looking back at the historical experience of the two major powers of our times, Britain and the United States, the dominance over oceans and sea-lanes was a pre-requisite for regional and global primacy. Indeed, this is how China was humbled during the opium wars of the 19^th century and reduced to a semi-colonial status. And now China wants to establish its sway over South China Sea and over the disputed (with Japan) islands in the East China Sea. 

When the communists won the civil war and established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the US was the dominant military power ruling the waves in much of the world in the midst of a Cold War, with China on the Soviet side. After intense internal ideological and power struggle, and a serious rift with the Soviet Union in the sixties and seventies overlapping into the eighties, China started to slowly emerge as a power in its own right under the stewardship of Deng Xiaoping. Deng was a practical leader with emphasis on learning from facts and not too infatuated with communist ideology, though he was a strong upholder of the Party’s monopoly power. He wanted to modernize China and build it into a strong and powerful nation. But he also advised that China should bide time while building its strength.

His successors obviously believe that the time has come for China to assert and reclaim its power and national interests. And these interests include recovering, what it perceives to have been historically its sovereign territories and waters in South China Sea and other maritime territories, including  Senkaku/Diayou islands, controlled by Japan. In regional political power play, China once had an advantage over Japan as its atrocious war record in China and other Asian countries created a kind of aggrieved brotherhood revived now and then over specific issues like the “comfort women”, Asian prostitutes, that Japanese soldiers used during the war time.

But with China’s rise and its determination to consolidate and expand its power, it is now simultaneously involved in sovereignty disputes over islands in the South China with a number of regional countries, like Vietnam, the Philippines and others and with Japan in East China Sea. Which is creating an aggrieved brotherhood of a different kind against China, with Japan increasingly regarded favourably. The most welcoming of Japan in this respect is the Philippines with its own serious maritime dispute with China. Japan and the Philippines have become strategic partners agreeing to collaborate to resolve their territorial disputes with China. And they have expressed “mutual concern” about China’s increasingly assertive claims.

Vietnam is another country with a serious maritime dispute with China in the South China Sea, and has lately drawn strategically close to the United States. Both Japan and the Philippines have their security pacts with the United States, as does Australia. But Japan is not without its own problems arising from a serious maritime dispute with South Korea, which too is a US ally. The US has been urging both its allies to resolve their dispute but signs so far are not propitious.    

Even without US security connection, Japan is not an inconsequential power, though constrained militarily because of the US imposed post-WW11 pacifist constitution. There has been a slow erosion of that position with US support as Washington has been urging Japan for quite some years to play an important regional military role as its ally. With Shinzo Abe as Japan’s new Prime Minister, known for his ultra nationalist views, Japan will raise its defence expenditure and also take measures to get rid of the relevant constitutional provision constraining its military power.

China is already an ascendant military power with its defence budget reportedly doubling over the last six years. It seems determined to uphold its perceived national interests, which is its great strength with the Chinese people. While the government might not be playing the military band, the country’s senior military officers are not holding back their frank views. This was recently the case with Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu of China’s National Defence University in an interview with John Garnaut, China correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald.

He said colourfully, “America is the global tiger and Japan is Asia’s wolf and both are now madly biting China.” He hypothetically raised a scenario of nuclear retaliation by raising the WW11 analogy when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour and asked, “…how do you know it wouldn’t receive another nuclear bomb?” And said, “The world would hail if Japan receives such a [nuclear] blow.” He amplified, “I don’t want to mention China here [presumably, the country that might deliver the blow], as it is sensitive.” And he had a message for Australia not to follow the US or Japan into any military conflict, saying, “Australia should never “play the jackal for the tiger or dance with the wolf.”

Though Colonel Liu said his views didn’t represent government policy but, at the same time, emphasized that his views were consistent with what political and military leaders thought, if not what they said. In addition to the interview, Liu also provided written comments accusing the US of creating  “ a mini-NATO” to contain China with the US and Japan at its core and Australia within its orbit.

Having taken such a strong public stand on the sovereignty issue, the Chinese government would find it difficult to retreat from that position. Japan will equally be averse to making its sovereignty over the islands an open issue. If so, China and Japan are heading for a showdown of some sorts in the not-too-distant future. And that won’t be pretty regionally and globally.

 Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au

Asia-Pacific’s highly combustible mix

S.P.SETH

The recent East Asia summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, once again highlighted underlying regional tensions. We will come to that later. But first let us look at the background to all this. It basically stems from concerns about China’s rise, particularly whether or not it will be managed peacefully. Beijing certainly regards it as a peaceful development to correct the historical aberration of China’s humiliation by the colonial powers and Japan during the 19^th and first half of the 20^th century. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, supposedly put an end to it.

Though China’s communist revolution restored the country’s independence and dignity, it didn’t bring to fruition its perceived historical role as the Middle Kingdom that it once was. This was mainly because China remained preoccupied with Mao Zedong’s perpetual revolution. It was not until after Mao’s death in 1976, and Deng Xiaoping’s political ascension a few years later, that China started to build up a strong economy. And in the decades since 1980, China’s economy has increased several folds, its armed forces have got new weaponry, it now has an advanced space program and, above all, the country is brimming with new confidence to restore its perceived historical role of asserting political primacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Believing that China was once a beacon of light for the region and the world, its new rulers do not have much sympathy with any country or countries that oppose, what it regards, as, its historical right and destiny. There is one problem, though. Which is that between the era of China’s dynastic rulers and now, the process of de-colonization in Asia and elsewhere has seen the emergence of new nations. And they are opposed to the assertion of China’s power, especially when it impinges on their own national interests. In this new world of nation states, territorial claims drawn from the old kingdoms/empires and maps, are contested and resisted, as is happening now in the Asia-Pacific region.

Like the rest of Asia (and, for that matter, Africa) China too was a victim of European colonialism. The Chinese have never forgotten and forgiven their humiliation by European powers and Japan. Ultimately, though, power remains largely the arbiter of relations between nations. With its new-found power and wealth, China is now seeking to assert its primacy, creating potential enemies in its neighbourhood with their competing and contending territorial and sovereign claims.

 The most vociferous, among them, are Vietnam and the Philippines, though others too have overlapping claims to islands in the South China Sea which China claims almost in its entirety.  In Beijing’s view, these countries have been put up to confront China by the United States with its renewed strategy of a “pivot” to Asia, as articulated by President Obama in November 2011 in the Australian parliament during his visit here.

China has sought to reinforce its claims by stamping its passports with its version of the sovereignty that covers South China Sea and the rest, drawing protests from other countries. It has also asserted its right to board and search ships passing through disputed waters. According to reports, China contends that its sovereignty dates back to the Ming dynasty that ruled between 14^th to 17^th centuries, if not even earlier. In other words, China’s sovereignty is incontestable.

These claims have been around ever since the communists came to power in 1949. But China then lacked the power to enforce them. It still is not able to enforce its sovereignty without causing considerable tensions in the region with the potential to lead to military conflict. Beijing would probably have wished the US to remain mired in Iraq and Afghanistan for the next decade or so, enabling it to bring its neighbours, contesting South China Sea islands, to its way of thinking. But this was not to be. And the US, even though drained by its two wars and the continuing financial crisis, still remains the strongest military power in the world. It is determined to play a leading role in the Asia-Pacific region of which it regards itself geopolitically, economically and strategically an integral part.

With a view to maintain its regional primacy, the US is beefing up its regional alliances, creating new strategic connections and projecting forceful economic and political role. This was evidenced at the recent East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, attended by President Obama. The United States, with its regional allies and political partners, would like the South China issue to be debated in regional forums with a view to create an agreed code of conduct for resolving the maritime boundary issue and for the unhindered use of sea lanes for international trade.

China sees a trap in this to regionalize/internationalize the contested nature of South China Sea issue, and is determined not to allow it. And it succeeded in keeping it out of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia Summit by leaning on Cambodia, the host country, to disallow it. But the issue of South China Sea will continue to dog every regional forum and keep regional tensions ticking.

At another level, China and Japan are also embroiled in a maritime dispute which, if not resolved, is equally, if not more, inflammatory. It revolves around the competing claims of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea creating an eyeball-to-eyeball situation between the two countries. It is feeding ultra nationalism on both sides. Indeed in the forthcoming snap election in Japan this month, the newly formed Japan Restoration Party, led by Toru Hashimoto, mayor of Osaka, and Shintaro Ishihara, till recently governor of Tokyo, will be campaigning on a program to revive Japan because: “If Japan keeps going like this [as a weakling], it will sink into a pit and die.” As part of this revival, Japan is urged to rebuild its military strength including, if necessary, acquiring nuclear weapons. In other words, China-Japan issue is not just a political spat between the two countries but a much more dangerous regional confrontation.

There are also unresolved questions between China and Indonesia over the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea.  The Spratly and Paracel islands in South China Sea are subject to overlapping sovereignty claims involving China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia. And there is, as mentioned earlier, the China-Japan dispute in the East China Sea. This is quite a list. But when some of these countries are also US allies, the situation is even more combustible. 

After US election, it is China’s Party

S P SETH

By a strange coincidence, the United States and China have been going through a leadership transition at about the same time. And what a contrast! In the US where Barack Obama has been returned as President for another term of four years, the election was a high political drama played out in the public space with both rival candidates making their own pitch for popular mandate. It was a chaotic and boisterous affair with a long drawn-out pre-election battle, with neither candidate knowing for sure their political destiny until the end. 

In China, the meeting of the 18^th Party Congress to formally anoint a new leadership for the next 10 years was very carefully choreographed and controlled without popular participation and lacking any sense of political drama. It has been known for quite sometime that Xi Jinping, vice-president, will succeed Hu Jintao as the CPC’s general secretary and the country’s new president early next year, and Li Keqiang, a vice-premier, will replace Wen Jiabao as premier. And this has come to eventuate, as well as a 7-member standing committee (the country’s apex governing body), a new politburo and central committee. This is China’s top political structure for the next ten years.

China’s economy is now the world’s second largest though, in the last few years, its growth rate has slowed. The country’s frantic economic growth in the last thirty years, with many millions lifted out of poverty and a rising middle class, has created some severe structural and societal problems. Hu Jintao, the outgoing party general secretary, highlighted some of them in his work report to the Congress, with special emphasis on corruption in the higher echelons of the party.

He warned that, “If we fail to handle this issue well, it could prove fatal to the party, and even cause collapse of the party and the fall of the state.” And added, “All those who violate party discipline and state laws, whoever they are or whatever power or official positions they have, must be brought to justice without mercy.” Apart from being a general statement of intent, this seemed like a pointed reference to the case of the dismissed Chongqing party boss, Bo Xilai, who will soon be tried for corruption and other charges.

The pertinent question, though, is: why didn’t the outgoing party leadership deal with this issue during the last ten years they were in power, when Premier Wen Jiabao was singling it out as a major issue for some years now?  During all this time corruption has grown like a virus infecting the entire body politic of the country, suggesting a serious disconnect between rhetoric and action. Which would suggest that corruption is now deeply entrenched into the system at all levels, preventing any serious action to clean up the system.

Indeed, a recent investigative report in the New York Times has found that Premier Wen Jiabao’s family (without pointing a finger at the premier himself) has amassed nearly $2.7 billion worth of fortune through all kinds of direct or indirect business deals. Which, of course, has been vigorously denied, and termed as an attempt to destabilize the country. However, the Chinese authorities have blocked any access on the internet to the New York Times’ report. Similarly, it is reported that the new party general secretary, Xi Jinping’s family too have helped themselves to a billion dollar fortune.

Whether or not these reports are true or tendentious, the question of corruption in the party, as highlighted by Hu Jintao in his report, is a make or break issue not only for the party but also for the Chinese state. Xi Jinping, the CPC’s new general secretary (and the country’s new president from early next year) has also highlighted the danger from corruption for the party as well as the state. But he too hasn’t unveiled any new strategy to root out this monster.

Apparently, it is a very sensitive issue and any radical action might not suit all the stakeholders. But without an effective strategy, backed up with necessary institutional changes like greater political transparency and accountability, this is likely to aggravate social unrest in China. With economic growth slowing, even as the wealth gap widens between rich and poor and between urban and rural areas, the government cannot afford to let this issue become a trigger for spontaneous social combustion like the Arab Spring in the Middle East.

In whatever way the CCP tackles social, economic and political issues; China today is undoubtedly a powerful country. And this is due to the economic reforms, since the eighties, under Deng Xiaoping. What should be the next course of action to propel the country’s economy is a divisive issue in the party. The Bo Xilai affair was a manifestation of it, as he unfurled Mao’s red banner against economic liberalization. Wen Jiabao, the outgoing Premier, on the other hand, has been a strong proponent of further economic liberalization, as well as some political reforms. In his report to the Congress, Hu Jiantao too emphasized the need for economic and political reforms, but again without any clear direction.

However, there is one issue that broadly unites the country and that is to build up a strong military to assert China’s national power. And Hu Jintao stressed the need for China to build a “strong national defense and powerful armed forces.” Apparently keeping in view China’s maritime disputes with some of its neighbors, he didn’t mince his words when he said, “We should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests and build China into a maritime power.”

It is interesting that even though China’s finances are in a much better shape than the United States with foreign currency reserves of over 3 trillion dollars, it appears to be losing economic momentum, not knowing how to break the logjam between its competing political factions in the party. In an altogether different political landscape from China, and despite Barack Obama’s re-election as the country’s President, the United States is also stuck in a rot of sorts. Against this backdrop, when there are no easy solutions to internal problems, there is always a danger of hyper nationalism getting out of control, especially in the volatile Asia-Pacific region. And this is a challenge for both China and the United States.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

New challenges for China’s new leaders

By S P SETH

China is set to have a new leadership team for the next 10 years that will formally be announced at the 18^th Party Congress, starting early next month. The next general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), who will also be the country’s president, has already been selected in behind-the-scene party conclaves as part of the factional deals. The Party Congress is expected to put an official stamp on it. By most accounts, the new president and the party general secretary (the latter title is more important because the party wields actual power) are Xi Jinping, presently vice-president, and Li Keqiang, a current vice-premier. The party standing committee, the governing body of 9 members, might be cut to seven in the new reshuffle. The new leadership line up will be known for certain at the 18^th Congress, slated to start on November 8.

The general secretary/president is generally also the chairman of the central military commission, combining both the executive political and military roles in his/her person, making him the most important Chinese leader. However, in the last leadership transition in 2002 when Hu Jintao became the party general secretary and the country’s president, the then president, Jiang Zemin, was keen to over-stay beyond his  agreed 10 years. It was eventually resolved with Jiang staying on for another two years as chairman of the military commission, which showed his political clout in the corridors of power. And his faction was also accorded some weighty representation in the powerful standing committee. Will Hu Jintao insist on remaining as head of the military commission, like his predecessor, for a period of time, to share power with Xi Jinping should be known soon at the 18^th Congress?

It is important to highlight such difficulties because of the lack of institutional mechanism for leadership succession from popular mandate. At some point China would need to work out a transparent succession mechanism to avoid, in future, factional power struggles between its leaders that can be quite disruptive and even dangerous, especially when, after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, China no longer has a supreme leader. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had Deng Xiaoping’s imprimatur. Premier Wen Jiabao is on record to emphasize the need for popular participation when he said, “If we are to address the people’s grievances we must allow people to supervise and criticize the government.”

Take the recent case of Bo Xilai, the powerful boss of the Chongqing metropolis of 30 million people, who came close to threatening the stability of the system by raising the Red banner of Mao Zedong against corruption, and the widening gap in wealth between the country’s poor and rich with Party connections. In the end, he was deposed and expelled from the CPC and will soon will face trial for corruption and much more. His wife has been given a suspended life sentence for the murder of a British businessman, Neil Heywood, for a real estate deal gone sour. It is important to remember that Bo was not alone in his crusade for the poor and had attracted some important party and military functionaries around him, equally dissatisfied with the state of affairs at high level.

This is not the first time that the CPC has faced purges as part of a power struggle at the top, going back to the time when Mao was the supreme leader. His Great Cultural Revolution (1966-76) was a period of great disorder and large scale political purges in China. The 1989 students’-led democracy movement, crushed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLO) at the behest of the CPC under Deng’s direction, was another watershed moment. Zhao Jiang, the then general secretary of the CPC and an appointee of Deng Xiaoping was purged because he was sympathetic to the students’ aspirations and spent rest of his life in house arrest till he died some years ago.

Be that as it may, China has gone on to make rapid economic progress, kick started by Deng Xiaoping since 1979-80, and resumed in 1992 after a couple of years of interruption from the democracy movement of 1989. Indeed, in terms of its economic growth, China has sprinted over the last three decades at an average rate of 10 percent, until now. After the global financial crisis of 2008-09, China faced economic sluggishness with millions of jobs lost due to recession in the US and Europe. China’s economic growth had been fuelled by cheap exports to the US, Europe and other countries, making it the factory of the world. And when the global economy nose-dived, China suffered. But with a large stimulus package of about $600 billion, investing into construction work across the board (infrastructure, housing, local level projects with banks asked to lend generously to local and regional governments and so on), China was able to keep up the economic momentum.

But this also caused problems, like inflationary pressures, mounting internal debt (according to some estimates, it is close to 100 per cent of GDP), excess housing and production stocks causing bubbles in sectors of the economy. Which, in turn, led the government to curb unwarranted spending to control the situation. China’s economic growth has slowed down to about 7.5 per cent, still quite healthy but not like 10 to 12 per cent in the years before. The government is now initiating a less ambitious stimulus program to maintain economic momentum. In other words, the authorities are trying to engineer a soft landing for the economy to contain any major eruption of social unrest.

China’s economy is at a critical point, requiring “structural reforms” as Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told China’s National People’s Congress in March. And political reforms are a pre-requisite for that. According to Wen, “Without political restructuring, economic restructuring will not succeed and the achievements we have made… may be lost.”

What it means is that China’s new leadership has a hard task ahead to create new pathways. That won’t be easy because of the vested interests of the country’s ruling class in the status quo. But to avoid a spontaneous outbreak of social unrest, as has happened during the Arab Spring (with the Chinese banning any internet access to key words there), the government would need to address large scale corruption in the country, as well as the  widening gap between the rich and poor and between the urban and rural areas. The migration of millions of rural workers into urban industrial economy has created its own problems, with urban crime increasingly blamed on rural immigrants.

On the positive side, though, China’s rapid economic development has lifted millions of its citizens from poverty and made China the world’s second largest economy and, at times, the envy of the world for its economic growth. But China now needs a new path and a new national consensus for a new century. Will the new team of its leaders be able to do what Deng Xiaoping did in another era? He charted a new course of economic growth based on the slogan that “to be rich is glorious?” That might not work now because China needs a new political and economic pact based on social harmony that President Hu Jintao promised but was unable to deliver. In the next ten years and after, it will be interesting to see if China will once again surprise the world!  

Looming China-Japan conflict

S P SETH

China-Japan relations are at a crisis point. The trigger this time is the ownership of the Senkaku islands (known as Diaoyu in China) in the East China Sea, with both China and Japan claiming sovereignty. Japan first acquired the islands after the Sino-Japanese war in 1896. During WW11, these were lost to the United States. But since 1971, when the US returned the Senkakus to Japan, these are under Japanese control. Beijing claims that these islands were historically part of China, and the US had no business returning them to Japan.

The recent escalation of tensions in China-Japan relations started with the Japanese government’s purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from their private Japanese owners to reinforce its state sovereignty. Which has led China to send naval patrol boats to the area to affirm the seriousness of its own claim. There are reports that Chinese fisherman will soon be going to the contested waters for fishing, possibly under protection of Chinese naval vessels.

These developments have occasioned an unprecedented show of national anger in China targeting Japanese establishments, big and small, leading them to shut down their operations. Apparently, there was an element of state encouragement behind all this. But these are being carefully controlled lest such public anger turn on state institutions for unrelated reasons.

There are several aspects to China-Japan hostility. First, on China’ side, there is the century of humiliation starting with the Sino-Japanese war of 1895-96, the 1930’s occupation of Manchuria followed by the brutality and atrocities of WW 11. The Japanese invasion of China was a horrendous affair and the memories are still fresh with the Chinese. China believes that Japan never made suitable and adequate amends for their wartime crimes, and remains unrepentant. Instead, it is still clinging on to old relics like the Diaoyu islands, as China would see.

Over and above China’s historical claim to the islands, they are also seen now as valuable real estate in terms of potential oil and gas resources on the ocean surface. Besides, they are rich in fisheries. Tokyo feels that this is indeed the real reason for China’s new interest in the islands. These two, history and prospective gas and oil discoveries, are important factors behind China’s sovereignty claim. A resurgent and powerful China is seeking to assert its claim and thereby announce a new Chinese era in regional politics and strategy, as it is doing in regard to other maritime disputes with some of its neighbors.

Japan raises China’s ire for its perceived arrogance in refusing to come to terms with its wartime crimes with suitable contrition. Such arrogance comes up time and again when some Japanese prime minister or minister visits the Yasukini shrine, which is a memorial to Japan’s war dead, including some of its WW11 generals charged with war crimes. Similarly, there is the issue of Japanese school textbooks that tend to whitewash Japan’s wartime record. Another problem that has cropped up, from time to time, is Japan’s attempt to ignore, as much as it can, its disgraceful record of “comfort women” (local prostitutes) it requisitioned for its soldiers during its occupation of Asian countries.

What it means is that the current crisis over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands has a history involving China’s deeply felt humiliation when it was weak with Japan treading all over it.  Now that it is strong and powerful, it might be going overboard to right the wrongs of the past. As for Japan, it is not willing to give any ground on its ownership claim on the islands, which is under its control. On both sides it is a question of national pride, even more so in China with seething anger over Japan’s wartime record.

It is also a difficult political time in China with the leadership transition in the country to be formalized at the 18^th Party Congress to be held soon. Because of the Bo Xilai factor and his wife’s murky murder verdict, there is a certain political shadow hanging over the country needing clear resolution. The expulsion from the Party of Bo Xilai, followed by his likely trial on criminal charges, is supposed to clear the political climate. That would remain to be seen. For instance, only recently there were all sorts of rumors when the presumptive president Xi Jinping was not seen publicly for two weeks. Against this political backdrop, the national outrage against Japan, involving attacks on Japanese businesses and establishments in China, is a useful distraction and a mobilization technique.

The CPC, however, is always mindful of keeping popular demonstrations under close watch because nationalism is a beast that might take an unwelcome turn, even turning on the Party, for all sorts of reasons. The Party appears to be already taking steps to dampen down some of the anti-Japanese hysteria. But these protests serve a useful purpose from time to time to distract, as at present, from the country’s slowing economic growth, internal political wrangling from Bo Xilai affair and the leadership transition.

Whatever might be China’s internal political imperatives and compulsions, its external ramifications are quite worrying by way of increased regional tensions. Japan has its own ultra nationalists like the Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara who wanted to buy the Senkakus from its Japanese owners, thus forcing the national government to pre-empt him with its purchase. Indeed, Japan’s centrist ruling Democratic Party of Japan looks like it will lose the ensuing election to a right-leaning Liberal Democratic Party that has just elected Shinzo Abe, a fervent nationalist, as its president. With Abe becoming the next prime minister of Japan, the political temperature between the two countries is likely to rise further.

Beijing, however, is not interested in Japan’s internal political dynamics and is furious over the islands’ deal. While this is essentially an issue between China and Japan, any military conflict between them is likely to involve the United States on behalf of its ally, Japan. The US secretary of defense, Leon Panetta, has visited both Tokyo and Beijing emphasizing the need for both countries to sort out the islands’ issue peacefully, lest it develops into a military conflict that could involve the United States.

The People’s Daily of China has observed that Beijing might take punitive economic measures against Japan, if it doesn’t back off. Highlighting Japan’s economic paralysis of the last two decades, further compounded by the global financial crisis, it warned that, “Japan’s economy lacks immunity to Chinese economic measures”, even though admitting that it was a “double-edged sword” for China as the two countries’ economies are interdependent in many ways. It added,“ Amidst a struggle that touches on territorial sovereignty, if Japan continues its provocations China will inevitably take on the fight.” And it doesn’t take long for economic warfare to take on the shape of a military conflict.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Australia’s China dilemma

Sushil Seth

Because of its historical beginnings as a British colony, Australia didn’t need to make hard choices on the international stage. It simply followed Britain, the mother country.

During WW11 when Japan was over-running one Asian country after the other pushing Britain out of the region, Australia feared for its security drawing closer to the United States. After WW11, it became part of the US-led ANZUS alliance.

But now with the rise of China and the resultant strategic competition between it and the United States, Australia is in a serious predicament.  China is now its biggest trading partner, with much of its export income coming from trade with that country.

The predicament is, therefore, centered on how best to balance its relationship with both these countries to maximize Australia’s advantage.

This is where it becomes tricky, because Australia not only wants to keep its strategic alliance with the United States but also is seeking to further strengthen it against the backdrop of China’s rise and the perceived security threat.

To this end, it is providing new base facilities for the US military as part of its new energized Asia-Pacific policy, as announced by the US President Barack Obama in an address to the Australian parliament when he was last visiting Australia.

Predictably, China is not happy, as it fears that this new development is directed against it. And Beijing has let it be known in no uncertain terms. Australia, of course, denies this. It regards its ties with the United States as part of its long-standing strategic relationship with the United States without any anti-China connotation.

The problem though is that even within Australia, there are some important voices that counsel against aligning too much with the United States in US-China strategic rivalry.

But they are not politically important enough to make any difference so far because Australia’s political establishment, by and large, favors US strategic connection.

This is for two reasons. First is that Canberra’ US alliance is an insurance against any security threat to Australia, and China is seen as a potential threat as indicated in its 2009 defense white paper.

Second, by being welcoming of the US presence and engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, Canberra hopes that the United States wouldn’t one day simply walk away from the region, leaving Australia to its own devices.

 However, those in Australia who would like a more nuanced relationship with the US argue that Canberra should rather play a role in persuading the United States to share power with a rising China.

In this way, the US-China relationship would be managed peacefully, thus avoiding a potential military conflict sometime in the future as happened in the past between a rising Germany and the established European powers in WW1, and to Hitler’s rise leading to WW11.

An important proponent of this broad argument is Professor Hugh White at the Australian National University, formerly a senior defense department official. He has argued his line in his book, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power.

It is believed that China will become the world’s biggest economy in a decade or so, thus leaving the US behind. Its military power is also growing, though the US will still remain the world’s strongest military power for many years to come.

Even at this stage China has amassed a strong military deterrent, if not denial, capability to make the United States cautious about exercising or using its superior military power against China.

Therefore, to avoid any mischance of a US-China strategic rivalry breaking into a war, it is considered necessary that US should accommodate China into a power-sharing arrangement.

Paul Keating, a former Australian prime minister, is another one cautioning his country against drifting towards confrontation with China as a US ally. He recently said that peace in the region lay in accommodating China as a “great power”.

He added, “The presumption has been that the foreign policy of Australia is somehow synonymous with the foreign policy of the United States.”  Which “could never have been broadly true, notwithstanding the points of coincidence from time to time in our respective national interests.”

He, therefore, advocates a more independent approach for Canberra in its relations with the United States. Incidentally, Keating chairs an international advisory council of the China Development Bank.

There are problems with this thesis, not with the idea of sharing power but its feasibility. First, it assumes power sharing as if it is there for the US to give and for China to partake.

International relations do not operate like that. The US might be the dominant power in the region but there are other regional actors that might not go along with a regional duopoly between the US and China. 

A solution to this might lie through creating a concert of powers as in the Europe of the 19^th century to create balance of power. Even that didn’t stop military conflict eventually leading to WW1.

In its supposed Asian reincarnation, this might involve other regional heavy weights like Japan and India. But China might regard it with suspicion as Japan and, probably, India too is tilted toward the US. Therefore, Beijing is unlikely to relish the balance of power idea tilted against it.

China might also find the idea of being assigned a power-sharing role as condescending hearkening back to the days when the European powers, including the US, decided what was good for China.

The humiliation of 200 years of European domination of China is too fresh in Chinese mind to accept arrangements, even of an enhanced power-sharing role, as demeaning.

Besides, who decides what sort of power sharing is involved? For instance, China basically wants the US out of the Asia-Pacific region that it regards as its own political and strategic space since 14^th and 15^th century. And the European colonial meddling, in their view, was a historical aberration.

Now that China is powerful, it wants to restore, what it sees as, its historical destiny. It, therefore, wants the US, as Beijing sees it, to stop interfering and/or encouraging some regional countries to put forward their rival sovereignty claims to South China Sea islands. The US is not willing to abandon its regional allies to China’s wishes.

In other words, it might be difficult for both China and the United States even to go beyond the first base of a regional sovereignty issue.

It would, therefore, seem that strategists like Hugh White and former politicians like Paul Keating are barking up the wrong tree.  In international relations, where national interests are involved, there are no neat solutions. 

China’s Bo Xilai to continue haunting the CCP

By Sushil Seth

China’s political tempest, unleashed early this year with the removal of Chongqing metropolis’ powerful boss and party leader, Bo Xilai, is still causing low level disturbance which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is trying to contain. And this is being done at two levels.

The first is how best to deal with Gu Kailai, Bo’s wife, without mixing it up with her husband’s Party situation. She has already been tried for murdering the British businessman, Neil Heywood and given a suspended death sentence. Which, in some ways, is more sinister because the issue can be revisited depending on the exigencies of the situation at a given time. And she can be forced to sing any song based on the lyrics written by the CCP headquarters, implicating her husband or others.

One of the mitigating circumstances that has saved her from the gallows, for the time being at least, is that she was mentally unhinged at the time of poisoning Heywood because of the maternal instinct to protect her son, Bo Guagua. Heywood had allegedly threatened to destroy Bo over a failed real estate deal. But this is dismissed by Heywood’s friends, who did everything to smooth Bo’s induction into the British educational environment.

The second issue is how to deal with Bo Xilai, believed to have been seeking to mobilize a Cultural Revolution kind of frenzy. That is what Premier Wen Jiabao feared at the time. Bo was engaged in some wide-ranging campaign to target gangsters and mafia elements, leading to the arrest and torture of some people. He was also playing on the widening income disparities between the rich and the poor, using Maoist red banner as a rallying point.

His police chief, Wang Lijun, was instrumental in a wide-ranging violent police crackdown in Chongqing at Bo’s behest. Wang later sought asylum in the American consulate in Chengdu (not granted) and spilled the beans on Gu’s murder of Neil Heywood.  Despite the odious side of Bo’s violence, many in Chongqing reportedly still remember his measures to help poor.

Bo, though, was pushing his political button too hard to capitalize on the Mao legend with the Chinese people to reach one of the highest prizes of a place in the 9-member standing committee of the CCP, which is China’s ultimate governing body.  And he apparently had some support within the party hierarchy. Which made the dominant party leadership nervous and keen to prevent him from a place in the standing committee, and then using it as a platform to subvert the system and tailor it to his political ambitions.

But a chain of events turned the tables on Bo Xilai when his police chief, Wang Lijun, sought asylum at the US consulate in Chengdu. He spilled the beans on Gu’s murder of Neil Haywood, and other gory stuff of torture and killings under Bo’s political dispensation, of which Wang was the principal instrument and for which he would be separately tried at some point of time.

All this was happening to coincide with the National People’s Congress session in March. It was an opportune time for the ruling faction to remove Bo from his Chongqing leadership position and from the politburo. And that is where he is languishing, possibly in some sort of detention, to face charges at a later time.

Gu’s case was a priority to get it out of international headlines as China’s new Lady Macbeth after Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, who played a major role in organizing Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution turning the country upside down.

 Bo Xilai is likely to face charges of violent breach of party discipline, including corruption and whatever else can be thrown at him. He is likely to be expelled from the party, and might even be charged with multiple other stuff. In this way both Gu and Bo will become non-persons before the transition to the new Party leadership later in the year at the 18^th Party Congress. Even though it looks like a very neat script, there is always a danger of things not quite working as planned.

Some believe that that Bo and his wife were framed, as the former was threatening to undermine the existing cozy system of a nexus between political and economic power in the current structure.

Indeed, China’s party echelons seem divided over the way Gu and Bo cases be handled. That is probably why Gu’s sentence is a bit tentative allowing the CCP time to make up its mind finally over time.

 The so-called liberals in the CCP suspect that Gu and Bo might receive lenient treatment because of their lineage, both being the children of revolutionary heroes. While the Left (Maoists) believe that Bo has been framed and Gu’s murder charge is a way to get at him. According to one Chinese professor, “The group of capitalist roaders [the terminology used against Mao’s enemies in the Cultural Revolution] has brought down the socialist roader”, meaning Bo Xilai. 

Professor Han Deqiang reportedly added, “This means crisis and turmoil for China.” Indeed, the feelings are so high among some Chinese netizens (on the internet) that they believe Gu’s picture on the Chinese TV at the time of her trial was indeed her double, being so plump compared to her real image.

The attempt by some to posit Bo as some kind of a popular hero is overdrawn. Bo and his wife were highly privileged and powerful couple because of the system in which they operated, with their son studying abroad and driving flash cars. And they were also privileged, being the scions of revolutionary leaders.

In other words, it was more like a power grab by Bo to reach among the top nine standing committee members and then to maneuver to capture power. But he was outmaneuvered and lost.

However, this might not be the last word on the subject because Bo’s image as the personification of the Maoist ideal of an equal and revolutionary society will likely haunt the CCP. And if he is sent to the purgatory, he might even become a martyr figure as the true heir of Mao’s legend.