China’s race to become superpower

By S.P.SETH

China is in a hurry to become the world’s superpower. It is now the world’s second largest economy and might overtake the US in a decade or two. It will, however, still lag behind the US in terms of per capita GDP for a long while yet. In other words, many of its people will still struggle to make a decent living.

China is now also a major military power, with enough deterrence to discourage any threat to its national security. But it still finds its ambition to do what it likes constrained for a number of reasons.

The main obstacle being that the US is not facilitating its unilateral claims over South China Sea and its island chains. Washington is also not terribly keen on conceding Asia-Pacific region as China’s strategic space.

Beijing realizes that without US understanding, if not support, of its “core” interests and strategic concerns, China will feel thwarted in its primacy over the region. Not surprisingly then, China’s vice-president and leader-in-waiting, Xi Jinping, said in Beijing, just before his US visit, that he hoped “the US can view China’s strategic intentions… in a sensible and objective way…”

And he emphasized that: “Ultimate caution should be given to major and sensitive issues that concern each country’s core interests to avoid any distraction and setbacks in China-US relations.” Apparently, he didn’t succeed in this respect during his recent US visit.

Beijing is angry that the US is increasing its military muscle in the region. Reacting to President Obama’s recent announcement that the US would be prioritizing Asia-Pacific as part of its new strategic direction, Xinhua warned that, “If the US indiscreetly applies militarism in the region, it will be like a bull in a china shop [literally and figuratively], and endanger peace instead of enhancing regional stability.”

Another problem is that China’s neighbors, though duly impressed with its growing power, are not willing to give up their core interests. For instance, China’s sovereignty claims over regional waters and island chains are strongly contested by several South East countries, as well as Japan in the East China Sea.

And some of these neighbors have close strategic ties with the United States. Australia, for instance, feels that China’s growing power will destabilize the region, thus posing a security threat.

There are two ways for China to deal with these constraints. The first is to persuade the US to let China sort out its problems with its neighbors, without Washington’s overt or covert backing for them. If this were to happen, Beijing might not have much problem “persuading” its neighbors to see things China’s way.

However, this is unlikely. Therefore, there is no way for China to test this hypothesis since the US is not vacating the region for China’s power games.

The second way is to tell its neighbors, in no uncertain terms, that contesting China’s sovereignty claims might mean exclusion from beneficial economic relations with China. Their strategic tilt against China, as part of closer ties and/or security alliance with the US might, therefore, cost them dearly.

Australia has clearly received this message. In a recent editorial, the Sydney Morning Herald wrote: “Cui Liru, the head of the Institute of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, warned that the economic relationship could not mask the strategic divide with China.”

It opined, “The underlying message was that Australia would have to catch up with the reality of growing Chinese power.”

No doubt, similar messages are being conveyed overtly and covertly to other regional countries that are cozying up to the United States.

Will it work? It is hard to say. But so far it is having the opposite effect. China’s flexing of muscles lately has had the effect of pushing some of these countries into a tighter US embrace, as well as creating bilateral and regional linkages.

Xi Jinping’s visit was intended to soften China’s image regarding its regional ambitions. But the differences with the US remain, because it refuses to acknowledge China’s privileged position in the Pacific.

For instance, on Taiwan, the US is continuing to sell defensive weapons despite China’s insistent pressure against it.

And that applies to the Korean peninsula too, with the US committed to its alliance with South Korea.

In a sense, China wants to enforce its own Monroe doctrine in the Pacific area.

If the US were to concede China’s sphere of influence in the region, China’s neighbors would feel vulnerable.

Obviously this is not going to happen, with all signs pointing to the US determination to become more active in the Asia-Pacific region.

According to Aaron L. Friedberg, in his book A Contest for Supremacy… , China’s goal is “to displace the United States as the dominant player in East Asia, and perhaps to extrude it from the region altogether.”

As for any common ground on international issues, the currently hot issues of Iran and Syria are a matter of contention. While supportive of nuclear non-proliferation, China is not keen on becoming part of the US-sponsored strict regime of comprehensive economic sanctions.

On Syria, China, along with Russia, has vetoed the UN Security Council resolution to condemn the regime’s bloodbath of its own people.

Another issue clouding their relationship is North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. There is some hope that Pyongyang might put a moratorium on its nuclear program in exchange for US food aid.

China has been playing a helpful role with its Beijing-sponsored on–off six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue but has resisted putting decisive pressure on its North Korean ally.

At the global level, China lacks commensurate clout in the existing international order designed and shaped, after WW11, by the United States and its western allies.

However, over the last few years, due to global financial crisis, the United States is starting to appear a bit wobbly giving China, as its major creditor, a lift in its global ranking.

At the same time, Europe is limping with the euro zone racked with debts.

With US and Europe in economic difficulties, China will seek to change international economic institutions to its advantage, with its financial power.

But it is still a long way to go for China.

For instance, even with all US’ economic problems, the US dollar still remains the world’s reserve currency. And when the economic news is bad, there is still a rush on US dollar as a dependable asset.

Even China is heavily invested in US bonds and treasury notes.

Therefore, it is too early to say that China will replace the US as the world’s superpower.

And considering the rising social unrest and other domestic problems, including its slowing economy, it might take a long time for China, if at all, to become the world’s top dog.