China and Afghanistan

S P SETH

Afghanistan has historically proved to be the graveyard of foreign powers trying to interfere in the country to advance their own interests. During the 19^th century’s two Afghan wars, the British found it to their cost that it was not possible to subdue Afghanistan. In the nineties, Moscow’s military intervention contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. And starting in the new century, the US and its allies have failed disastrously to pacify the country and create a self-governing political architecture. Now China is reportedly envisaging an activist role to mediate/reconcile the Taliban and the Afghan government in the wake of substantial US withdrawal. Of course, China’s role, if pursued seriously, is different because, as of now, there is no suggestion of a military component in it. It would for the most part be political, leading to economic benefits. The problem, though, is that in Afghanistan any substantive initiative of any sort leads incrementally to military involvement of one kind or the other. But that would be in the future, if it were to happen.

This is how China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi broached the subject during a recent visit to Pakistan. He said, “We will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including the Taliban.” And he added, “China is ready to play its constructive role and will provide necessary facilitation at any time if it is required by various parties in Afghanistan.” Dwelling on Pakistan’s role, Wang said, “I have got a strong sense that Pakistan takes very seriously the issue of Afghanistan and it has a strong will to take a constructive part in the resolution of this matter.”

The Chinese foreign minister’s announcement in Pakistan would suggest a serious intent to facilitate a resolution of Afghanistan’s intractable problem. And in this way Beijing was indicating its special interest reflecting that, in some ways, it regarded the region as part of its sphere of influence. At the same time, Wang seemed to suggest that China was on the same page as Islamabad to resolve the issue.

China obviously has an advantage over other disastrous foreign adventures in Afghanistan. First, as noted, there is no suggestion of a military component in its proposed initiative. Second, China has excellent relations with Pakistan that regards Afghanistan as its strategic space. Therefore, Pakistan’s own strategic rationale against India might dovetail into the two countries’ shared objectives. Which should propel Pakistan to lean on Taliban to be coopted into Beijing’s grand design.

In the past, China has generally avoided such a role in the affairs of other countries. Its inclination to be so involved in Afghanistan would, therefore, be highly unusual. And there have to be some potent reasons for it, especially when it doesn’t look like that all the concerned parties in the Afghan scenario have sought China’s role, though the Afghan government appears to have done it. By handing over some of the Uighur militants and separatists from China’s western province of Xinjiang, Kabul has gone out of the way to show its goodwill in a matter that is of great concern to China. Which is the persistence of Uighur Muslim insurgency and separatism plaguing Xinjiang. One of the Afghan security officials involved in the transfer to Chinese authorities of the Uighur prisoners reportedly said that, “We offered our hand in cooperation with China and in return we asked them to pressure Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban or at least bring them to the negotiating table.”

From the Afghan government’s viewpoint, it would make sense to have China on their side now that the US and its allies have substantially wound down their role in Afghanistan, leaving Kabul to deal with the Taliban largely on its own politically and militarily. The Taliban are a potent force as evidenced almost all through the long US-led military operations, and their threat to the Afghan government is becoming even more pronounced with the audacity and frequency of their operations. Therefore, unless the Taliban are integrated as part of a new Afghan political architecture, the country is unlikely to see peace and normalcy. That is where China’s possible mediation role becomes important. And in the process it might also confer some legitimacy on the Ashraf Ghani government.

Chinese foreign minister Wang, in his statement during his Pakistan visit, seemed to put the Afghan government in the centre when he said that, “We will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including the Taliban.” Of course, Pakistan’s central role in the process is also acknowledged with its “strong will to take a constructive part in the resolution of this matter.”  And in advancing this process, China seems to have the support of the United States.  According to a senior US state department official, “The US and China have agreed to work together to support Afghanistan’s government of national unity, security forces and economic development to ensure that Afghanistan can never be used as a safe haven for terrorists.” At the same time, by denying training and refuge to Muslim Uighur insurgents from China’s western border province of Xinjiang, Afghanistan will be of great help in its anti-insurgency operations in that province.

Political stability in Afghanistan is also very important as China interests itself in exploring and recovering its mineral resources. One can, therefore, see why China would like to play a more active role to stabilize Afghanistan in the wake of US withdrawal. But will the Taliban welcome this role, especially when it might legitimize the present political order and the Ghani government? It would seem unlikely but with Pakistan’s help, Beijing might be able to make a beginning. It is assuming that Pakistan has a determining influence on the Taliban leadership, which hasn’t always been the case.

China might soon find out that Afghanistan is a beehive of all sorts of contending and clashing interests. For instance, how will China bring about reconciliation among the mosaic of diverse ethnic groups that inhabit Afghanistan from one part of the country to the other? As Patrick Cockburn pointed out in an article in the London Review of Books a while ago, “The Pashtun are the largest community in Afghanistan, but at 42 per cent of the population they aren’t quite a majority.” The second largest ethnic group at 27 per cent are Tajiks. And then there are Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimak, Turkmens and Baloch. And they are not easy to coalesce together to constitute an Afghan nation of shared identity.

While Pakistan might be able to lean on Taliban, it doesn’t have much sway with other ethnic groups. Indeed, Pakistan’s close ties with Taliban might be a hindrance to a common Afghan national identity. This is not all. There are also regional powers like India and Iran that have their own interests and spheres, and they might not take kindly to a shared China-Pakistan project aimed at excluding them. One can see the pitfalls ahead for China, as with other powers before them. And if they succeed in reconciling Afghanistan’s fractured ethnic and political landscape, it will be the first in the country’s history. And they will reap enormous strategic and economic benefits.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@ yahoo.com.au