Turbulence forecast for Asia-Pacific

S P SETH

Asia-Pacific region has been and still is, largely, an American dominated part of the world. It is not surprising then that China’s rise, particularly its growing military power and naval reach, is creating tensions in the region. Even more so because China is not only claiming a number of islands and vast stretches of waters in the South China Sea and East China Sea, but is actively taking measures to assert its claims. It has an ongoing sovereignty dispute over a cluster of rocky islets with Japan, which has brought the two countries close to naval skirmishes with the potential to develop into a military conflict. And the tensions escalated recently when China declared “an air defence identification zone” over a vast swathe of the East China Sea over and around the disputed islands, including some in the South Korean claimed maritime zone. What it means in effect is that any foreign aircraft entering the zone will be required to notify their flight plans as well as maintain radio contact or else face unspecified “defensive emergency measures”. All this activity, with claims and counter-claims, is deepening the fault lines in the region raising serious concerns.   

Added to this were concerns recently when a Chinese naval flotilla conducted an unannounced naval exercise through the approaches into the Indian Ocean. An Australian journalist captured his country’s concern this way: “Three Chinese warships on an exercise that included combat simulations sailed through the Sunda Strait, turned east, passed by Christmas Island [Australian offshore territory] before skirting the southern edge of Java and turning north again.” He added, “Never before has a Chinese drill come so close to Australia.” Of course, China’s naval flotilla was operating in international waters and wasn’t obliged to inform/consult Australia or any other country.

But that is not the point for China’s critics. The real issue is that China is developing a navy that can now operate where it never treaded before. As Rory Medcalf, program director at the Lowy Institute, an independent think tank here, reportedly said, “they’re going to have to expect the Chinese to be able to operate in considerable force in the vicinity of our [Australian] territories.”

Even though the Australian government has been trying to be calm and understanding, it is not a welcome development for them. Australia’s US alliance has been, and is, the cornerstone of Australia’s security policy. And Canberra sees China rocking the boat, thus posing a threat not only to Australia but also to the region. But from Beijing’s viewpoint, it works both ways. Just as Australia sees China as a potential or real security threat, Beijing is not happy about Australia’s deepening security nexus with the United States. They regard it as part of a policy to contain China, with Japan included in the trilateral arrangement.

Apparently, China wants the region to become used to the projection and display of its military power as a back up to its sovereignty claims in the oceans around. And some Chinese commentators are not shy about saying this. According to Shen Dingli, professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai: “Expect more of China’s naval exercises around [Australia], per international law.” He is further reported to say that as a “normal great power”, China has every right to build its navy in order to deter American “interference.” Amplifying it, he said, “ China’s legitimate national interests are still undermined by the US. America has interfered in mainland China’s unification with Taiwan, and its region-based alliances have served its purpose of military intervention.” And: “Australia is on the US strategic chessboard for such purposes… Australia shall not expect to be entitled to follow the US to threaten China without hurting itself.”

As of now, China is militarily still fairway behind the United States. Therefore, it would probably be not keen on a military conflict with the United States and its regional allies. But with its growing economy, it has the capacity to keep raising its defence expenditure every year to further modernize and expand its military power. In the last couple of decades, its defence expenditure has been rising at the rate of 10 per cent or more, with a 12.2 per cent rise this year, as announced by Premier Li Keqiang during his annual work report to the National People’s Congress (NPC). If such increased allocation is maintained and/or increased and compounded, China’s defense budget might come close to the US’ over a couple of decades. At the same time the US defense allocation is on a downward trajectory because of its twin debt and deficit problems.  At present, though, the US defence budget of about $700 billion is way ahead of China at about $130 billion; though China’s official figure is regarded by many as a gross under-estimate.

But China is not shying away from its determination to increase its military profile. As Premier Li told the NPC, “We will comprehensively enhance the revolutionary nature of the Chinese armed forces, further modernize them and upgrade their performance, and continue to raise their deterrence and combat capabilities in the information age.” What China is seeking at present is to build up enough deterrence to make it costly for the US to come in support of its regional allies. At a broader level, China might want to treat the Asia-Pacific as its own strategic backyard with its own Monroe Doctrine, like the US in an earlier era for the Western Hemisphere. But as long as the US is committed to regarding the region as its primary focus (“pivot”, as Obama has said), with China equally determined to assert its primacy, there will always be potential for military conflict by miscalculation rather than design.

Though China is now an emerging superpower and might soon be on par with the United States, both countries would like to avoid an open conflict. In the case of China, it needs a decade or more of relative peace to foster social stability and equity at home. The pace of change since the eighties has been so fast that the Chinese society needs to strike a new balance. Just to take one example, mass migration of working people from rural areas to urban industrial centres is not only depopulating villages but destroying traditional culture and networks. And these rural workers, because of residency restrictions, cannot settle permanently in urban centres where they work. Suffice it to say that the pace of change in China is creating serious social and economic problems.

Over and above, there is this scourge of widespread corruption at the highest levels, threatening the credibility of the Communist Party. One of the revolutionary veterans’ daughter, 72-year old Hu Muying, put the enormity of the task in some perspective. She reportedly told a recent gathering of princelings (sons and daughters of party leaders and veterans) that “ [The corrupt] have gained lots of power” through relationship networks and have formed many “self-interested groups.” As a result, “It is all intertwined in many ways, touching one affects the whole network…”

The enormity of challenges at home might constrain external push for regional dominance at any cost. The only danger is that perceived sovereign interests (on all sides) tend to generate their own momentum. And before you know, it is already too late. The First World War, started hundred years ago, illustrates this.

   

China and Mao Zedong’s legend

S P SETH

It was a little surprising that Mao Zedong’s 120^th birthday, which fell on December 26^th, didn’t receive much international media attention. Even more surprising that it wasn’t celebrated with as much gusto and on a grand scale all over China. Which might explain the subdued international attention.  But what might be the explanation for less than grandiose celebrations in China? There had been reports earlier that the event was going to be a grand and gala affair all over the country, but it ended up being a much smaller but dignified affair with the country’s leaders paying homage to Mao in Beijing. President Xi Jinping sought to put it in perspective in his speech on the occasion at the Great Hall of People in Beijing when talking of Mao, as well as other revolutionary leaders, who led China’s communist revolution. He reportedly said, “Revolutionary leaders [particularly Mao whose birthday it was] are not gods, but human beings. [We] cannot worship them like gods or refuse to allow people to point out and correct their errors just because they are great; neither can we totally repudiate them and erase their historical feats just because they made mistakes…”

Ever since Bo Xilai, who ruled Chongqing and invoked Mao and his legend to   destabilize the political transition from President Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, the Communist Party of China (CPC) is wrestling with balancing Mao’s deified image with facts on the ground. Which is that while Mao was a great revolutionary leader, he was still a human being and prone to make mistakes like other human beings. But what those mistakes/frailties might have been remain a mystery because China’s post-Mao generations have no knowledge of it in the absence of any discussion or debate. Hence, Mao’s deification continues.

Bo Xilai sought to use Mao’s legend as the people’s man to promote his own political ambitions to make it to the top but lost, was purged and is now behind bars. President Xi Jinping has been watching his back from the likes of Bo who rallied around him, like China’s former security czar and Standing Committee member, Zhou Yongkang, who is being investigated for corruption which, in political terms, would mean anything and everything. But Xi Jinping himself was  toying with Mao’s image and legend after he became China’s top leader because it was a populist thing to do, judging by how Bo was seemingly doing a good job of it before he was undone by his former police chief and his wife, Gu Kailai, the latter now  serving a suspended death sentence for poisoning her British business associate, Neil Heywood.

However, now that Xi is feeling more secure and has decided to liberalize China’s economy, relatively speaking, by giving private sector a greater role, he feels the need to strike a certain balance between Mao’s popular image as a god-like figure who couldn’t and didn’t make mistakes, and a human being likely to err at times. But that is about as far as any Chinese leader will go in assessing Mao’s role. Even Deng Xiaoping, who like many other Chinese communist leaders suffered when Mao launched his Great Cultural Revolution (1966-76), and might be considered the father of modern China in terms of its economic transformation, went only as far as telling the Italian journalist, Oriana Fallaci, that Mao was 70 per cent good and his mistakes amounted to only 30 per cent.

 Since Mao died in 1976, his successors, starting with Deng Xiaoping, have made a complete about-turn from his theory and practice of ‘perpetual revolution’ to keep the revolution safe. Deng Xiaoping was for ‘learning from facts’ and not ideologically bound. And the facts dictated a more pragmatic model of making use of capitalist practices to make China economically strong. And that is what China has done since eighties with spectacular results, making it into the world’s second largest economy and an emerging superpower. And Deng was all in favor of people becoming rich, though he realized that it wouldn’t lead to an egalitarian society for a long time to come, if at all.

The consequent income gaps between rich and poor, urban and rural areas, among coastal regions and the interior as well as the periphery (border areas) have caused widespread social tensions, frustration and, even, unrest. Such unrest is further fueled with widespread corruption at all levels of the Party and the government by blurring the line between politics and economics. For instance, reporting by the New York Times and Bloomberg recently revealed that the families of the then prime minister Wen Jiabao, and the present President Xi Jinping, had made millions through political connections, though neither Wen nor Xi were said to be personally involved.

Coming back to Mao’s god-like image, there is a sense among many Chinese, with new generations having grown up with no knowledge or experience of convulsive events of that time, that when Mao was China’s ‘helmsman’ things were simple and everybody lived happily with guaranteed employment for life. But there were awful things happening. For instance, Mao’s Great Leap Forward, of the late-fifties and into early sixties, to leapfrog development process seriously contributed to China’s famine at the time that resulted in millions of deaths from starvation. And when Communist Party of China (CPC) sought to reverse Mao’s policies, he unleashed his Great Cultural Revolution (1966-76) against the party leadership to reassert his control. It was a lost decade with Red Guards, Mao’s storm troopers, turning on the party’s veteran political leaders who had fought for the revolution alongside Mao. Among those hounded to a miserable death was Liu Shaoqi, then president of China, among others. In other words, while Mao was a great leader who spearheaded the communist revolution and helped establish the People’s Republic of China, his record in the post-revolutionary period was, by and large, disappointing, to put it mildly.

And it was not until after Mao’s death in 1976 that China’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping, who had also been sent to purgatory during Cultural Revolution, was able to turn things around to build China into a successful and strong nation with emphasis on economic growth. And, as we can see, it has worked so far. But the new China also faced a new dilemma, which continues to dog it today. Which is:  how to reconcile the virtual abandonment of its communist ideology by following the capitalist mode of production while still insisting on maintaining the CPC’s monopoly power. This is where China’s post-Mao leadership finds itself in a difficult position, and where Mao’s legend (even with some caveat here and there) is useful. Because if Mao is delegitimized as erratic, his successors to the great CPC that brought about the revolution, might also stand delegitimized, especially in the midst of pervasive cynicism among many Chinese about the party leadership at all levels with reports of widespread corruption and so on.

Xi Jinping’s speech on Mao’s 120^th birthday, quoted earlier in the article, neatly encapsulates this contradiction and dilemma faced by the party.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au     

More trouble between China and Japan

S P SETH

Since I last wrote on this subject (Daily Times, November 20), the situation has further deteriorated requiring just a spark to ignite a bonfire. I am referring here to the sovereignty dispute between China and Japan over an outcrop of uninhabited rocks jutting out of the East China Sea, which Japan and China respectively call Senkaku and Diaoyu islands. Late last month, China declared an “air defence identification zone” covering a vast swathe of East China Sea over and around the disputed islands, including some in South Korea-claimed maritime zone. What it means in effect is that any foreign aircraft entering China’s zone will be required to notify Chinese authorities of their flight plans as well as maintain radio contact or else face unspecified “defensive emergency measures”.

With Japan adamant about its sovereignty over the disputed islands, China apparently decided to force the issue with its air defence zone. Whether or not this policy was clearly thought through with a follow up Plan B in the event that China’s directive was flouted, is not quite clear. Indeed, the US, Japan and South Korea all decided to ignore the Chinese identification zone by flying their military aircraft without communicating their flight plans, with one important difference though. Which is that the US authorities have advised their civilian airlines to comply with the Chinese directive but insisting that this does not mean the US acceptance of China’s position. Japan, though, has advised its airlines to ignore the Chinese directive. After appearing to fumble on its follow up response, Beijing is slowly refining its approach which is a combination of avoiding any military action while reinforcing their position with scrambling fighter jets and carrying out “routine patrols”. Beijing seems to be conveying the message that it has the capacity to enforce its security environment if it were threatened.

An important motive for China to declare its “air defence identification zone”, apart from putting Japan on notice, likely was to test the limits of the US resolve, in what Beijing considers essentially a bilateral territorial issue between China and Japan. The US has tried not to take a formal position on the sovereignty issue but has acknowledged Japan’s administrative control as well as stating unequivocally that the Senkaku islands are covered under the US-Japan security pact. In other words, the US will be bound militarily to protect Japan if these islands came under attack from China. During his recent Japan visit, later followed by trips to China and South Korea, the US Vice President, Joe Biden, was critical of China’s action as an effort to “unilaterally change the status quo”, saying that it had raised “the risk of accidents and miscalculation.” China, though, has reportedly called the new zone a fact of life that the world needed to accept.

 China’s action has also invited criticism from Australia as a close ally of both the US and Japan. And it invited a strong reaction from Beijing and a stern warning to Canberra to “correct” its mistake and avoid damaging their bilateral relationship. Australia appeared unfazed at the Chinese reaction, with its Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, arguing that Canberra has a stake in the region and therefore, opposes “action by any side [referring obviously to China] that we believe could add to the tensions or add to the risk of a miscalculation in disputed territorial zones in the region.” Indeed, Australia has taken a very strong stand despite some concern that it could seriously affect economic ties with its largest trading partner. But Prime Minister Tony Abbot pointed out “China trades with us because it is in China’s interest to trade with us.”

Abbot has been much more forthright in both emphasizing the centrality of Australia’s defence ties with the US and Japan as well as the dangers arising from China’s unilateral move to change the status quo. To quote Abbot, “We are a strong ally of the United States, we are a strong ally of Japan, we have a very strong view that international disputes should be settled peacefully and in accordance with the rule of law and where we think this is not happening, or it is not happening appropriately, we will speak our mind.” In China’s view, this trilateral US-Japan-Australia nexus amounts to containing China. There is a strong sense in China that a number of regional countries simply can’t stand its rise. As Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Peking University reportedly said, “Whatever China does, it always attracts critics. Let the critics go on, and we’ll do what we do.” He added, “China is going through its rise--- we just have too many jealous neighbours.” In other words, China is not going to worry too much about its neighbours and, for that matter, the United States.

There are two important factors guiding this national view. First is China’s strong sense of humiliation in the past by foreign powers, focusing most on Japan for its wartime crimes. What follows from this is that China must be strong and united and not show any weakness in pursuing its “core” interests, including in the East China Sea. China is, therefore, keen to prove to itself and to the world that it is not going to be trifled with any more, and must re-establish its pre-eminent ‘historical’ role in the region. The problem, though, is that China’s perception of its ‘historical’ role is coming into conflict with the concept and reality of today’s nationalism, which is at the core of international relations. Some of China’s neighbours, that might or might not have been tributaries at one time of China’s Middle Kingdom, as it was then known, are now independent and they contest China’s ‘historical facts’.

In the meantime, the US has been doing some tight rope walking. Its earlier call on China to “rescind” its decision on air flight zone doesn’t appear to have been repeated. On the question of civilian flights, as noted earlier, the US authorities have advised their airlines to notify their flight plans as required by the new Chinese directive, but without conceding China’s territorial position. During his recent visit to Japan, China and South Korea, Biden seemed keen to contain any escalation over over-lapping air defence zones of these three countries. While eschewing any counter-measures, military or otherwise, Biden was at pains to emphasize to its regional allies that the US’ Asia-Pacific “pivot” or rebalancing, as it is now called, remains solid.

In other words, the US nexus of security alliances with its Asian partners remains a corner store of its Asian policy. At the same time, Beijing has been told that US-China relationship is crucial for Asia-Pacific region. These signals might appear contradictory and they are, but the US believes that it can somehow pull through its policy of competing and contending with China while still creating sufficient common ground to maintain peace in the region. It is a herculean task, and if the experience of history is anything to go by, it is unlikely to work over a period of time. 

Note: This article first appeared in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au  

China-Japan heightened tensions

S P SETH

The spat between China and Japan over their maritime dispute is entering a dangerous phase with potential to ignite a military confrontation. China lodged an official protest with Japan the other day when its ships entered an area in the Pacific and disrupted Chinese live ammunition military exercises. According to Colonel Yang Yujun, a defence ministry spokesman, “Not only did this interfere with our normal exercises, but endangered the safety of our ships and aircraft, which could have led to a miscalculation or mishap or other sudden incident.” He called it “a highly dangerous provocation” leading China’s defence ministry to make “solemn representations to the Japanese side.”

Both sides are determined to maintain their ground, with Japan insisting that it wouldn’t allow China to change the maritime status quo by military means. To this end, Tokyo is beefing up its armed strength and marshaling together a regional front, as China also has contested maritime boundary disputes with some other regional countries. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reportedly said recently that, “There are concerns that China is attempting to change the status quo by force [in Asia], rather than by rule of law. But if China opts to take that path, then it won’t be able to emerge peacefully.” And he added, “So it shouldn’t take that path, and many nations expect Japan to strongly express that view. And they hope that as a result, China will take responsible action in the international community.”

Prime Minister Abe’s statement would seem to suggest two things. First, that Japan is anointing itself as the leader of a regional coalition to forewarn China against any military action to change the status quo. It is not clear if Abe has the authorization of the countries concerned to be speaking on their behalf, although he did have a series of summits with regional leaders recently. But, in the absence of any repudiation by countries contesting China’s maritime/territorial claims, it would seem that a political regional front, at the very least, is shaping up against China. Second, Tokyo has made it abundantly clear that it will refuse to budge from its position, even backing it up with military means if necessary. Even though the US is maintaining silence on saber rattling between China and Japan, it is clear that the two countries are allies with mutual obligations in a military conflict. In other words, the on-going brinkmanship has consequences that go beyond Japan-China bilateral relationship.

Ever since Shinzo Abe took over as Prime Minister last year, Japan has toughened its resolve to face up to China’s assertive claims of sovereignty over the Senkaku islands, which China calls Diaoyu. He recently said that “the security environment facing Japan is becoming ever more severe.” Japan is taking concrete measures to beef up its defences. It has raised defense expenditure, as has China over the last few years. It is scrambling jet fighters reacting to Chinese air and naval visits near disputed islands, and is threatening to shoot down Chinese drones if flying over Japanese air space. China says that it would be an act of war, and so it goes on. As part of its defence preparedness, Japan recently unveiled its biggest warship since WW11, which is more like an aircraft carrier. The ship reportedly has a flight deck nearly 250 metres long, and is designed to carry up to 14 helicopters. Its unveiling, in the context of growing tensions with China, gives it a special meaning.

Japan, at the same time, is keen to amend its pacifist constitution, which prohibits it from waging war. Although it has a defence force, it is supposed to be purely defensive. The government is slowly trying to get around Article 9 of the constitution that ties it down to a pacifist role. Indeed, Taro Aso, Japan’s deputy prime minister, recently suggested to follow the example of the Nazi Germany by simply scuttling the constitution, imposed on Japan by the victorious United States after WW11. That raised some hackles and the minister backed off, saying he was quoted out of context.

The deep hostility between China and Japan is rooted in contemporary history, starting with the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 with China roundly defeated and Japan emerging as a new modern power.  This came on top of China’s defeat and humiliation earlier in two Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and 1856-1860 at the hands of the British, with China exposed as a waning power and an easy prey. This encouraged Japan to make its own bid to gain territorial and commercial advantage from a declining China and hence the 1894-95 war. Japan subsequently went on to attack China during the thirties occupying Manchuria, and making further inroads during WW11 with reports of atrocities committed on Chinese people.

The bitter memories of those times are fresh in a rejuvenated and resurgent China, now keen to reclaim its ‘lost’ territories that once were supposedly part of its vast kingdom, including almost the entire Asia-Pacific region. While Japan is probably China’s most hated regional neighbor, Beijing’s maritime disputes with other regional countries are creating strategic convergence between Tokyo and some of the regional countries, like the Philippines and Vietnam, who had earlier hated Japan as much for its war crimes. China is not happy over it but attaches more importance to its national project of unifying its ‘lost’ kingdom from a bygone era. And this muddies the waters further, making it a regional issue rather than simply a bilateral China-Japan affair.

Japan is equally adamant about its territorial integrity. After its defeat in WW11 and occupation by the US, Japan was a lost country needing direction. It was also the time when the Cold War had started pitting the United States and its Western allies against the Soviet bloc. And Japan was coopted into the US bloc as an independent state but with its foreign and security policies under the US direction. With China part of the Soviet bloc in the early stages of the Cold War, Japan obviously was favoured in its, then dormant, territorial disputes. Since then these disputes have come into the open and China blames the United States for encouraging Japan on its course.

Some Chinese commentators often make the argument that the US has no business being in the Asia-Pacific region and fueling tensions. The counter argument, and indeed the US policy, is that the United States is as much an Asia-Pacific country with its Pacific coast and trade and strategic interests as China or any other regional country. In other words, the US “pivot” to Asia is a valid policy after more than a decade of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. That makes US alliances with Japan and other Asia-Pacific countries part of its strategic axis. Which makes the ongoing China-Japan brinkmanship all the more dangerous. Unless there is a diplomatic resolution of the contested maritime disputes in the region, it is like living near a volcano that might erupt any time. 

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au