US dependence on China shortsighted

By S.P.SETH

North Korea continues to defy the world on almost everything. The latest was the sinking of a South Korean navy ship with a North Korean torpedo, killing 46 crews. Pyongyang denies the accusation, even though it has been investigated and confirmed by an international enquiry.

Even if one were to give some credence to Pyongyang’s denial, its history of killing its South Korean targets at different times in the past would suggest that the sinking of the South Korean ship is in character with the regime’s propensity to commit murders and create mayhem.

However, all the brouhaha created by this serious act of criminality seems to have died down. After making a big show of protests, and follow up action (with the support of the United States), Seoul too has gone relatively quiet.

There are two reasons for this. First, China has put a damper on getting involved in a punitive action against Pyongyang. Both the United States and South Korea were hopeful, that faced with the evidence of North Korean involvement, Beijing might line up with the rest of the world to take action against the Kim Jong-il’s notorious regime.

Therefore, they put much store by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent visit to Seoul to examine the issue. But after a flurry of meetings in South Korea, Premier Wen wasn’t keen on blaming the North. He instead favored a policy of restraint to calm the situation.

In other words, China seemed to put both sides of the Korean peninsula on an equal footing in relation to the crisis. Apparently, China’s reluctance to buy into the inter-Korean crisis had a dampening effect on both South Korea and its ally-the United States.

Premier Wen’s South Korea trip has emphasized China’ special security interests in the Korean peninsula. It had apparently heard the North Korean version from the Dear Leader when Kim Jong-il visited China last month in a special train and was warmly welcomed by its top leadership. Therefore, it shouldn’t be surprising that Wen refused to take sides.

The United States might find comfort in the critical observations of some Chinese academics bemoaning that North Korea has high-jacked China’s foreign policy in the Korean peninsula. But, they argue, that this cannot be sustained and, sooner or later, China would have had enough of it. It might be part of the good cop and bad cop routine because nothing about China is all that simple.

Another reason for the calming of the rhetoric in the Korean situation is that the South Korea’s ruling part has suffered a drubbing in the country’s local and regional elections.

Seoul made a lot of noise (even cancelling the few economic ties it has had with the other side) over the question of its ship’s sinking. They believed that a South Korean government standing up to North Korea’s bullying would be a popular move.

After all, the present conservative government came to power promising a hard line. But it would appear that its strong rhetoric hasn’t gone well with many of its people. And the government has lowered the decibel level.

And where China is concerned, North Korea seems to get away with even the murder of Chinese citizens across their border in Liaoning province. According to a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “On the morning of June 4, some residents of Dandong, in Liaoning province, were shot by a DPRK border guard on suspicion of crossing the border for trade activities, leaving three dead and one injured.”

China’s response was quite passive, simply raising “a solemn representation with the DPRK” and awaiting investigation. It will obviously be sorted out in a low-key fashion.

Whichever one looks, China’s role in the Korean peninsula is considered critical but Beijing is not inclined to effectively put pressure on North Korea. And without that there cannot be any forward movement, be it the issue of the sinking of the South Korean ship and, more importantly still, its nuclear program.

At one point, when North Korea was saber-rattling with its atomic tests Beijing seemed quite worried, and took a common stand in the UN Security Council to slap sanctions on North Korea. But it was weak on implementing the sanctions, thus continuing to provide lifeline for North’s regime.

China apparently has come to the conclusion that if it went all the way in denying North Korea its essential supplies, the regime would collapse and with it the country itself. Which would flood China with a horde of refugees creating all sorts of unpredictable problems.

Since then, the internal situation in North Korea has only got worse. The Dear Leader Kim Jong-il’s health seems to have further deteriorated, which the Chinese must have had time to assess during his recent trip to Beijing.

The succession issue, with his youngest son supposedly the favored one to take over, doesn’t appear to have been sorted out. The country is in a prolonged state of food scarcity with widespread hunger. Even though hope and morale are very low, there are no signs of rebellion of any sort.

With the government exercising total control, it is not surprising that people are afraid to challenge the regime. However, all the signs of a collapse from within are there.

But China’s economic and political support is delaying the inevitable day. China is, of course, worried about the influx of refugees if North Korea were to collapse. But that is going to happen any way sooner or later.

If such a reading of the situation were correct, it would be in China’s interest to work out with the United States and other countries a comprehensive refugee policy to share the burden.

But China obviously is not keen on a regional or global approach, because it regards Korean peninsula as its own strategic patch. It doesn’t want to involve other countries to further muddy the situation; when the US already has troops’ presence as well as military alliance with South Korea.

Despite this, the United States is depending more and more on China, believing that the US and China have shared non-proliferation objectives. That may well be true in a limited sense but China sees it in a larger context.

The US doesn’t share a border with North Korea. A murky and dangerous situation arising from an unstable North Korea might trigger a US military response on behalf of its South Korean ally from a perceived or actual attack from Pyongyang.

Therefore, for the US to imagine a shared or common strategic objective between itself and China in regard to North Korea is shortsighted. For China, geopolitically, Korean peninsula is its backyard.

For the US, on the other hand, North Korea (like Iran), is part of its global policy to stop nuclear proliferation, as well as to support South Korea against a potential or real military attack from the North.

While it makes sense to have China on its side to stop North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, it doesn’t make sense, though, to depend largely on China to promote US strategic goals.

US dependence on China shortsighted

By S.P.SETH

North Korea continues to defy the world on almost everything. The latest was the sinking of a South Korean navy ship with a North Korean torpedo, killing 46 crews. Pyongyang denies the accusation, even though it has been investigated and confirmed by an international enquiry.

Even if one were to give some credence to Pyongyang’s denial, its history of killing its South Korean targets at different times in the past would suggest that the sinking of the South Korean ship is in character with the regime’s propensity to commit murders and create mayhem.

However, all the brouhaha created by this serious act of criminality seems to have died down. After making a big show of protests, and follow up action (with the support of the United States), Seoul too has gone relatively quiet.

There are two reasons for this. First, China has put a damper on getting involved in a punitive action against Pyongyang. Both the United States and South Korea were hopeful, that faced with the evidence of North Korean involvement, Beijing might line up with the rest of the world to take action against the Kim Jong-il’s notorious regime.

Therefore, they put much store by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent visit to Seoul to examine the issue. But after a flurry of meetings in South Korea, Premier Wen wasn’t keen on blaming the North. He instead favored a policy of restraint to calm the situation.

In other words, China seemed to put both sides of the Korean peninsula on an equal footing in relation to the crisis. Apparently, China’s reluctance to buy into the inter-Korean crisis had a dampening effect on both South Korea and its ally-the United States.

Premier Wen’s South Korea trip has emphasized China’ special security interests in the Korean peninsula. It had apparently heard the North Korean version from the Dear Leader when Kim Jong-il visited China last month in a special train and was warmly welcomed by its top leadership. Therefore, it shouldn’t be surprising that Wen refused to take sides.

The United States might find comfort in the critical observations of some Chinese academics bemoaning that North Korea has high-jacked China’s foreign policy in the Korean peninsula. But, they argue, that this cannot be sustained and, sooner or later, China would have had enough of it. It might be part of the good cop and bad cop routine because nothing about China is all that simple.

Another reason for the calming of the rhetoric in the Korean situation is that the South Korea’s ruling part has suffered a drubbing in the country’s local and regional elections.

Seoul made a lot of noise (even cancelling the few economic ties it has had with the other side) over the question of its ship’s sinking. They believed that a South Korean government standing up to North Korea’s bullying would be a popular move.

After all, the present conservative government came to power promising a hard line. But it would appear that its strong rhetoric hasn’t gone well with many of its people. And the government has lowered the decibel level.

And where China is concerned, North Korea seems to get away with even the murder of Chinese citizens across their border in Liaoning province. According to a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “On the morning of June 4, some residents of Dandong, in Liaoning province, were shot by a DPRK border guard on suspicion of crossing the border for trade activities, leaving three dead and one injured.”

China’s response was quite passive, simply raising “a solemn representation with the DPRK” and awaiting investigation. It will obviously be sorted out in a low-key fashion.

Whichever one looks, China’s role in the Korean peninsula is considered critical but Beijing is not inclined to effectively put pressure on North Korea. And without that there cannot be any forward movement, be it the issue of the sinking of the South Korean ship and, more importantly still, its nuclear program.

At one point, when North Korea was saber-rattling with its atomic tests Beijing seemed quite worried, and took a common stand in the UN Security Council to slap sanctions on North Korea. But it was weak on implementing the sanctions, thus continuing to provide lifeline for North’s regime.

China apparently has come to the conclusion that if it went all the way in denying North Korea its essential supplies, the regime would collapse and with it the country itself. Which would flood China with a horde of refugees creating all sorts of unpredictable problems.

Since then, the internal situation in North Korea has only got worse. The Dear Leader Kim Jong-il’s health seems to have further deteriorated, which the Chinese must have had time to assess during his recent trip to Beijing.

The succession issue, with his youngest son supposedly the favored one to take over, doesn’t appear to have been sorted out. The country is in a prolonged state of food scarcity with widespread hunger. Even though hope and morale are very low, there are no signs of rebellion of any sort.

With the government exercising total control, it is not surprising that people are afraid to challenge the regime. However, all the signs of a collapse from within are there.

But China’s economic and political support is delaying the inevitable day. China is, of course, worried about the influx of refugees if North Korea were to collapse. But that is going to happen any way sooner or later.

If such a reading of the situation were correct, it would be in China’s interest to work out with the United States and other countries a comprehensive refugee policy to share the burden.

But China obviously is not keen on a regional or global approach, because it regards Korean peninsula as its own strategic patch. It doesn’t want to involve other countries to further muddy the situation; when the US already has troops’ presence as well as military alliance with South Korea.

Despite this, the United States is depending more and more on China, believing that the US and China have shared non-proliferation objectives. That may well be true in a limited sense but China sees it in a larger context.

The US doesn’t share a border with North Korea. A murky and dangerous situation arising from an unstable North Korea might trigger a US military response on behalf of its South Korean ally from a perceived or actual attack from Pyongyang.

Therefore, for the US to imagine a shared or common strategic objective between itself and China in regard to North Korea is shortsighted. For China, geopolitically, Korean peninsula is its backyard.

For the US, on the other hand, North Korea (like Iran), is part of its global policy to stop nuclear proliferation, as well as to support South Korea against a potential or real military attack from the North.

While it makes sense to have China on its side to stop North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, it doesn’t make sense, though, to depend largely on China to promote US strategic goals.

Hu Jintao’s “harmonious society” is a cruel joke

By S.P.SETH

The recent spate of killings in China, mostly of young children, raises several questions.
The frequency of it---eight assaults in 10 weeks---cannot just be explained away as the work of mentally deranged killers or copycat incidents, though some of them might be.
The Chinese authorities have sought to limit media coverage on the ground that it simply encourages copycat killings. While one sympathizes with China’s ordeal in the wake of such horrible killings---the latest involving the use of a kitchen cleaver to kill seven children and two adults at a kindergarten--- limiting or censoring its exposure by the media is hardly the right approach.
It is only through media exposure and open investigation that a clear picture of such human tragedy is likely to emerge. And on this will depend the desired course of action to deal with such incidents.
But, as with any other disaster, the first response of the Chinese authorities is to clamp down on public information.
Even in the absence any substantive information about the killing of children, there are some plausible explanations.
It so happens that when some people start acting out their murderous impulses to wreak vengeance on society, particularly children, it is most likely that their dramatic action is intended to invite attention in the absence of legitimate avenues to be heard.
They might nurse terrible agony that has remained bottled up, needing psychological counseling/treatment, as well as social interaction.
According to a study conducted last year by Dr. Michael Phillips, a mental health expert at Tongji University, Shanghai, 173 million Chinese suffered from mental problems ranging from schizophrenia to alcohol abuse. Of these, 91 per cent had never been treated.
China’s rapid economic growth, and consequent social disruption, has created a serious disconnect between its rulers and the people.
True, China’s ruling oligarchy has created a new social base in urban middle class. But they too, like most other people, feel frustrated with the growing income gap between them and the rich business class.
Not only this. The new business class and the Party apparatchik work in cahoots; with the princelings of the top Party leadership at the top of the pyramid. Therefore, wherever one looks, corruption and nepotism are the order of the day.
In the midst of such venality, China’s rulers have the gumption to talk about creating a “harmonious society”. And to rally people around the flag by staging national extravaganzas like the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai World Expo jamborees.
At the same time when horrible killings of school children occur, Premier Wen Jiabao has platitudes aplenty to offer. Reacting to the killings, he reportedly said that besides taking “…vigorous safety measures, we also have to pay attention to addressing some deep-seated causes behind these problems, including dealing with some social conflicts and resolving disputes.”
And what has he in mind precisely? Not much except to urge that, “We must strengthen the role of mediation at the grassroots…” Which means nothing in real terms.
As Prime Minister presiding over the rising social contradictions and cleavages in his country, there should be a well thought out plan to deal with and resolve these issues that threaten the country’s social stability.
Of course, any well-thought out plan will require open debate and investigation into the “deep-seated causes behind these problems.”
But this is not what the government would want. They had squelched the persistent demands by the parents of the children buried alive under shoddy school buildings during 2008 Szechuan earthquake, as well as brushing aside the scandal about the poisoning of children with milk mixed with chemical melamine.
The first response to all these and other tragedies is to manage and censor the media as is being done with schoolyard killings.
In a recent media exposure of children’s deaths and illnesses from the use of unrefrigerated vaccines, the authorities removed Bao Yueyang, editor of the China Economic Times, which carried out the investigation.
The second method is to buy out the victims’ silence with money. And if that doesn’t work to threaten them with physical harm.
And in most cases it works when victims are arrayed against state authorities without any other recourse for redress to their grievances.
The third method is to frame them in some fake criminal case and throw them into jail. A variant of this is to throw some of them into mental institutions.
However, if some victims still persist in taking their cases to Beijing, they are waylaid on the way and thrown into “black jails”--dungeons operated by gangsters hired by local and regional authorities.
In other words, there are no legitimate avenues for Chinese citizens to seek justice.
The media are managed, manipulated and censored; courts work under state direction and politics of the country is the monopoly of the Party.
No wonder, there is so much repressed anger in the society, that tends to find outlet through outbursts like schoolyard killings.
The pursuit of greed at any cost has cost the country its anchors in community life and traditional beliefs as social props. China is increasingly becoming a dog-eat-dog society.
In the light of all this, Hu Jintao’s talk of bringing about a “harmonious society” is not only a contradiction in terms but also a cruel joke. China needs to ease up and open up.
And some of the Chinese academics are coming to this conclusion. Since they manage to say certain things without threatening the one-party system, they serve a useful role.
For instance, the Southern Weekend newspaper recently published extracts from a report by a group of sociologists, led by Professor Sun Liping of Tsinghua University.
The report, quoted in the press, said: “Without fundamental resolution of the question of mechanisms for social justice and balancing interests, blindly preventing the expression of legitimate interests in the name of stability will only accumulate contradictions and render society even more unstable.”
Still another academic, Professor Yu Jianrong at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has argued for opening up the system for people’s participation. He warns that if this is not done, “Great social upheaval may thus occur, and the existing social and political orders are likely to be destroyed.”
But China’s ruling party is drunk with power, and in no mood to listen.

Need for balance in projecting China’s rise

By S.P.SETH

The symbolism of China’s growing power is dramatized in the French President Nicolas Sarkozy‘s recent China visit as an exercise in smoothing relations with that country.

Their relations reached a crisis point in 2008 over a series of events such as protests in Paris over Chinese Olympic torch relays, criticism of China’s human rights in Tibet and, above all, President Sarkozy’s meeting with the visiting Dalai Lama.

Beijing reacted strongly by downgrading economic and political relations with France.

Beijing was apparently telling France and the world that any country officially hosting the Dalai Lama would have to be prepared to stand up to China or else face political and economic sanctions.

Taiwan is the only country that recently managed to squeeze in the Dalai Lama’s visit when it was hit by a typhoon. He had been invited to offer spiritual solace, sought by the affected people and their political leaders who, incidentally, largely belonged to the opposition Democratic Progressive Party.

Understandably, China didn’t want to give President Ma Ying-jeou’s opponents more political fuel to damage the ruling Kuomintang party. President Ma is their best political bet in Taiwan’s competitive political landscape.

But coming back to the French President Sarkozy’s China visit, undoubtedly it is an important symbol of China’s Middle Kingdom syndrome, and an effective exercise of Beijing’s coercive diplomacy.

However, It doesn’t square with the reality of Chinese power and prosperity. In terms of raw military power, the United States still remains the most powerful country in the world.

As for economic prosperity, in per capita terms its people are way behind the West, and Japan, and likely to take a long time to reach there, if ever.

But its spectacular economic growth from a very low base, and the vastness of China, has created the perception of a new superpower likely to overtake the United States in the next two to three decades.

More and more experts and policy makers are coming to this view. Which has led them to argue in favor of accommodating and integrating China increasingly into the framework of the existing international institutions, largely shaped by the United States and Western countries in the post World War 11 period.

This way, it is believed, that the transition to a new world order, with China as its crucial component, might be achieved peacefully.

According to China scholar Marc Lanteigne, “What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers [like Germany and Japan], is that not only is it ‘growing up’ within the milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country’s development of global power status.”

It is true China has made best use of the existing international institutions to exponentially increase exports (though the global economic crisis has limited that prospect), amass trade surpluses of $2.4 trillion (and rising) and significantly increase its international profile.

But, at the same time, it is also true that, when constrained in its role as an emerging global power, it doesn’t feel the need to abide by some accepted international norms. Which is frustrating for international community.

Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia best expressed this frustration in a recent speech at the Australian National University (ANU).

He reportedly said, “It doesn’t help, for example, that China associates with regimes around the world that others seek to isolate because of their assault on the integrity of international system—from Sudan to Burma.”

He went on, “China can—and should—do more to support international efforts against destabilizing regimes and on global security challenges such as Afghanistan and Iran”, as well as North Korea.

Beijing is prepared to operate within the multilateral framework of international institutions as long as it suits China.

At the same time it likes the operational flexibility to promote its interests as a competitive centre of power, if not the only centre of power.

Indeed, in recent history, no country with global aspirations has been satisfied with a role within an existing global system. The examples of Germany and Japan are illustrative.

China is already engaged in a wild grab for resources anywhere and everywhere in the world.

And as John Mearsheimer, an American scholar of realpolitik, has written, “If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.”

The first part of China’s story is its spectacular economic growth to eventually become a centre of power.

But there is an important caveat here, which is generally ignored in this big picture.

The caveat is whether a one-party state of China’s size will be able to maintain its monopoly power over a period of time.

We are already seeing signs of widespread social unrest in various forms and in different places, and its suppression with brute state power.

According to Bao Tong, a famous dissident, “Every four minutes there is a protest of more than 100 people” In China. In other words, so many “little Tiananmen” are happening everyday, so says Bao.

But these lack organization. The Party’s greatest fear is that human rights activists and intellectuals might fill the organizational gap at some point when social discontent reaches a critical point.

Hence, there is a systematic suppression of such elements.

But for how long?

There are so many issues agitating the people, from widespread corruption, nepotism, land grab, use of gangsters, particularly by the local and regional authorities, to silence its critics, police brutality, and the list goes on.

To take one example: China’s showcase World Expo in Shanghai reportedly involved clearing 2.6 square kilometers along the Huangpu River.

Which meant moving 18,000 families and 270 factories, including the Jiang Nan Shipyard, which employs 10,000 workers.

Only an authoritarian regime of China’s ilk can spend $45 billion or more for such an event, causing so much distress and suffering to its own people removing them from settled lives and livelihood.

There are so many big and small examples of such scant regard for people, when the government is bent on having its way.

What it means is that anyone making a projection of China’s future and its international status must take into account the fragility of the country’s internal situation.

It is a one-party band with no legitimate channels for people to express their frustration and anger and to seek justice.

In such a situation with anger and frustration constantly building up, and with no safety valve by way of popular forums and institutions to channel people’s wrath, there is every danger of a blow up at some point.

The symbolism of China’s growing power is dramatized in the French President Nicolas Sarkozy‘s recent China visit as an exercise in smoothing relations with that country.

Their relations reached a crisis point in 2008 over a series of events such as protests in Paris over Chinese Olympic torch relays, criticism of China’s human rights in Tibet and, above all, President Sarkozy’s meeting with the visiting Dalai Lama.

Beijing reacted strongly by downgrading economic and political relations with France.

Beijing was apparently telling France and the world that any country officially hosting the Dalai Lama would have to be prepared to stand up to China or else face political and economic sanctions.

Taiwan is the only country that recently managed to squeeze in the Dalai Lama’s visit when it was hit by a typhoon. He had been invited to offer spiritual solace, sought by the affected people and their political leaders who, incidentally, largely belonged to the opposition Democratic Progressive Party.

Understandably, China didn’t want to give President Ma Ying-jeou’s opponents more political fuel to damage the ruling Kuomintang party. President Ma is their best political bet in Taiwan’s competitive political landscape.

But coming back to the French President Sarkozy’s China visit, undoubtedly it is an important symbol of China’s Middle Kingdom syndrome, and an effective exercise of Beijing’s coercive diplomacy.

However, It doesn’t square with the reality of Chinese power and prosperity. In terms of raw military power, the United States still remains the most powerful country in the world.

As for economic prosperity, in per capita terms its people are way behind the West, and Japan, and likely to take a long time to reach there, if ever.

But its spectacular economic growth from a very low base, and the vastness of China, has created the perception of a new superpower likely to overtake the United States in the next two to three decades.

More and more experts and policy makers are coming to this view. Which has led them to argue in favor of accommodating and integrating China increasingly into the framework of the existing international institutions, largely shaped by the United States and Western countries in the post World War 11 period.

This way, it is believed, that the transition to a new world order, with China as its crucial component, might be achieved peacefully.

According to China scholar Marc Lanteigne, “What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers [like Germany and Japan], is that not only is it ‘growing up’ within the milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country’s development of global power status.”

It is true China has made best use of the existing international institutions to exponentially increase exports (though the global economic crisis has limited that prospect), amass trade surpluses of $2.4 trillion (and rising) and significantly increase its international profile.

But, at the same time, it is also true that, when constrained in its role as an emerging global power, it doesn’t feel the need to abide by some accepted international norms. Which is frustrating for international community.

Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia best expressed this frustration in a recent speech at the Australian National University (ANU).

He reportedly said, “It doesn’t help, for example, that China associates with regimes around the world that others seek to isolate because of their assault on the integrity of international system—from Sudan to Burma.”

He went on, “China can—and should—do more to support international efforts against destabilizing regimes and on global security challenges such as Afghanistan and Iran”, as well as North Korea.

Beijing is prepared to operate within the multilateral framework of international institutions as long as it suits China.

At the same time it likes the operational flexibility to promote its interests as a competitive centre of power, if not the only centre of power.

Indeed, in recent history, no country with global aspirations has been satisfied with a role within an existing global system. The examples of Germany and Japan are illustrative.

China is already engaged in a wild grab for resources anywhere and everywhere in the world.

And as John Mearsheimer, an American scholar of realpolitik, has written, “If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.”

The first part of China’s story is its spectacular economic growth to eventually become a centre of power.

But there is an important caveat here, which is generally ignored in this big picture.

The caveat is whether a one-party state of China’s size will be able to maintain its monopoly power over a period of time.

We are already seeing signs of widespread social unrest in various forms and in different places, and its suppression with brute state power.

According to Bao Tong, a famous dissident, “Every four minutes there is a protest of more than 100 people” In China. In other words, so many “little Tiananmen” are happening everyday, so says Bao.

But these lack organization. The Party’s greatest fear is that human rights activists and intellectuals might fill the organizational gap at some point when social discontent reaches a critical point.

Hence, there is a systematic suppression of such elements.

But for how long?

There are so many issues agitating the people, from widespread corruption, nepotism, land grab, use of gangsters, particularly by the local and regional authorities, to silence its critics, police brutality, and the list goes on.

To take one example: China’s showcase World Expo in Shanghai reportedly involved clearing 2.6 square kilometers along the Huangpu River.

Which meant moving 18,000 families and 270 factories, including the Jiang Nan Shipyard, which employs 10,000 workers.

Only an authoritarian regime of China’s ilk can spend $45 billion or more for such an event, causing so much distress and suffering to its own people removing them from settled lives and livelihood.

There are so many big and small examples of such scant regard for people, when the government is bent on having its way.

What it means is that anyone making a projection of China’s future and its international status must take into account the fragility of the country’s internal situation.

It is a one-party band with no legitimate channels for people to express their frustration and anger and to seek justice.

In such a situation with anger and frustration constantly building up, and with no safety valve by way of popular forums and institutions to channel people’s wrath, there is every danger of a blow up at some point.

Need for balance in projecting China’s rise

By S.P.SETH

The symbolism of China’s growing power is dramatized in the French President Nicolas Sarkozy‘s recent China visit as an exercise in smoothing relations with that country.

Their relations reached a crisis point in 2008 over a series of events such as protests in Paris over Chinese Olympic torch relays, criticism of China’s human rights in Tibet and, above all, President Sarkozy’s meeting with the visiting Dalai Lama.

Beijing reacted strongly by downgrading economic and political relations with France.

Beijing was apparently telling France and the world that any country officially hosting the Dalai Lama would have to be prepared to stand up to China or else face political and economic sanctions.

Taiwan is the only country that recently managed to squeeze in the Dalai Lama’s visit when it was hit by a typhoon. He had been invited to offer spiritual solace, sought by the affected people and their political leaders who, incidentally, largely belonged to the opposition Democratic Progressive Party.

Understandably, China didn’t want to give President Ma Ying-jeou’s opponents more political fuel to damage the ruling Kuomintang party. President Ma is their best political bet in Taiwan’s competitive political landscape.

But coming back to the French President Sarkozy’s China visit, undoubtedly it is an important symbol of China’s Middle Kingdom syndrome, and an effective exercise of Beijing’s coercive diplomacy.

However, It doesn’t square with the reality of Chinese power and prosperity. In terms of raw military power, the United States still remains the most powerful country in the world.

As for economic prosperity, in per capita terms its people are way behind the West, and Japan, and likely to take a long time to reach there, if ever.

But its spectacular economic growth from a very low base, and the vastness of China, has created the perception of a new superpower likely to overtake the United States in the next two to three decades.

More and more experts and policy makers are coming to this view. Which has led them to argue in favor of accommodating and integrating China increasingly into the framework of the existing international institutions, largely shaped by the United States and Western countries in the post World War 11 period.

This way, it is believed, that the transition to a new world order, with China as its crucial component, might be achieved peacefully.

According to China scholar Marc Lanteigne, “What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers [like Germany and Japan], is that not only is it ‘growing up’ within the milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country’s development of global power status.”

It is true China has made best use of the existing international institutions to exponentially increase exports (though the global economic crisis has limited that prospect), amass trade surpluses of $2.4 trillion (and rising) and significantly increase its international profile.

But, at the same time, it is also true that, when constrained in its role as an emerging global power, it doesn’t feel the need to abide by some accepted international norms. Which is frustrating for international community.

Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia best expressed this frustration in a recent speech at the Australian National University (ANU).

He reportedly said, “It doesn’t help, for example, that China associates with regimes around the world that others seek to isolate because of their assault on the integrity of international system—from Sudan to Burma.”

He went on, “China can—and should—do more to support international efforts against destabilizing regimes and on global security challenges such as Afghanistan and Iran”, as well as North Korea.

Beijing is prepared to operate within the multilateral framework of international institutions as long as it suits China.

At the same time it likes the operational flexibility to promote its interests as a competitive centre of power, if not the only centre of power.

Indeed, in recent history, no country with global aspirations has been satisfied with a role within an existing global system. The examples of Germany and Japan are illustrative.

China is already engaged in a wild grab for resources anywhere and everywhere in the world.

And as John Mearsheimer, an American scholar of realpolitik, has written, “If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.”

The first part of China’s story is its spectacular economic growth to eventually become a centre of power.

But there is an important caveat here, which is generally ignored in this big picture.

The caveat is whether a one-party state of China’s size will be able to maintain its monopoly power over a period of time.

We are already seeing signs of widespread social unrest in various forms and in different places, and its suppression with brute state power.

According to Bao Tong, a famous dissident, “Every four minutes there is a protest of more than 100 people” In China. In other words, so many “little Tiananmen” are happening everyday, so says Bao.

But these lack organization. The Party’s greatest fear is that human rights activists and intellectuals might fill the organizational gap at some point when social discontent reaches a critical point.

Hence, there is a systematic suppression of such elements.

But for how long?

There are so many issues agitating the people, from widespread corruption, nepotism, land grab, use of gangsters, particularly by the local and regional authorities, to silence its critics, police brutality, and the list goes on.

To take one example: China’s showcase World Expo in Shanghai reportedly involved clearing 2.6 square kilometers along the Huangpu River.

Which meant moving 18,000 families and 270 factories, including the Jiang Nan Shipyard, which employs 10,000 workers.

Only an authoritarian regime of China’s ilk can spend $45 billion or more for such an event, causing so much distress and suffering to its own people removing them from settled lives and livelihood.

There are so many big and small examples of such scant regard for people, when the government is bent on having its way.

What it means is that anyone making a projection of China’s future and its international status must take into account the fragility of the country’s internal situation.

It is a one-party band with no legitimate channels for people to express their frustration and anger and to seek justice.

In such a situation with anger and frustration constantly building up, and with no safety valve by way of popular forums and institutions to channel people’s wrath, there is every danger of a blow up at some point.

US-China relations in dire state

By S.P.SETH

There is an air of triumphalism in China these days. It was reflected at the recent National People’s Congress (NPC) jamboree where Premier Wen Jiabao presented his annual report.

Commenting on global financial crisis, he said that, “Our economy was the first in the world to have made a turnaround.” Which would testify, “…that no difficulties or obstacles can impede the course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

He added, “The past year was truly extraordinary and inspiring… and raised China’s international standing and influence.”

This kind of self-congratulation is mostly directed at the domestic audience to distract attention from popular disenchantment with the way the country is functioning.

The country is racked by widespread corruption, nepotism, gangsterism (particularly at local and regional levels), the absence of accessible avenues to redress peoples’ problems, repression of dissent and so on.

The country’s oligarchs seem to think that they are the God’s gift to the nation by the way they have projected China on the world stage.

The people are told that they are lucky to be part of the vibrant Chinese nation “with the incomparable superiority of the socialist system.”

In other words, China’s socialist system has no peers.

Therefore, all the talk of Western democracy as the way to go for China and other authoritarian regimes in the world is nonsense. China’s one-party rule, indeed, is a superior model for the world.

In Chinese narrative, the United States is a country where “civil and political rights of citizens are severely restricted and violated…”, contrasting it with China’s social and political harmony.

At the same time, people all over the world are “suffering a serious human rights disaster caused by the US subprime crisis-induced global financial crisis…”

Which Chinese communist oligarchs have sought to rescue with the goodness of their heart.

China’s socialist system, therefore, is supposedly not only doing wonders for the country but also showing the way to the rest of the world.

This is, of course, all self-serving to perpetuate the one-party rule.

The simple rebuttal to this is that if the Communist Party rule in China is so superior, why do they need to repress political dissent and throw the dissidents into jails?

While trumpeting his country’s economic turnaround from global recession, Premier Wen was also blaming the United States for present difficulties in their bilateral relationship.

At his news conference after the NPC session, he accused the United States of creating disruption in their relationship by meeting the Dalai Lama, and by its decision to sell weapons to Taiwan.

He said, “The responsibility for the serious disruption in US-China ties does not lie with the Chinese side but with the US.”

As for the snub at Copenhagen where Wen didn’t turn up at a meeting hosted by Obama, he retorted that this was in response to the “shock” of being not invited to a smaller leaders’ group meeting.

And on the question of currency valuation, Wen said emphatically that, “I don’t think the yuan is undervalued.”

On the other hand, he worried about the volatility of the US dollar and hence China’s investments in US Treasury bonds.

In short, all the difficulties in US-China relations are US responsibility and the onus for their correction lies with the United States.

This is a new China, an arrogant and inflexible China that seeks to define and reorder US-China relationship entirely on its own terms.

Remarkably, the US is so far refusing to buy into Chinese provocations.

However, it is quite possible that the US might not be able to maintain its forbearance for long.

And the issue to trigger this is likely to be China’s undervalued currency, giving it an unfair trade advantage.

China has accumulated vast reserves of US dollars from trade surplus with the United States.

The resultant loss of competitiveness with China has cost the United States many jobs, adding to unemployment in that country.

With unemployment in the US around 10 per cent (some estimates put it at around 17 per cent, accounting for under-employment and those who have stopped looking for jobs), there is increasing pressure on the US to formally declare China a “currency manipulator”.

And if that happens, a trade war between China and the United States seems likely further widening the gap between the two countries.

According to Paul Krugman, an influential New York Times columnist, Noble prize winner in Economics and a Princeton University professor, “It’s going to be really hard for them [the US treasury] yet again to fudge on the obvious fact that China is manipulating [its currency].”

He added, “Without a credible threat, we’re not going to get anywhere.”

It is important to note that Barack Obama himself accused China of “currency” manipulation during his presidential campaign. After becoming President, his government has tried to fudge the issue for diplomatic reasons.

But like so many other US overtures, this too hasn’t worked.

It would appear that the United States is preparing for the eventuality of a trade skirmish/war, if Larry Summers’ remarks at the World Economic Forum in Davos are anything to go by.

Summers, who is Obama’s top economics adviser, reportedly said that free-trade arguments no longer held when dealing with “mercantilist” powers (a reference to China).

This and other issues, like Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, and the sale of US weapons to Taiwan, are building up into a potentially serious crisis in US-China relations.

From the assertions made by Premier Wen at his recent press conference, it doesn’t seem that Beijing is going to backtrack or comprise on any of the issues clouding China-US relationship.

Premier Wen Jiabao takes a black and white view of things. And since the US is supposed to be doing the wrong things and making unreasonable demands (on the currency issue, for instance) it is not for China to take any corrective action.

In other words, without the US backing down, the ground is being set for a showdown.

It doesn’t mean that there will be a military showdown in the near future; though an escalation of the naval skirmishes/incidents in the South China Sea cannot be ruled out with China asserting sovereignty over its waters and islands.

The likely scenario is that of a serious diplomatic crisis and trade war of sorts.

In the long run, as John Mearsheimer has observed, “If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intensive security competition with considerable potential for war.”

The case of a fast rising Germany demanding the restructuring of the global order to its advantage, leading to the First World War, is illustrative of it.

China’s paranoia over Taiwan and Tibet

By S.P.SETH

China is very angry at the United States. It is angry because Washington is selling defensive weapons to Taiwan.

The United States has also incurred China’s displeasure because it continues to treat the Dalai Lama with consideration and regard; evident from the recent meeting between the Tibetan leader and President Barack Obama undeterred by Chinese protests.

Let us consider Taiwan first.

In the past too, China has been unhappy about the US sale of weapons to Taiwan. But this time there is a difference. Its tone is much harsher, threatening the US with consequences for the bilateral relationship.

But the United States is only doing what it has done in the past, that is: it is fulfilling its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to sell weapons to defend against any military attack from China.

And this is even more relevant today when China is constantly increasing its missile deployment (targeting Taiwan), now exceeding 1000 missiles. It is said to be increasing at the rate of 100 missiles a year.

These couldn’t obviously be meant to defend China from Taiwan.

Beijing contends that Taiwan belongs to China, and the US is interfering in its internal affairs.

In other words, the US should facilitate its sovereignty claim to Taiwan.

It is a dangerous way of pursuing its objective if the choice China presents to Taiwan is of either accepting its sovereignty or else face the consequences from a military attack.

The US’ Taiwan Relations Act was meant precisely to ward off such an eventuality.

Washington doesn’t have any objection against peaceful unification, based on the will of the people of Taiwan.

But China is opposed to any exercise of popular mandate in Taiwan; rightly fearing that its people would prefer to remain a sovereign nation while still pursuing peaceful relations with China over the entire gamut of their mutually beneficial ties.

Beijing, however, has pre-empted this possibility (as far as it is concerned) by announcing unilaterally that Taiwan is part of China, and following it up with passing domestic legislation to this effect.

In other words, any formal declaration of sovereignty by Taiwan will lead to its forcible annexation by China.

The main obstacle in China’s path is the United States, with its Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese invasion.

Therefore, Beijing has protested every time Taiwan has been sold US weapons. But this time China is more belligerent.

For instance, it has threatened trade sanctions against US companies involved in the sale of weapons to Taiwan.

Why is it so? Because: there would seem to be a growing belief in China that the United States is a declining power. And it might be pushed around.

It is a convenient of asserting China’s great power status by snubbing the US.

A recent example was at the Copenhagen climate change conference where the Chinese Premier didn’t turn up at a venue hosted by President Obama.

Whether or not the US is a declining power is academic at the moment. Despite its many problems, the United States still remains the world’s largest economy and, militarily, the world’s most powerful nation.

Therefore, for China to treat the United States in a cavalier fashion can be dangerous and counter-productive.

In the case of Taiwan, for instance, Beijing might think that its new international status and military power would be a deterrent enough for the United States to stay out of the Taiwan Strait imbroglio, if one were to develop.

But for China to over-estimate its power and under-estimate the United States might turn out to be its greatest strategic blunder.

Another issue, which makes China very angry at the United States, is the consideration shown to the Dalai Lama at the highest level.

President Barack Obama received him during his recent US visit to China’s great annoyance and anger.

As in the case of US arms sales to Taiwan, there is a harsher and belligerent tone in this regard.

For China, the Dalai Lama is a traitor to the motherland. He is regarded as a monk in wolf’s clothing.

By any dispassionate analysis, though, China appears terribly paranoid about the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan issue.

In all the on-off meetings between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and the Chinese side, his delegation has simply pressed for autonomy for Tibet.

In other words, there is no disagreement on the core issue of China’s sovereignty. Regarding the details and the quantum of autonomy, it shouldn’t be beyond China’s ability to accommodate the Tibetan leader.

After all, China will continue to have control over Tibet’s defense, and foreign policies as well as common Chinese currency.

The crux of the matter is that Beijing doesn’t trust the Dalai Lama.

The Dalai Lama is 74 and the Chinese are wishing him an early ascension to heaven/hell. They can then appoint their own Dalai Lama and, presto, the Tibetan problem will all be over.

They consider him the source of all China’s problems on Tibet as the instigator of unrest in the region, as well as the rallying point of international support.

During his recent Australian tour he gave some inkling of what might be the future shape of the Tibetan movement in exile.

In an informal chat with an Australian journalist, Joyce Morgan, he said that, in the short term, (while he is still alive) it might be possible to appoint a senior figure as an interim leader just “like a deputy Dalai Lama”

He maintained, though, that this was yet decided.

Regarding a future Dalai Lama (his re-incarnation after his death), his view is that: since the very purpose of a reincarnation is to continue the unfinished work of the previous incarnation, it is only logical that that I will be born in exile to continue my unfinished work.

In other words, Dalai Lama is already de-legitimizing Beijing’s plans to appoint their own Dalai Lama following his death.

Considering his enormous moral authority (likely to become legendry after his death), China will have to continue wrestling with the Tibetan question.

On the other hand, since Dalai Lama is so keen to resolve the Tibetan issue on the basis of autonomy (with Tibet still remaining part of China), it makes more sense for Beijing to sort out the issue with him, while he is still alive.

In other words, whether it is Taiwan or Tibet, China’s problems there are self-inflicted based on its chauvinism, paranoia and stubbornness.

Therefore, blaming the United States for its own mistakes will only complicate matters.