China and the Asia-Pacific region

S P SETH

From China’s viewpoint, South China Sea is virtually its waterway. Beijing has claimed sovereignty over its island chains, and reinforced it with building military structures and facilities over old and newly dredged islands. Surely, the US is challenging this with occasional naval patrols to assert the right of freedom of navigation. This tends to outrage China.  Some regional countries contest China’s sovereignty, but they have been effectively silenced with its overwhelming military power, its dominant trade and investment role in regional economies and due to regional disunity.

Take the case of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has ceased to be effective as a regional voice because some of its member nations are beholden to China for economic and political reasons. The Philippines, which had its sovereignty claim vindicated by the international judicial process, simply decided not to pursue it, as President Rodrigo Duterte sought friendly ties with China for economic and political reasons. With other regional countries, like Vietnam, China’s military prowess seems to be prevailing.

Indonesia is also a sovereignty contestant with China in South China Sea. But it has generally sought to avoid public controversy, believing that its case is self-proven. But this is far from the case. Jakarta has lately sought to assert its position.  As Joe Cochrane of the New York Times recently reported from Jakarta, “Indonesia’s increasingly aggressive posture in the region—including a military build up in its nearby Natuna Islands and the planned deployment of naval warships—comes as other [regional] nations are being more accommodating to China’s broad territorial claims in the South China Sea.” Indeed: “The two countries had three maritime skirmishes in 2016, involving warning shots, including one in which Indonesian warships seized a Chinese fishing boat and its crew.”

China is not amused and has said that its nine-dash line that delineates its sovereignty claims in South China Sea does include “traditional fishing grounds” within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. How far Indonesia will go to press and pursue its claims would remain to be seen, as Jakarta is dependent on China for investments and trade, not to speak of China’s military power. But at a time when China is, more or less, becoming the accepted regional heavyweight, Indonesia’s public airing of its sovereignty dispute with China is intriguing.

China appears to be getting used to the idea of being the dominant regional power, though the US now and then has been challenging its claims “with naval maneuvers through waters claimed by Beijing.” Indonesia is now taking up the issue, which is not helpful to China’s claim to regional primacy. There is always the prospect of a regional alliance as a counterweight to China’s dominance. It already exists in a way as Japan and Australia are US allies. Even though these alliances are not primarily directed against China, they claim to maintain regional stability and security. With Japan, China has sovereignty dispute in East China Sea and there have been some close naval encounters between them. The US has indicated that it stands by Japan, though in what circumstances and what shape it might take is not quite clear.

Another regional country that often annoys China is Australia with its security alliance with the US. Even though Australia and China do not have any sovereignty dispute like some other regional countries, Canberra is concerned about Beijing’s regional forays into South China Sea as likely to upset existing regional order that has served well both in terms of regional security and trade among nations, including China. China’s control of South China Sea and island chains might upend the regional order and that, the argument goes, is in nobody’s interests, including China.

Australia is a strong proponent of this view and favors the continuance of a strong US presence and role, while China is inclined to view the US as an external power meddling in somebody else’ backyard. It is especially galling to Beijing that even though China is Australia’s largest trading partner and an important source of its economic prosperity, Canberra is still refusing to accept what China believes is the new order of things.

Even something like press reports about the possible appointment of Admiral Harry Harris as US ambassador to Australia, has brought a tough response from Beijing. Admiral Harris, as commander of the US Pacific Fleet, according to China’s The Global Times newspaper, is “the most prejudiced and Cold War-minded chief of all US pacific commanders since WW11.” Admiral Harris has publicly spoken against China’s “increasing assertiveness” in the South China Sea, and urged freedom of navigation patrols by US naval vessels to challenge China’ territorial claims. Australia had declined invitation to join the US patrols. Beijing would fear that Admiral Harris as US ambassador might seek to pull Australia into line on this and further reinforce the security alliance between the two countries.

In any case, Australia is too much a part of the US alliance system whether or not it formally participates in freedom of navigation patrols.  Every time Australia’s prime minister or foreign minister is critical of China, Beijing feels compelled to respond angrily. For instance, when Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull recently called upon China to cut off its oil supplies to North Korea to rein in its nuclear program, The Global Times devoted an entire editorial to Turnbull’s “indiscreet” and “absurd” comments, calling Australia a “second class citizen of the West.”

Even though China acts like it is the dominant regional power but such intemperate comments seem to suggest that it is not quite sure if it is a given thing. And with Korean peninsula as the new hot flashpoint, there are all sorts of uncertainties. But that is another story.